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Despite its prominence and popularity, television sport remains an under-
researched area in media studies and is a subject that lacks a ready-made 
theoretical context. Consequently, a political economy approach - including 
ideas about value, commodification, transformations, power-relationships 
and the emergence of a profit-motivated sport-media-corporate axis – is 
used to answer 3 primary questions: 
 
1) Whilst sports and broadcasting systems in the US and UK started 
from diametrically opposed positions post-World War II, why have 
the similarities between them, including a more overtly consumer-
oriented approach in the UK, become the most noticeable features?  
 
2) How do three often unseen upstream pre-production processes – 
technology, broadcasting rights and regulation - increasingly 
influence what television sport looks and sounds like, where it can be 
seen and who can see it?  
 
3) How are upstream pre-production processes manifest downstream 
on the supply side in terms of (a) broadcasters (including who 
provides sports media) and (b) independent sports television 
production, including the day-to-day work of sports producers and 
directors?   
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Two critical perspectives are added: 1) the central role of sports 
federations, ranging from the “peculiar economics of sport” (Neale, 1964) 
through to federation run host broadcast operations for major events; and, 
2) a relevant micro-level analysis of downstream supply-side activities 
following the trickle down effect of significant upstream transformations. 
This new perspective complements the big picture often favoured by 
political economists. It is argued that important transformations in 
technology, broadcasting rights and regulation have radically changed the 
television sport landscape in the UK since 1992. How these factors have 
evolved goes a long way to explain (a) what sport we see on television, (b) 
where we can see it and (c) what the final output looks and sounds like. The 
battle to control broadcasting rights and subsequent television output is set 
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My first encounter with professional sport was as a four year old. Standing 
outside East End Park, Dunfermline, the noise and excitement near the end 
of a match had a magnetic attraction - what was this? I wasn’t sure, but I 
was hooked. In May 1967, local streets emptied as people turned to their 
televisions to see Celtic become the first British team to win the European 
Cup. A year later came the 1968 Mexico Olympics. The fuzzy black and 
white satellite pictures and the crackling telephone-line quality of 
commentary from David Coleman on the BBC’s breakfast-time television 
presentation was hypnotic; watching television before school was unheard 
of, it even felt a little bit revolutionary. The effervescent 1970 World Cup 
Finals, when Pele’s Brazil swept aside Italy 4-1 in the blazing sun of the 
Azteca Stadium, was the first time I saw colour television - the shimmering 
gold of Brazil and the brilliant azure blue of Italy are images that still come 
easily to mind. Back then, any idea that I would work as an executive 
producer in television sport in the UK and USA would have sounded far-
fetched. But it happened. As a frontline participant-observer I have 
experienced a radical transformation in how television sports programmes 
are made, who programmes are made for and where they can be seen. 
From an all time low point in the 1980s, I saw football rise again to become 
part of a global sports business that, in 2010, was estimated to be worth 
US$122 billion (Evens, Iosifidis and Smith 2013:19). The goalposts have 
moved; transformations on this scale and magnitude are not accidental. 
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For Boyle and Haynes (2000:45) sport and television were “two great 
cultural forms which simply proved to be irresistible to each other”. 
Mediated sport has offered us a view of history lived and shared; it can also 
provide an engaging dialogue, a sense of identity and enhanced cultural 
citizenship. Today, for most people, most of the time, watching sport means 
switching on the television rather than attending an event. Summer 2012 
marked a high point in the sheer amount of television sport broadcast in the 
UK, including the Euro 2012 football tournament, Wimbledon tennis, 
Bradley Wiggins’ success at the Tour de France, the London Olympics and 
the Paralympics. But, for all its prominence, television sport is a subject 
where academic research is limited. Important contributions to 
understanding have been made by, amongst others, Barnett (1990), 
Whannel (1992), Tunstall (1993) and Boyle and Haynes (2000,2004). More 
recently, the marketisation of broadcasting, the sport-media-business 
complex, and the roles of sports broadcasting rights and regulation have 
attracted the insight of political economists from Nauright and Schimmel 
(2005) through to Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013). Despite these valuable 
contributions large gaps in understanding can still be found.  
 
Research challenges 
Access presents a major challenge for researchers approaching television 
sport. Acute commercial sensitivity means information about sports 
broadcasting rights is heavily guarded. The growing technical complexity of 
major event coverage can provide another barrier, as can workflows that 
bear very little resemblance to those of only a few years ago - the fast 
moving pace of change tests analysis. In the UK television sport is a 
relatively small sector, so knowing people is crucially important. Outsiders 
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can be treated with caution and working cultures this tightly padlocked can 
be hard to pick open. As the reasons not to bother mount then it is hardly a 
surprise that researchers often opt to consider the big picture, the battles 
for control of broadcasting rights and the strategies used to gain market 
dominance. As a result what is missing is a contemporary account of how 
significant pre-production factors interact and have shaped transformations 
in television sport in the UK, including many largely unseen but important 
outcomes in the downstream production-side. The consequences of these 
transformations are significant, yet they remain largely unexamined. 
 
Research questions 
On face value transformations in television sport – including dramatic 
increases in the volume of sports content, the remarkable advances in 
coverage made possible by digital technology; that there are now many 
more channels broadcasting sport in the UK, plus new means of delivering 
content for consumption via computer, tablet and mobile phone – might 
have provided a foundation for a creative heyday for sports producers and 
directors. However, a very different scenario appears to be playing out. 
Causes for concern include how intellectual property rights have been used 
to “inhibit innovation and creativity” (Haynes, 2005:10) and what Drahos 
and Braithwaite (2002:4) call the “quiet accretion of restrictions”.  
 
The primary research questions are: 
1) Whilst sports and broadcasting systems in the US and UK started 
from diametrically opposed positions post-World War II, why have 
the similarities between them, including the adoption of a more 
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overtly consumer-oriented approach in the UK, become the most 
noticeable features?  
 
2) How do largely unseen upstream pre-production processes – 
technology, economics (specifically sports broadcasting rights, but 
also the economics of sports organisations and media providers) and 
politics (as applied via competition law and media regulation) - 
increasingly influence what television sport looks and sounds like, 
where it can be seen and who can see it?  
 
3) How do these upstream pre-production processes impact 
downstream on (a) broadcasters (including who now provides sports 
media) and (b) independent sports television production, including 
the day-to-day work of sports producers and directors?   
 
Research overview 
It is argued that transformations in television sports production in the past 
two decades have been driven by a combination of increasingly influential 
upstream forces including technology, sports broadcasting rights and 
regulation. 
 
As leagues and federations have extended their direct control of coverage 
and output we can see (a) an increasingly prescriptive approach to 
television sports production including (b) additional conditions written into 
sports broadcasting rights as they are issued and (c) since around 2005, 
how leagues and federations now produce global television coverage for 
major events, including the Olympics and World Cup Finals, with 
Milne | June 2014 
 
13 
broadcasters providing localised presentation in their own markets. 
Separately, we see the Premier League producing and distributing its own 
international television channel.  
 
A political economy perspective is used to interpret these transformations 
and to track the shifting relationships (and behaviours) that increasingly 
define televised sport in the UK. Haynes (2005:68) points out that the 
ownership of key sports rights has become “the flagship and distinguishing 
factor of a television station’s brand identity, and are lost at their peril.” The 
research updates understanding by examining the critical and often 
overlooked interplay of technology, broadcasting rights and 
competition/regulation and how these factors exert a growing influence on 
what is subsequently produced. Viewing the virtually unrestricted 
financialisation and commodification of sport and the marketisation of 
broadcasting the research remains aware of (a) how economic markets 
work, (b) how market forces affect economic outcomes and (c) how 
powerful actors attempt to manipulate market forces to advance their 
private interest (Gilpin, 2001:40).  
 
Research structure and perspective 
The research is set out in three parts. Part one provides relevant 
background, with an introductory chapter including methodology. Chapter 2 
provides the literature review and further context, whilst chapter 3 
addresses a surprising gap in the literature by adding a historical 
comparison of the development of televised sport in the UK and USA 
between 1945-1995. 
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Part two focuses on 3 increasingly influential pre-production factors that 
now shape television sport, including technology (chapter 4), sports 
broadcasting rights (chapter 5) and regulation (chapter 6).  
     
Part three offers a micro-level analysis of the challenges and trends faced 
by broadcasters (chapter 7) and in independent sports television production 
(chapter 8). Chapter 9 provides a conclusion for the research. 
 
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism Harvey (2005) talks about “accumulation 
through dispossession” (2005:159) and how neoliberalisation has meant the 
“financialisation of everything” (2005:33), as sport has shed many of its 
cultural and social dimensions in favour of a climate where economic value 
reigns supreme then adopting a political economy view feels appropriate. 
Who gets what, when and how are questions that are seldom asked by 
economists. However, political economy theory is at its best when charting 
major currents in economics, politics and technology therefore it tends to 
offer a wide-angle view. This research zooms in to provide a more closely 
focussed view of how these key transformations work and how they are 
subsequently manifested in broadcasters’ activities and in the day-to-day 
work of sports producers and directors.  
 
Original contribution to knowledge 
In the 1990s I was based in the US as producer of NBA coverage on 
Channel 4. Sometime later I read a short analysis of this production by 
Boyle and Haynes (2000:98). Their views were interesting but, ultimately, 
felt disconnected from my experience of devising and delivering this 
content. Crucially, this research will provide a connection to work place 
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practice through participant observation, day-to-day field notes and 
contributor interviews with those closely involved in television sport. In 
some ways the research can be regarded as complementary to a wider 
political economy view, providing a micro-level view of the supply side, a 
terrain too often viewed from a distance.  
 
In part one, a chronological review of the opposing television-sport systems 
that were adopted in the United States and the UK post-World War II and 
their subsequent development fills a surprising gap in the literature.  How 
sport and television in the UK, after a prolonged period of resistance, came 
not only to adopt more consumer-oriented approaches seen in the US but, 
in some instances, to become even more commercial in outlook says a lot 
about the state of play today. Whilst Barnett (1990) cautions against such 
comparisons the extent to which sport and television have continued to 
develop in the 21st Century, including the predominance of live football 
coverage, suggests such a review would be useful. Also missing is a 
consideration of league and federation activity, from the “peculiar 
economics” of sport (Neale, 1964) through to the latest stages of 
commodification and downstream broadcasting activities.  
 
Moving to part two; an analysis of how technology, economics 
(broadcasting rights) and politics (competition and regulation) increasingly 
shape what television sports looks and sounds like, where sport can be seen 
and who can see coverage provides an updated view. Whilst Haynes (2005) 
and Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013) have offered a valuable insight into 
the role of broadcasting rights, this research explores the ways technology, 
broadcasting rights and regulation are closely interconnected and, together, 
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exert a significant influence on television sport. I am not aware of any 
similar approach.  
 
How influential decisions have migrated upstream, away from broadcasters 
towards leagues and federations, extends the work of Todreas (1999), 
Gratton and Solberg (2007) and Doyle (2002) as the various power-
relationships and battles for control in the television sport production chain 
are updated. In terms of case studies, new examples from Premier League 
Productions and the UEFA Champions League are provided. 
Insight on a micro level is offered in part three, as the trickle-down effect of 
wider transformations are identified. Further contributions include the 
challenges now faced by broadcasters, for example (a) the rise of 
federation-based coverage of major sports events and (b) the subsequent 
importance of presentation in sports television – both discussions cover new 
ground. The research then adds the perspective of independent production 
sports companies as well as individual producers and directors as they 
adjust during this period of unprecedented transformation. The research is 
foregrounded by frontline experience throughout. 
 
Research context  
As a participant observer I have been immersed in television sports on a 
daily basis since the early 1980s. The research draws on my industry 
connections and the personal trust I have established working as an 
executive producer. I started my professional career at the BBC and, since 
then, have held senior positions at several independent production 
companies including Cheerleader Productions, Chrysalis Television and IMG 
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Sports Media. I have also been a consultant at several other firms, including 
Endemol Sport.  
 
In addition to 40 high-profile international sports productions – from the 
NFL, NBA, Football Italia, Rugby Union, Sumo, Formula 1 and World Rally 
Championships - I have written numerous tender responses on behalf of 
independent production companies for both broadcasters and federations. 
Looking at new channels, I have been involved with Setanta Sports News, 
Trace Sports and BT Sport. Adding consultancy work carried out for the 
Bundesliga, the IOC and FIFA during 2012 means many of these projects 
have been relevant and have helped inform my approach. My curiosity 
about the transformation of television sport was first triggered working 
closely with rights-holding federations in the US, UK and Japan, along with 
influential research by Barnett (1990) and Whannel (1992).  
 
A primary objective is to offer an interpretation of how wider forces 
manifest themselves in the day-to-day work of media providers and sports 
producers. The research evidence has been collated from a variety of 
sources including (a) my role as a participant observer, with access to 
commercially sensitive activities over a prolonged period, (b) from daily 
personal encounters, including numerous field notes, alongside (c) new 
fieldwork comprising selected contributor interviews and (d) a larger 
number of short-form interviews many of which were carried out following 
specific work place situations. There were approximately 50 contributors 
from broadcasters, federations and independent production companies. The 
contributors were more experienced and many had senior positions. 
Throughout I was conscious of accessing people and places where entrance 
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raised some questions about critical perspective, in other words in trying to 
adopt a friendly but neutral position there is a danger of being disowned by 
both sides. Accessing busy professionals to discuss potentially sensitive 
business practices can be problematic and not all the contributors 
approached chose to take part, at least in a longer interview. As the 
research progressed I found that a combination of day-to-day field notes 
and shorter, but more specific, questioning carried out in the context of 
work activities provided the best results, consequently the methodology was 
adapted as the research progressed, particularly for the micro-level shop 
floor view provided in part three. I am aware that my own career history, 
professional contacts and the level of trust I have gained were extremely 
useful tools not normally available to media researchers. On occasions 
where my own experience as an observer-participant is a factor, then this is 
clearly marked. Although I have used examples from my own experience, 
the research is not about my work but is about (a) how many important 
aspects of television sport have been transformed and (b) the sheer scale of 
these transformations. Whilst the final argument presented benefits from 
extensive access and hands-on television sports production experience, I 
hope the evidence is separated from any emotional pull and guards against 
easy assumptions and short-handedness. Offering anonymity was a critical 
component in attracting expert contributors, as was the assurance that no 
commercial confidence would be breached. Wherever I was working my 
research interest was made known to my employers. Although no issues 
were ever raised it was assumed that confidentiality would be observed, 
particularly for projects covered by non-disclosure agreements. All 
contributors were approached in advance, the research terrain was 
explained to them and contacts to my supervisor provided should any 
Milne | June 2014 
 
19 
questions arise. The interviews were carried out after a cooling off period 
was allowed. I am not aware of any material used that compromises 
contributors or that is inappropriate from an ethical perspective. 
 
Methodology overview  
The research moves from a wide-angle view in part one to a detailed 
analysis presented in part two. Part three zooms in to provide a micro-level 
view of how transformations are manifest in day-to-day workplace 
practices.  
 
Part one methodology  
Part one is mainly constructed from secondary research into the literature, 
theory and history. Where there is a scarcity of literature, for example in 
the most recent broadcasting legislation and/or regulation, then document 
analysis is used, including: 
 
Legislation. Key changes to broadcasting regulations (including UK, 
European and US legislation), DCMS, Ofcom (ITC) and European 
Commission publications. Material can be accessed online via the relevant 
regulator website. There are also good summaries and discussions in 
national newspaper archives held online. 
 
Industry Reports and Trade Journals. Industry reports from media and sport 
were useful sources, including independent reviews (e.g. the Annual Review 
of Football Finance by Deloitte & Touche, and Independent European Sport 
Review and research papers including the Birbeck Football Governance 
Research Centre). These reports offer insight into economic criteria, 
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copyright issues and, of course, media policy. Broadcaster annual reports 
and policy statements, including from Ofcom, were useful. As a 
contemporary and fast-moving subject, so specialist periodicals - including 
political economy debate, sports business, legal and marketing reports like 
TV Sport Markets, Sports Business reports - were useful sources.  
 
Part two methodology   
Part two combines secondary research with primary research, including 
daily field notes taken as a participant observer, semi-formal contributor 
interviews plus my own professional encounters and experience.  
 
Chapter 4, technology, is an area where producers and directors are often 
most comfortable and spoke freely. Most people were quite open about the 
technical aspects of coverage and delivery; they often talked like proud 
parents of plans and productions that had been successful. Discussion of 
digital workflows, new developments in graphics or media servers followed 
from a comprehensive consultancy document I wrote for the Bundesliga in 
2012, with detailed benchmarking against other federation-based output 
including the Premier League. To illustrate key points I have provided an 
interpretation of relevant work practices.   
 
Chapter 5, broadcasting rights, required more of a work around as 
questions about how rights are constructed and valued are subject to acute 
commercial sensitivity. Research sources include (a) published Business 
Reports, including media providers and sports federations, (b) copyright 
law, including case reviews in professional journals and (c) regulation and 
competition authorities. I have added field notes and contributor testimony 
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when these are free from non-disclosure agreements. Issues surrounding 
broadcasting rights include an examination of how rights are defined and 
how media providers respond to auctions. Of course, some rights issues can 
also be backtracked from the point of production, so the evidence of 
producers and senior executives was helpful. 
 
Chapter 6, regulation and competition, continued the methodology used in 
chapter 5 but references additional sources such as formal reports, findings 
and legislation. As noted, there has been some useful new literature on this 
subject including Smith (2009) and Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013). The 
chapter also considers a range of regulations that directly impact on sports 
production but that are seldom discussed, including regional production 
quotas and the impact of Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE).  
 
Part three methodology 
Part three considers the challenges faced by broadcasters as a consequence 
of increasingly influential pre-production factors. Testimony from senior 
managers, producers and directors was important. However, as noted, day-
to-day field notes and shorter more subject-specific interviews tended to 
yield more relevant results than general interviews. Annual reports from 
broadcasters and independent production companies have also been 
referenced, as are specific industry reports. The fieldwork considered 
testimony up to the end of 2013, including experience from the 2012 EURO 
Championships, the 2012 London Olympic Games and Paralympics Games, 
The Premier League Channel, UEFA Champion’s League, Champion’s League 
Week and FIFA Futbol Mundial.  
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As with part two, the new fieldwork comprises semi-formal interviews 
conducted with a range of contributors. A personal touch provided the most 
viable approach therefore semi-structured interviews in a free format were 
preferred. The interview style can be described as conversations with a 
purpose, following Lindlof (1995). According to Dilman (1978), questions 
can be grouped under four headings:  
1) Behaviour, what do people do. 
2) Beliefs, what do people believe to be the case. 
3) Attitudes, what people would prefer to be the case. 
4) Attributes, background information, such as age and experience.  
 
The interviews were held in the contributors’ place of work, but Skype was 
also used occasionally at the contributor’s request. Importantly all 
contributors were provided with anonymity due to the sensitivity of some 
issues discussed. Contributors received an assurance that all subsequent 
media (recordings and transcripts) were restricted to password accessible 
hard-drives that were not connected to third party networks. As noted 
anonymity was a critical condition to ensure trust and provide as candid a 
response as was practical. Contributors included broadcasters, managers 
from leagues and federations and a large number of producers, including 
many in senior positions. Across approximately 50 contributions the most 
experienced and influential people were sought. Anxiety was more 
noticeable when discussing the roles of federations rather than immediate 
employers. On occasion a lack of confidence in discussing wider issues was 
apparent. The research allowed contributors to identify the factors that they 
thought had the most impact. For example, talking with producers 
highlights the importance of technology in their workflows including media 
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servers as an integral part of a fully digital workflow revolutionising outside 
broadcast work and host broadcast operations. Or, recognising how much 
their role has changed raised the topic of increasing levels of supervision, 
including new roles such as production management, as producers’ 
activities have moved from general management to more focussed creative 
and editorial roles.  
 
In the literature, Barnett (1990), Whannel (1992) and Tunstall (1993) all 
used broadly similar methodology; a primary difference is the need, today, 
for personal confidentiality. However, the experience of those involved in 
making the final sports programmes we see adds an important supply side 
perspective to the larger battle for control of sports broadcasting. 
Considering the literature, Boyle and Haynes (2000:38) suggest “a history 
of sport is often presented as a history of televising sport”, to what extent 
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This chapter includes the literature review and a discussion of arguments 
relevant when using political economy to interpret television sports, 
particularly the under-reviewed production supply side. The chapter also 
provides contextual and conceptual parameters for the research including, 
in particular, the increase in critical pre-production factors prior to the 
production of programme output. The chapter deals with transformations in 
economics and politics, broadcasting policy and technological 
transformations, before considering media and sports economics followed 
by regulation and competition. 
 
2.1 Literature review  
 
Media studies and televised sport  
In UK-oriented media studies, literature on televised sport prior to the 
1980s is rather limited. However, by the early 1990s a more systematic 
approach becomes evident whilst, in the new millennium, a more focussed 
political economy interpretation took shape.   
 
Transformation 
Towards the end of Sport and the British, Holt (1989) discusses sport on 
television, particularly the role of television as a “non-neutral provider of 
images or a mere facilitator”. For Holt television has “increasingly 
determined the manner in which high-performance sport is played and 
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presented to the public”, (1989:317); the idea of transformation is 
introduced to media-sport research.  
 
In their follow up study Holt and Mason (2000) reflect a growing interest in 
the symbiotic relationship between sport and television. Televised sport was 
becoming more real than the event itself, for example Wimbledon was a 
television event in itself (2000:100). Surveying commercial developments 
that link sport and television, Holt and Mason concluded that sport could no 
longer be “confined by time and space” and that: “Spectator sport and the 
media have fused together. The one is inconceivable without the other.” 
(2000:120).   
 
Research into the transformation of sport via television and the subsequent 
cultural implications gathered pace from the late 1980s as Goldlust (1987), 
Whannel (1992), Wenner (1992) and Rowe (1995) all added to the debate. 
It is generally agreed that Whannel’s Fields in Vision (1992) represents a 
landmark study.  
 
Whannel (1992) argues for a schematic split between (a) textual/semiotic 
and (b) socio-economic practices and the political organisation of the media. 
So, in addition to political economy Whannel adds textual analysis and 
ideology, as he examines both the political and economic structures of the 
media-sport relationship as well as its mediated representations. However 
since Whannel’s work was published in 1992 there has been a remarkable 
increase in the volume of televised sport. This raises difficult questions for 
textual studies, particularly the selection of a representative text to analyse 
– by 2012 BSkyB was providing 35,000 hours of programming per year 
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across four channels (Evens, Iosifidis and Smith, 2013:111), so what text is 
selected and why becomes challenging. Consequently, textual studies are 
not pursued in this research. However, insights into the commodification of 
popular culture by capital are certainly relevant. For Whannel (1992) the 
relationship between sport, television and sponsorship has (a) reshaped 
sport as a cultural form and (b) reflects deeper economic and cultural shifts 
in society insofar as the sports-television relationship reproduces power 
relations that exist elsewhere in a capitalist society.  
 
Providing an alternative view, Goldlust (1987) and Barnett (1990) chose an 
empirical approach for their analysis of the structural aspects (political and 
economic) of the relationship between sport and television. Goldlust sets 
the tone: “to those who appropriate sport as their own property, it is just 
another potentially lucrative entertainment commodity” (Goldlust, 
1987:171). Many of the issues raised by Barnett (1990) – for example, the 
willingness of sport to adapt its rules to suit television, the influence of 
commercial sponsors and the way technology has changed the way sport is 
presented – are still relevant. Barnett’s approach gets closer to sports 
production than many, so it is an important reference. It also contains the 
most useful US-UK comparisons albeit framed with some reservations. 
Where Barnett is concerned with the addition of contrived narratives, the 
argument here notes the subtraction of critical comment from coverage. 
Reviewing developments from the early 1980s, Whitson (1998) recognised 
that sport in the UK was becoming firmly positioned within the broader 
communications strategies of corporations and identifies “a new kind of 
corporate integration in the media and entertainment industries” (1998:59). 
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Herman and McChesney’s contribution to understanding a market-oriented 
global media is significant and is considered in more detail below.  
 
Commercialism and capital incursion 
By early 2000 transformation remained a prominent theme as discussion 
became more closely framed on the ever-increasing commercialisation of 
sport and the mutual interdependence of sport and television. Boyle and 
Haynes (2000, 2004) have done much to drive the debate. Football in the 
New Media Age (2004) pointed Haynes towards a further study, Media 
Rights and Intellectual Property (2005) including a specific chapter on sport 
and intellectual property rights. Boyle and Haynes argue that the last thirty 
years has seen a tightening of the stranglehold that sponsors, in 
conjunction with television, exert on major sporting events. For them a 
sporting triangle has formed between television, sport and sponsorship; this 
description is unmistakably reminiscent of Whannel’s 1992 explanation. The 
argument is: whilst appearing to be an adjunct to the advertising industry, 
British sport has undergone a series of rapid and dramatic transformations. 
More sophisticated marketing and promotional strategies have been 
introduced by sporting bodies keen to attract the interest of television and 
by the television companies themselves who want to maximise the return 
on their significant investment in sports broadcasting rights. All this, say 
Boyle and Haynes, “reflects a mode of organisation that is more akin to the 
long-standing consumer-orientated configuration of sport in North America” 
(Boyle and Haynes, 2000:66). For such an important idea it is a pity that 
they did not develop this discussion further.  
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Whilst Boyle and Haynes discuss television’s view of sport as “another part 
of its entertainment programming that delivers potential audiences to 
advertisers, and attracts subscribers to new delivery systems” (2000:66) 
they do not explore important parallels between developments in the US 
and the UK. This suggests that whilst political economists paint an 
informative big picture, when it comes to providing a detailed understanding 
of increasing pre-production factors that do much to shape subsequent 
output - such as technology, broadcasting rights and regulations - the 
explanations become more sketchy and incomplete. There is no comparison 
between the development of sports broadcasting in the US and UK, how this 
is reflected in the value of sports broadcasting rights and, in turn, is 
subjected to broadcasting policy and regulation. This surprising gap in the 
literature is addressed in chapter 3.  
 
Considering growing commercialism, Giulianotti (1999, 2005) is broadly 
sympathetic to Boyle and Haynes as he identifies television as the biggest 
influence on football’s political economy; the medium of television makes 
brand marketing a mass possibility. The conversion of football’s governing 
cultural institutions into corporate institutions is so apparent for Giulianotti 
that the process should be obvious to any observer. On a similar theme, 
Falcous (2005) constructs another sporting triangle, this time a 
configuration of corporate, media and sport interests. The accelerated 
phase of corporate-media-sport alignment has resulted in sport being linked 
with more instrumentally rational approaches to capital accumulation. 
Falcous brings together strands from Barnett, Whitson, Boyle and Haynes 
and Herman and McChesney as he charts how the commercial character of 
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British sport underwent an unprecedented acceleration during the 1990s. 
The essential points to note are:  
 
a)  The reformulation of the structures, ethos and governance of 
commercial sport in Britain.  
b)  That such shifts are situated within wider processes of heightened 
global interdependence (where developments in the economics, 
technology and regulation of media delivery are central).  
c)  The consequences for sport include realignment with the interests of 
corporate investment and the managerial tenets of advertising, 
marketing and public relations.  
 
The new objective for elite sports like Premier League football, crudely, was 
to jettison what couldn’t make money, as economics became the primary 
measure of value. Whitson (1998) also notes the emergence of these 
characteristics represents a new stage in the commodification of sport, 
“such that it may be gradually detached from meanings based on place 
attachments and loyalties” – an echo of Holt and Mason’s (2000:120) 
conclusion that sport could no longer be “confined by time and space”.  
 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:2) express an interest in football on 3 levels, “as a 
cultural form; football as an industry and business and football as a media 
product. It seems to us, that at certain moments the game is clearly one of 
these, at others, it can appear to be all of these.” In a similar vein, Mason 
(1999) considered what the sport product might be and who buys it. Mason 
notes (1999:403) that: “sport has commodified, as it has become 
increasingly bound up in the processes of economic production and 
Milne | June 2014 
 
30 
distribution”.  In terms of the sport product Mason sees 4 categories of 
relationships: (1) the sports fan, (2) television and other media, (3) 
communities that construct facilities and support local clubs [mainly a US 
phenomenon] and, (4), corporations that interact with the leagues and 
teams. 
 
The focus of this research is firmly based on elite sports, particularly 
football, as a media product. It is accepted that this limits discussion, for 
example it does not fully represent cultural factors, nor are the recent 
extension of personal, on-demand and social media aspects considered, in 
2014, to displace the central significance of television as the dominant 
media product. Efforts by federations to extend control over television 
coverage are the central interest; the distinction between international 
coverage and localised presentation is a further important consequence.    
 
Of interest to Nauright and Schimmel (2005) is the accelerated expansion of 
transnational capitalism and its extension into the sport/cultural realm and 
media-sport. Among the key ideas are (a) the expansion of neoliberal 
ideology, (b) vertical integration of media and sports markets, (c) 
competition for capital investment at all geographic levels and (d) brand-
name marketing of sport and sport-related goods and services. Schimmel 
reiterates the importance of the corporate-media-sport alignment and how 
such mutually beneficial alliances “accelerate the commodification and 
commercialisation of sport and, aided by recent advancements in production 
and communication technologies, deliver sport product on ever increasing 
scales to international consumers” (Schimmel, 2005:3; Hargreaves, 2002 
and Miller et al, 2001). 
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Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013) provide a timely contribution as they note 
3 phases of broadcasting in the UK – (1) public service regulated 
monopoly/duopoly operating under conditions of spectrum scarcity, (2) the 
emergence of new broadcasting delivery systems between 1980 to the mid 
1990s with the end of public service duopoly and the introduction of 
commercial competition and, (3), the transition from analogue to digital, 
including (potential) convergence with new delivery platforms including the 
Internet and mobile phones. In reviewing the political economy of television 
sports rights they make a strong case for a “regulatory approach that seeks 
to balance the commercial priorities of broadcasters and sports 
organisations with the wider social and cultural benefits citizens gain from 
free-to-air sports broadcasting” (Evens, Iosifidis and Smith, 2013:223). The 
case of US sports broadcasting is used to demonstrate that free-to-air 
terrestrial television can serve the interests of leagues, broadcasters, 
advertisers, sponsors and viewers alike. 
 
In very general terms, the literature deals with the behaviour of leagues 
and federations as seen in the commercialisation of sport, the marketisation 
of broadcasting and the behaviour of broadcasters and media providers as 
they seek market power in respect of their own platforms and, more 
recently, an increasing number of political economy accounts of reasonably 
wide-angled issues, such as football in the digital age and the increasing 
impact of broadcasting rights, competition law and regulation. What is 
missing is a frontline account of how technology, rights and regulation 
together influence broadcasters, media providers and producers, in other 
words how these wider transformations are manifest in day-to-day 
workplace practices. 
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Tunstall (1993:71) argued that sports producers found themselves working 
in a “business partnership” with sporting bodies. Explaining how this 
happened, and to measure the extent of the radical transformation of sports 
television production since the early 1990s, is a central aim of this research. 
 
2.2 Further context  
Thinking about how to address gaps in the literature, ideas about 
transformation and value were recurring themes, particularly as expressed 
as a political economy view. 
 
Sports broadcasting professionals virtually all agree that developments in 
technology (both production and distribution) are often re-articulated in 
broadcasting rights, usually following a cycle behind (typically 3 years). 
Competition to acquire rights is often mitigated by industry regulators 
following a further cycle of rights behind developments; regulators and 
competition authorities seek to echo the prevailing media policy. 
 
Figure 2.1, Policy technology, economics and regulation  
 
























(Market failure & 
competition) 
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In terms of the increasing influential pre-production factors in television 
sport – technology, broadcasting rights and regulation - this interpretation 
is a reasonable context from which important transformations in (a) 
economics and politics, (b) broadcasting policy, (c) technology, (d) media 
and sports economics and (e) regulation and competition can be examined. 
 
2.2.1 Transformations in economics and politics  
Changing ideas about value lie at the heart of sports broadcasting rights. 
Media providers purchase popular sports broadcasting rights to attract large 
audiences or to drive take up of pay-TV subscriptions and other revenue 
generating services. Increased competition to acquire rights has resulted in 
a dramatic escalation in their economic value. The economic value now 
attached to broadcasting rights differs from the wider historical, cultural and 
social values previously attached to sport, particularly in the UK and 




Value, even in economics, is not a fixed term. How we define value changes 
with the prevailing political climate. For example, from the late 1970s 
value-creation rather than production (manufacturing of goods) became a 
“guiding light of economic activity” (Harvey, 2005:32). Creating conditions 
that were good for business shaped ideas about value, including the 
promotion of economic value above all others. Consequently, Gilpin 
(2001:40) calls for awareness about how (a) economic markets work, (b) 
how market forces affect economic outcomes and (c) how powerful actors 
attempt to manipulate market forces to advance their private interest.  
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For elite sports broadcasting rights, value is also linked to desirability 
(football can attract audiences, advertisers and sponsors for broadcasters), 
but arriving at a sustainable value introduces risk for broadcasters. 
Economics assumes that the free market will produce the right amount and 
variety of goods by an invisible hand even though the market appears to be 
chaotic and unrestrained. Gilpin (2001:54) calls this the “self-regulating and 
self-correcting smoothly functioning machine”; critics call it a non-system. 
The free market for sports broadcasting rights has shown little inclination to 
become self-regulating as values continue to rise, even in times of 
economic austerity and recession. Critics also question whether the market 
provides sufficient cultural and social value, for example Giulianotti (1999, 
2005) and Falcous (2005) note that in football’s rush towards 
corporatisation and financial gain many traditional cultural and historical 
values were jettisoned, a position often taken by EC competition authorities 
when considering market failure.  
 
The rise of neoliberalism  
Ideas about value began to change post World War II under the growth and 
stability provided by embedded liberalism (Harvey, 2005). However, 
mathematic formalisation and abstract modelling, adopted in the 1960s, 
changed the character of economic thought (Gilpin, 2001)). In the 1970s 
there was an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism as capital was dis-
embedded from the web of social and political restraints that had 
surrounded market processes. Castells (2000:59) argues this was a “new 
model of accumulation in historical discontinuity with post-World War II 
capitalism” whilst Polanyi (1944) considered stripping away market 
restraints would result in freedom becoming “a mere advocacy of free 
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enterprise”. By the 1980s Castells (2000) notes the prominence of service-
based economies. 
 
With its policies of deregulation, privatisation and the withdrawal of the 
state from many areas of social provision, neoliberalism soon became 
incorporated into the common-sense way the world was understood. Harvey 
(2005:159) argues the neoliberal project engages in “accumulation through 
dispossession” as it promotes private property rights1. In the late 1970s, 
under Thatcher and Reagan, neoliberalism helped pave the way for the 
“deregulation of everything” (Harvey, 2005:26). Neoliberalism marks a new 
phase in economic globalisation, as it:  
 
…	  emphasises	  the	  significance	  of	  contractual	  relations	  in	  the	  market	  place.	  It	  holds	  that	  
social	  good	  will	  be	  maximised	  by	  maximising	  the	  reach	  and	  frequency	  of	  market	  
transactions,	  and	  seeks	  to	  bring	  all	  human	  action	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  market.	  (Harvey,	  
2005:3).	  
 
Under neoliberalism relationships were increasingly defined by contracts, 
commodification was unrestricted and everything was financialised - the 
only value that really mattered now was economic value. Gilpin (2001) 
identified a new economic paradigm during the 1980s and early 1990s in 
the United States, emphasising (a) deregulation, (b) open markets and (c) 
minimal government intervention in the economy and (d) the spread of 
American-style equity culture. For Castells (2000) US corporate culture was 
suited to embrace the digital revolution of the 1990s. This culture was 
widely adopted in the UK. 
                                           
1 The extension of private property rights influences the value of those rights and provides 
protection (through patents and copyright) that encourages investment in new technology. 
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The transnational corporation  
A key actor in the new economic paradigm is the transnational corporation 
(TNC). For Herman and McChesney (1997:13) TNCs were the “new 
missionaries for corporate capitalism”. The rise of the TNC-led new order 
helped to institutionalise a wide range of commercial practices and values, 
including the demand for minimal government intervention, improved 
communications2, promotion of free market ideology, the advancement of 
advertising culture and the provision of a favourable environment for 
advertisers and sponsors. In the emerging US television market, advertisers 
and sponsors were attracted to the large audiences and demographics 
delivered by sport.  
 
Also of note is product differentiation in trade3 (Ravenhill, 2005), a 
repercussion is an extension of legal protection via intellectual property 
rights, trademarks and copyright. Protection became a central concern of 
powerful TNCs during the 1990s just as competition to acquire and control 
sports broadcasting rights entered a new era of intensity.  
 
Changing the rules  
With more emphasis being placed on value creation restructuring plays a 
significant role in the neoliberal project.  
                                           
2 The central importance of new technology in determining trade patterns is also emphasised 
by new theories of growth, economic location and strategic trade. Key technological 
advances revolutionised communications and began to reshape every aspect of social, 
political and economic affairs. The material form of this advance was determined by the 
needs and ambitions of the TNCs. Castells (2000:69) analyses the role of new technology, 
including market driven innovation. 
3 Such differentiation tends to be intra industry, such as Volvo cars versus BMW cars, or 
English Premier League football as compared to Italy’s Serie A.  
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Restructuring	  of	  business	  firms,	  and	  the	  new	  information	  technologies,	  while	  being	  at	  the	  
core	  of	  globalising	  trends,	  could	  not	  have	  evolved,	  by	  themselves,	  toward	  a	  networked	  
global	  economy	  without	  policies	  of	  deregulation,	  privatisation,	  and	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  
trade	  and	  investment.	  (Castells,	  2000:147).	  
 
Harvey (2005:157) adds that the privileges of ownership and management 
of capitalist enterprises became fused together; the payment of CEOs 
(managers) in stock options (ownership titles) led to stock values (value 
creation) rather than physical production becoming the “guiding light of 
economic activity” (Harvey, 2005:32). Castells (2000:156) adds that “the 
profitability of a firm or economic activity is no longer enough on which to 
base valuation”, and… “It looks like greed is now expressed more directly in 
value creation through the expectation of higher value – thus changing the 
rules of the game without changing the nature of the game” (2000:160). In 
1992, the top flight of English league football was radically restructured 
along corporate lines; the new game was profit.  
  
Oligopolistic competition 
As ideas about value were changing, so were markets and competition. 
According to strategic trade theory (Brander and Spencer, 1983), TNCs are 
usually involved in an oligopoly, markets where there are a small number of 
suppliers (such as media markets) and where one supplier’s actions can 
have a significant impact on its competitors. This, explain Gratton and 
Solberg (2007), provides TNCs with noticeably more market power 
compared to a situation of perfect competition, but not as much power as in 
a monopoly. Shifts in market power between buyers and sellers are 
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extremely important in framing the relationship between media providers 
and sports.  
 
Oligopolistic conditions encourage TNCs to engage in strategic behaviour, 
including anticipating the behaviour of their competitors. That TNCs seek to 
earn profits is given, but less obvious are TNC efforts to leverage their 
market power to change the rules governing trade and competition in order 
to improve their long-term position. Here it is worth remembering Gilpin’s 
call to understand how powerful actors attempt to manipulate market forces 
to advance their private interest. Strategic Trade Theory argues that a 
government can take specific actions to help its own oligopolistic firms. 
Such action, in turn can lead to pre-emptive investment by the TNC, or 
adoption of a first-mover strategy – this includes adjusting their prices 
(including dumping, or selling below cost to drive out competitors) to 
capture a much larger share of the market than would be the case under 
conditions of perfect competition. Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation 
adopted first-mover strategy as it sought to establish satellite broadcasting 
in the UK in the early 1990s. The British government encouraged such 
competition under the 1990 Broadcasting Act. Harvey (2005:203) points 
out “the idea that the market is about competition and fairness is 
increasingly negated by the fact of the extraordinary monopolisation, 
centralisation, and internationalisation of corporate and financial power”.  
 
Economic globalisation and global media  
 “The crucial change for global capitalism, which laid the groundwork for the 
rise of the global media, was the emergence and ascension of the 
transnational corporation (TNC)” write Herman and McChesney (1997:13). 






In other words, global capitalism, TNCs and the formation of a commercial 
market-oriented global media are linked; the global media is “a very recent 
development reflecting to no small degree the globalisation of the market 
economy” (1997:10). Herman and McChesney identify television as the 
most important media technology to emerge post-World War II. They also 
highlight advertising as a pivotal industry in the globalising process, noting 
the post-World War II US television boom was funded by advertising 
revenue. Reviewing the central role of advertising we see various themes 
come together: advertising “is a defining feature of late capitalism, 
reflecting the rise of product differentiation and oligopolistic competition” 
(1997:21). 
 
Figure 2.2, Economic globalisation and global media 
 
     
                 





For Herman and McChesney a growing market-oriented globalised media 
was a key part of economic globalisation. By 1990 a global media market 
with its own logic and dynamics had emerged.  
 
The	  crucial	  incursion	  is	  the	  implantation	  of	  the	  model	  [of	  commercial	  television];	  the	  
secondary	  developments	  of	  importance	  are	  the	  growth,	  consolidation,	  and	  centralisation	  of	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gradual	  effects	  of	  these	  processes	  on	  economies,	  political	  systems,	  and	  the	  cultural	  
environment.	  (Herman	  and	  McChesney,	  1997:142)	  
 
McGrew (2005) identifies the underlying forces behind economic 
globalisation as: 
a) Politics (ideas, interests and institutions) 
b) Economics (markets and capitalism) 
c) Technics (technological change and social organisation)  
 
In other words, we might view influential pre-production factors that help 
define television sport output like this: 
 
Figure 2.3, Pre-production factors 
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The ways we think about value have been completely transformed since 
1945; the importance of cultural and social value has diminished as the 
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importance of economic value has risen. Broadcasting markets have been 
transformed and the implications for sports broadcasting are far reaching.  
 
2.2.2 Transformations in broadcasting policy  
For Owen and Wildman (1992:1) few industries have been as revolutionised 
by regulatory reform and technological change as the television business. 
Government policy initiatives and regulatory measures, Doyle (2002:161) 
reminds us, strongly influence the economic performance of media markets. 
Key stages in the transformation of television sport are linked to wider 
media policies including deregulation in the US and UK and to technological 
changes that challenged established methods of television distribution and 
addressed basic market failure. Television sport is very often at the frontline 
of such changes.  
 
Considering media policy the US Federal Government (followed by the 
Federal Communications Commission) licensed frequencies in a system of 
broadcasting that, for Owen and Wildman (1992), continued the 
concentration of economic power that had evolved in radio broadcasting. 
Corporate interests had been quick to grasp the commercial potential of 
radio as an advertising-funded medium4 and, according to Herman and 
McChesney (1997:14), large corporations used political leverage to seize 
control of the television industry before a public service system could be 
established. The economic forces that favour mass consumption of media 
messages are reinforced by the simultaneous production of audiences for 
sale to advertisers as a dual output (Owen and Wildman, 1992:151; Picard, 
                                           
4 Selling programmes to sponsors was an early solution to market failure, a way to collect 
value from broadcasts.   
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1989). Consequently, advertising fuelled the US television boom of the 
post-War period. As with any oligarchical system, argue Owen and Wildman 
(1992:16), a myth of social responsibility evolved; the myth (that US 
audience interests were served rather than those of advertisers and 
shareholders) helped to rationalise the privileges of the wealthy few. And 
those few were the major US networks whose dominance and economic 
self-interest was protected by the FCC (through restrictions placed on 
granting broadcasting licenses).  
 
Addressing basic market failure in the UK a public service broadcasting 
(PSB) system was adopted, with funding provided via a licence fee paid by 
the consumers of broadcasts. The BBC, argue Curran and Seaton (2003), 
was founded on a rejection of market forces and politics insofar as the 
British government considered that broadcasting demanded a new form of 
administration with social and not financial priorities. The UK government 
established the publicly owned BBC as a vertically integrated programme 
maker, channel provider and broadcast distributor (Szymanski, 2006). 
Television in the UK was developed as a monopoly and, as Owen and 
Wildman (1992) note, there is a sharp distinction between the behaviour of 
a monopolist and the behaviour of a competitive industry.  
 
With such contrasting starting points – in the US, professional sports 
broadcast on commercial advertising-funded networks and, in the UK, 
amateur sport aired via a public service monopoly – how, by the early 
1990s, the UK had gravitated so far towards a more US consumer-oriented 
model for sports broadcasting, to the extent that it is the similarities and 
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not the differences that stand out, is a relevant argument. The deregulation 
of broadcasting markets played a crucial role in the US and the UK. 
 
Deregulation in US broadcasting 
Until the early 1970s the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had 
protected the networks (NBC, CBS and ABC) from external competition 
during a period marked by increasing demand for national audiences by 
advertisers – less competition and more income was an attractive formula 
for the networks. FCC protection took the form of highly restrictive 
regulations on cable operators in 1966, 1968 and 1971 and also on pay-TV. 
However, the political foundations of the networks’ protected position began 
to unravel in the early 1970s. As part of a wave of wider neoliberal reforms, 
the cost of national video distribution to broadcast and cable outlets began 
to drop following the FCC’s open skies policy for domestic communications 
satellites. The regulator then made it illegal for the broadcast networks to 
continue to provide financing (to produce television series) in return for a 
share of the back-end profits, usually from syndication. By 1972 the 
networks were forced to divest all their interests in syndication businesses. 
In 1974 an FCC antitrust lawsuit restricted in-house production of network 
prime-time entertainment series and option terms for rights and, in 1975, 
the FCC’s prime-time access rule became effective. Together, these reforms 
are often referred to as the FinSyn rules.  
 
Significantly the artificial scarcity of spectrum - that had been an original 
barrier to entry in broadcasting - was no longer effective in protecting the 
networks from competition. The gates were beginning to open. In the 
second half of the 1970s the courts overturned the FCC’s restrictions on 
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pay-TV, including most of the remaining restrictions on cable television 
(Owen and Wildman, 1992).  Among the consequences of this political 
activity the broadcast networks turned more of their attention towards 
producing in-house sports and news programmes, activities that were not 
restricted by regulation policy. The rise in popularity of the NFL on US 
network television during the 1970s is, at least in part, a consequence of 
broadcasting deregulation and the FinSyn rules.  
 
Increased competition among US media providers 
As FCC regulations concerning cable networks in the USA became less 
restrictive two new channels entered the market: in 1976 it was Ted 
Turner’s Turner Broadcasting (TBS) and, in 1979, Bill Rasmussen launched 
the 24 hour-a-day cable sports broadcaster ESPN5. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s competition among the 3 major US networks intensified with 
the emergence of new cable networks. Whilst the arrival of CNN, and later 
CNN Headline News, triggered an overall increase in news production, TBS 
and ESPN signalled important shifts in the relationship between sports and 
television in the USA. For example:  
 
1)  There was an immediate increase in the demand from media 
providers for broadcasting rights for a wider variety of sports to fill 
longer on-air schedules.  
2) The established terrestrial broadcasting paradigm was altered by the 
addition of new delivery platforms that bypassed the existing 
networks and their advertising sales divisions. 
                                           
5 Turner purchased the Atlanta Braves Major League Baseball franchise to provide cheap 
programming for his network, whilst Rasmussen purchased a continuous 24-hour satellite 
feed because it was cheaper than buying separate blocks of time.  
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3) Cable provided a technological solution to long-term market failure 
insofar as it introduced a means of charging and collecting revenue 
directly from customers via subscriptions. In economic terms, the 
willingness-to-pay of cable customers was, in some cases, now 
greater than the willingness-to-pay of advertisers.   
 
In commercial television advertiser-valuations of the audiences generated 
by programmes determine which programmes are provided, also known as 
product competition (Owen and Wildman, 1992). In a pay-TV model content 
is also determined by preference and is sold directly to viewers, 
consequently competition for viewers is based on a combination of product 
and price. A number of analysts, including Spence and Owen (1975, 1977) 
have argued in favour of a competitive pay-TV industry and point to the 
explosive growth in cable penetration and VCR ownership since 1975 as 
evidence of (a) viewers’ willingness-to-pay and (b) a previously restricted 
market. However, Gratton and Solberg (2007) counter that US subscription-
based channels have often been regarded as a supplement rather than as a 
full competitor to terrestrial free-to-air-channels6. This is an important 
point. For sport, the free-to-air US networks have retained a comparative 
competitive edge over the pay-TV channels because, as Jay (2004) points 
out, television sport is a medium for renting audiences to advertisers, so 
the ability to deliver large audiences combined with frequent breaks in play 
was a compelling package for advertisers. This helps explain why, in 
contrast to the UK, US Major League sports retain a strong presence on the 
free-to-air terrestrial broadcast networks where, as Evens, Iosifidis and 
Smith (2013:211) argue, demographics also play a role as  “broadcasters 
                                           
6 On arrival in the UK in 2009 ESPN described itself as a supplemental channel and not 
direct competition to Sky Sports.  
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bid for those rights that are in line with their branding position and relevant 
target audience”. Szymanski (2006) adds, in the USA, that the structure of 
the sports broadcasting market, rather then regulatory intervention, has 
prevented a full migration to pay-TV platforms. 
 
British broadcasting and deregulation  
Deregulation played a significant part in determining economic practice in 
media markets in the UK, particularly television sports. The Annan Report 
(1977) was an early victory for those who wanted to open up British 
broadcasting, including long-term restructuring and diversification. The 
1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act7, followed by the 1986 Peacock 
Committee tried to soften the ideological importance of public service 
broadcasting (Haynes, 2005:70) and laid the foundation for the landmark 
1990 Broadcasting Act. Describing British broadcasting as the last bastion of 
restrictive practices Prime Minister Thatcher wanted to reform the entire 
structure of broadcasting - the previously closed world of broadcasting was 
to be exposed to the rigours of the free market. In doing so, industrial and 
technological policy became the driving force behind broadcasting policy as 
its cultural remit was relegated in importance. The 1990 Broadcasting Act 
has been described as an enabling force for Rupert Murdoch’s satellite 
broadcasting ambitions in Britain; satellite and cable systems were 
politically sanctioned to challenge the monopoly enjoyed by the terrestrial 
television networks.  
 
 
                                           
7 Barnett (1990:33) noted the list of protected events was written into the Cable and 
Broadcasting Act 1984.  
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Direct satellite broadcasting in the UK 
Whereas new cable providers challenged the established US networks, in 
the UK a small satellite footprint and lower capital costs meant that 
competition to the BBC/ITV duopoly (in terms of sport at least) came from 
direct satellite broadcasting. With the launch of the Astra satellite in 1989 
Sky gained a critical head start over the British Broadcasting Consortium 
(BSB) and, after accruing monumental losses in competition with each 
other, the two companies agreed to merge in 1990 to form British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB). The launch of Sky Sports in 1991 caused a 
paradigmatic shift in the UK market by providing competition for the BBC 
and ITV – Boyle and Haynes (2004) contend that ITV was not fully 
commercial, so the arrival of BSkyB represented a new commercial era. And 
this was not the supplemental add-on broadcasting model created 12 years 
earlier in the US.  Instead, this was all or nothing full-on competition. The 
goal of News Corporation, argue Herman and McChesney (1977:75), was to 
overwhelm other media giants and to dominate global television sport. The 
use of new distribution technology and the acquisition of exclusive 
broadcasting rights to the most popular sports were a key part of this 
strategy. Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:46) add: “technological 
developments have intensified the battle for control over sports rights”. 
 
In terms of policy-making and UK broadcasting, Smith (2009) regards the 
growth of the regulatory state as part of a general shift from government to 
governance associated with the withdrawal of the state from many activities 
as part of neoliberal thinking. Smith also identifies the increasing influence 
of EU level regulation and of competition authorities such as the OFT and 
Competition Commission. The scrutiny of competition authorities often 
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centres on the upstream activities of the leagues and federations as they 
sell broadcasting rights whereas, argue Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013), 
media regulators tend to engage with the downstream provision of 
programme content. A central concern of regulation is the control of market 
power – curbing monopolistic tendencies – in order to facilitate free market 
competition. Controlling market power in sports broadcasting, at least in the 
UK and Europe, is a recurring theme.  
 
2.2.3 Technological transformations in sports broadcasting 
For Gilpin (2001:367) the contemporary technological revolution has been 
“far more pervasive and, in many ways, a much more profound 
development than is globalisation”. Technology has radically transformed 
the distribution (transmission) and the production of television sport. For 
the UK, Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:198) identify 3 eras of 
development:  
1)  Public service regulated monopoly/duopoly (under conditions of 
spectrum scarcity). 
2)  1980 to the mid 1990s the emergence of new broadcasting delivery 
systems, the end of public service duopoly and the introduction of 
more commercial competition. 
3)  The transition from analogue to digital with the introduction of more 
channels and new methods of delivery (Internet and mobile phones).  
 
Following technological transformation, sport rapidly emerged as a core 
feature of media distributors’ strategies for market penetration (Herman 
and McChesney, 1997; Alger, 1998; Miller et al, 2001). Sport, more than 
any other form of media content, has been used as a weapon to break into 
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new markets, undermine competitors and ultimately dominate certain 
sectors of the media industry argues Haynes (2005:6).  
 
For many observers the increasingly global impact of sport has been 
characterised by new services, including dedicated sports channels, new 
delivery systems and payment methods such as subscription networks and 
pay-per-view events. Discussing commodification, Mosco (1996) argues 
that new services: 
…	  intensify	  the	  packaging	  of	  programming	  in	  increasingly	  customised	  forms	  from	  the	  
original	  broadcasting	  form,	  which,	  by	  comparison,	  produced	  programming	  with	  limited	  
specificity	  for	  a	  mass	  audience.	  The	  former	  intensify	  the	  commodification	  process	  by	  linking	  
increasingly	  specific	  kinds	  of	  programming	  to	  increasingly	  well-­‐defined	  audiences.	  (Mosco,	  
1996:152)	  
 
Whitson (1998) continues this theme by arguing that sport has been 
incorporated into a global promotional culture characterised by the push 
towards new revenue streams including the vertical integration of the 
communication and infotainment industries: 
The	  growth	  of	  subscription	  television	  technology	  has	  heightened	  market	  value	  of	  sports	  
events	  so	  that	  cross-­‐ownership	  of	  competitions,	  teams	  and	  leagues	  can	  afford	  significant	  
competitive	  advantages.	  Such	  sport-­‐media	  cross-­‐ownership	  affords	  further	  opportunities	  
for	  promotional	  synergies.	  (Whitson,	  1998:59)	  	  
For Boyle and Haynes (2000) sport offers a product to media industries that 
can be transformed into a valuable commercial entity delivering viewers, 
advertisers, subscribers and customers - “Sport, it appears, is often only 
too happy to oblige as a willing victim in this process” (2000:222). The 
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emergence of these characteristics, Whitson (1998) suggests, represents a 
new stage in the commodification of sport, such that it may be gradually 
detached from meanings based on place attachments and loyalties. So, in 
the place of, and supplemental to, geographical loyalties come the 
discourses of personal and consumer choice. This research will investigate 
an important split between federation-produced international coverage of 
major sports events and the localised presentation styles increasingly 
adopted by national broadcasters as they seek to differentiate their output 
from competitors. 
 
In the UK, new methods of distribution, particularly digital satellite services, 
triggered questions about the relationship between monopoly and 
technological innovation, a relationship that is not altogether 
straightforward during periods of rapid technological change. As Doyle 
(2002) notes conditional access systems, including electronic programme 
guides, are often located centrally between service providers so they occupy 
what is potentially a very powerful position. Firms like BSkyB are in a 
position to act as gatekeepers and to decide who may or may not be 
allowed market access, or they can at least impose disadvantageous terms 
to potential competitors wishing to use their platform. This isn’t exactly a 
free market. 
 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:52) argue against technological determinism and 
for viewing developments within a wider structural process of marketisation, 
as the market becomes the central frame of reference for cultural activity. 
They add that along with a re-regulation of broadcasting within a more 
commercial and market driven frame of reference that digital television has 
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accelerated this commercial process. Whilst digital technology has enabled a 
dramatic increase in the volume and scope of television sports content, it is 
the different and often unseen ways that this technology has been used that 
is most revealing, including who is using it and why – how leagues and 
federations use technology to take control of televised sport output is a key 
contribution. 
 
Economies of scope arise within the digital production paradigm as output 
increases due to the ability to recycle material in additional, new 
programme formats for minimal additional costs. For example, football 
review and preview programmes use the isolated camera feeds recorded as 
part of the original coverage to provide alternative views of the action. Such 
processes, argues Schimmel (2005:3) accelerate “the commodification and 
commercialisation of sport and deliver sport product on ever increasing 
scales to international consumers”. Mason (1999) takes the view that 
commodification is bound up in the processes of economic production and 
distribution.  
 
For Doyle (2002) it is the expansion in the way in which television can be 
distributed to viewers that is significant. Whilst new means of distribution 
had begun to challenge the spectrum scarcity associated with analogue 
technology, the introduction of digital transmission accelerated the process 
dramatically. As a consequence scarcity in broadcasting switched from the 
means of distribution (from owning a television channel) to content 
production, or having sufficient competitive programming to fill these new 
channels and attract viewers. Here it is the ability of specific sports to drive 
the uptake of new media technologies and pay-TV services that is key.  
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2.2.4 Media economics, sport economics and broadcasting rights  
Boyle and Haynes (2000:74) alert us to how contracts, licensing and the 
controlling force of intellectual property have become central concerns in 
the organising principles of cultural industries. Looking at sports 
broadcasting, the shifting power relations between sports and media 
providers – the battle for control of rights - is revealing as is the 
intersection of media economics and sports economics, most often 
expressed in the form of sports broadcasting rights.  
 
(i) Media economics 
A fundamental issue for media providers is how to collect value from the 
audiences its programmes and schedules attract. Finding a solution to basic 
market failure led to very different funding methods being adopted in the 
US and UK, with a monopoly public broadcaster system funded by a licence 
fee chosen in the UK in preference to the advertiser-funded commercial 
free-to-air networks in the US.  
 
In media production, although the cost of producing a programme is not 
affected by the numbers of people who watch it, there is a high first copy 
cost for the initial programme. However, the marginal costs associated with 
providing extra copies - in delivering the programme to a larger audience - 
are considered to be next to zero. In rudimentary terms this means the 
greater the audience for a media provider’s content the lower the cost per 
consumer, this is particularly significant in the US market. For Picard 
(1989:17-19) media firms operate in a “dual product” market. The two 
commodities broadcasters generate are: (1) content (programmes produced 
or acquired and subsequently broadcast in recognisable schedules) and (2) 
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the audiences that choose to watch. Commercial television networks can 
price and sell access to their audiences to advertisers and sponsors, pay-TV 
providers use exclusive content to attract both subscribers and sponsors 
whilst PSBs like the BBC use audiences and demographics to justify the 
licence fee it receives.  
 
Audiences matter 
For Herman and McChesney (1997:141) the outcome is a predominantly 
commercial system where “advertisers must be won and kept, along with a 
suitable audience”. Producing audiences and delivering them to advertisers 
is, for Mosco (1996:148), the primary role of media providers and even 
PSBs that “depend on user fees, government grants, commercial 
advertising, and government appointed senior management personnel, who 
are often required to demonstrate their ability to meet either political or 
market criteria for success” (1996:170). Predating Mosco and Herman and 
McChesney, Smyth (1977) sees the audience that is delivered to advertisers 
by broadcasters as the primary commodity. The ability of popular sports to 
consistently deliver audiences with more efficiency and demographic 
accuracy than other content genres, and the lack of viable substitutes, is 
critical to broadcasters. Speaking at an annual Commissioning Conference 
in November 2007 then ITV Controller of Programmes, Simon Shapps, said 
any new drama, or entertainment format8, that attracted over 5 million 
viewers for ITV would be considered a success.  Between January and 
November 2007 over 40 sports events surpassed Shapps’ threshold. It can 
be argued that the ability of sport to attract audiences with regular sports 
                                           
8 Entertainment formats including Pop Idol, the X-Factor, Britain’s Got Talent are often 
presented live, involve regional contestants and performances distinguished by uncertainty 
of outcome – all features of live sport. 
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coverage plus global mega-events, including the IOC Olympic Games and 
the FIFA World Cup Finals, has sustained the large free-to-air broadcasting 
networks as they continue to provide the easiest route to mass audiences.  
 
Media market structures 
Sports broadcasting is dominated by large networks, Doyle (2002) confirms 
this is an oligopolistic market structure. Political economists including 
Herman and McChesney (1997) argue that broadcasting market structures 
lead to economies of scale, where the cost of providing an extra unit of a 
good (in this case a programme) falls as the scale of output expands (and 
the cost per viewer decreases). Economies of scope are also present due to 
savings that can be achieved by offering significantly increased output – for 
example creating new programme formats (from the same basic content) 
but for different audiences. In the case of football (which provides 
particularly malleable content) this might be highlights of action previously 
broadcast live in its entirety, a journalists’ round-table discussion with clips, 
previews of forthcoming matches, nostalgia-based programmes, or further 
re-versioning of interviews and action in different programmes. Digital 
workflows significantly enhance economies of scope as they enable much 
greater output.  
 
As economies of scale and of scope can be achieved, there are major 
advantages to be gained when a broadcaster becomes a very large size firm 
- competitive advantage is gained in (a) reaching the largest audience for 
each product and (b) in releasing the product in as many different markets 
as possible. Herman and McChesney concluded the global media are 
dominated by a small number of very large and powerful international firms 
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including News Corporation, Time Warner, Disney and Viacom. Another 
distinguishing feature of media markets is the substantial barrier to entry 
that favour the largest vertically integrated corporations. These barriers are 
primarily two-fold: (a) the high technical costs associated with the 
production and transmission of television networks including major sports 
events and (b) the rising cost of intellectual property including sports 
broadcasting rights.  
 
The vertical supply chain for media providers 
Turning to the sports broadcasting value chain, Doyle (2002) uses vertical 
deconstruction to reveal a basic range of functions for media providers. 
These functions start upstream with (a) the creation (or acquisition) of 
intellectual property rights and work through succeeding downstream 
stages, including (b) the production of programmes and (c) its distribution 
(transmission) to the audience. 
 
Figure 2.4, Vertical supply chain 
     Upstream                                    Downstream  
 
    Intellectual property                  Production             Distribution 
     Sports broadcasting rights   Media content        Terrestrial 
                Satellite, Cable 
                Internet 
 
 
With developments in technology a further function (d) should be included, 
which is the ability of media providers to collect value directly from 
audiences by means of subscriptions and pay-per-view services.  
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In the case of sport, a broadcaster would (a) acquire broadcasting rights 
from a League (e.g. BSkyB purchases rights from the Premier League), (b) 
produce programmes in accordance with the rights granted (for example 
the agreed number of games between selected clubs on given dates) and 
(c) transmit these programmes via their network again in accordance with 
the rights granted (for example, live broadcasts at specified times, delayed 
broadcasts, clip rights or highlights). Media firms can approach these basic 
functions differently depending on how they are funded, but typical funding 
models include:  
 
1) Commercial free-to-air terrestrial broadcasters including the large US 
networks funded by advertising and sponsorship9 without receiving a 
direct payment from their audience.  
2) Free-to-air terrestrial PSBs that receive public funding. For the BBC 
this involves an annual licence fee set by government. 
3) Free-to-air commercial-PSB broadcasters, like ITV, that generate 
revenue from advertising sales but that retain PSB responsibilities. 
4) Cable and pay-TV services including direct satellite broadcasting. 
Media providers like BSkyB charge viewers directly at various levels 
of subscription to receive television services, they also offer pay-per-
view (PPV) for additional content. Some cable and direct satellite 
television networks also sell advertising and sponsorship, but not all 
networks charge a subscription for access.  
5) Further pay-content media services including Internet service 
providers (IPTV) and telephone platforms. Media providers like BT 
                                           
9 Including individual segment sponsorship, product placement within programmes through 
to paid for infomercials. 
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have previously offered a basic low-cost subscription with additional 
pay-per-view and video-on-demand services. 
 
Whilst the supply chain model is a useful reference the argument here is 
that influential pre-production factors, including technology, broadcasting 
rights and regulation, interact to further determine the final broadcast 
output in ways that are far from linear.  
 
The common denominator for all broadcaster-funding models is attractive 
content. Haynes (2005:13) draws our attention to the increasing use of 
intellectual property rights in the everyday activities of media organisations 
and how such rights, particularly sports broadcasting rights, have become 
the most important assets in media markets. 
  
Sports	  rights	  can	  be,	  and	  usually	  are,	  the	  flagship	  and	  distinguishing	  factor	  of	  a	  television	  
station’s	  brand	  identity,	  and	  are	  lost	  at	  their	  peril.	  Understanding	  why	  sport	  is	  so	  important	  
demands	  knowledge	  of	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  sport	  and	  broadcasting	  has	  
developed	  and	  how	  the	  power	  relations	  between	  sports	  authorities	  and	  broadcasters	  have	  
dynamically	  changed	  over	  time.	  (Haynes,	  2005:68)	  
 
(ii) Sports economics  
Sports leagues and federations auction broadcasting rights. Sports 
broadcasting rights increasingly define the relationship between sport and 
broadcaster. Whilst media economics is well researched, sports economics 
is a distinct and separate field. However, it is hard to see how a political 
economy view of television sport can be complete without at least 
considering the ways that league behaviour, particularly as expressed in 
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sports broadcasting rights, influences the final output of media providers. 
This is a significant omission from contemporary literature. 
 
The “peculiar economics” of sport 
Sport is a sector where many basic economic rules appear to be inverted. 
The essence of sports economics is captured by Neale (1964:14): “It is 
clear that professional sports are a natural monopoly, marked by definite 
peculiarities both in the structure and in the functioning of their markets”.  
 
Scarcity, Fort (2006) reminds us, makes the economic world go round. 
Looking at sport, scarcity can be said to exist in (a) elite athletic 
performance, (b) absolute and relative team quality, (c) the shared 
experience that sports provide and (d) the thrill of victory. When 
uncertainty of outcome for live sports events is added, it is hard for media 
providers to find an adequate substitute in other programme forms. And, 
because scarcity exists, Demand Theory says that rationing devices must be 
chosen and the most prominent rationing device is price. For the most 
popular sports, demand from media suppliers outstrips the supply from the 
leagues. Consequently the value of rights rises as a result of competition. 
Scarcity, rationing and competition represent an “economic trinity” (Fort, 
2006:15).  
 
Fort (2006), Quirk and Fort (1992 and 1999) and Dobson and Goddard 
[2007) have built on the work of sports economists Rottenberg (1956), 
Neale (1964) and Sloane (1971). Among other things, they agree that 
sporting competition is more profitable than sporting monopoly. For 
example, leagues are necessary to professional sport; a single team cannot 
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supply the entire market because it would have no other team to play. 
However, a single league can supply the entire market in conditions of a 
natural monopoly (Dobson and Goddard, 2007:5). Furthermore, 
competition between different sports is more common than competition 
between rival leagues within the same sport. 
 
For Neale (1964) leagues engage in both single entity co-operation and 
joint-venture co-operation. Essential league activity – including determining 
competition rules, setting the schedule of games and organising match 
officials and so on – ensures that play can happen; this is single-entity 
cooperation. Neale highlights the relationship between single-entity action 
by leagues and profitable economic outcomes, naming it “the peculiar 
economics of team sports”.  
 
Joint-venture co-operation occurs where teams surrender part of their 
autonomy to the league to act on their behalf. The best example is when a 
league negotiates collectively on behalf of its member teams with media 
providers. In this case joint-venture cooperation results in an exercise of 
market power by the league, as media providers have no option but to 
negotiate with the league. Examining the sport product, including who it is 
marketed to and how, Mason (1999) considers the league to be an 
economic entity (in other words, a proper business entity).  
In terms of economics, the revenue side of professional sport changed 
forever with the willingness of advertisers to pay for sports programming, 
the crucial importance of revenue from broadcasting rights was established 
(Fort, 2006:53). 
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(iii) Sports broadcasting rights 
Sports broadcasting rights are identified, constructed and auctioned by the 
sports governing body or their representatives. Not only do broadcasting 
rights express the economic value of the rights assigned, increasingly they 
have come to determine the relationship between the sport, media provider 
and the willingness to pay of advertisers and audiences. Fort (2006:60) 
provides a basic schematic to which a further category audiences 
(willingness to pay) has been added: 
 
Figure 2.5, Willingness to pay in sports broadcasting rights 




                            Programming    Rights fees $ 






               
         
Ad slots    Slot fees $            Exclusive    Subscriptions 
            content       & PPV fees  
  
 
              
                
The programming opportunities offered by leagues to media providers 
within the assigned broadcasting rights include definitions of the: 
1) Range of programme packages offered (number and type) 
2) Distribution platform(s) 
3) The broadcast territory 
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Fort’s description highlights the relative disadvantage of PSB media 
providers when competing to acquire rights as they cannot (a) monetise the 
sports rights that they hold (by charging subscriptions for access) or (b) 
forecast potential advertising and sponsorship revenue to help calculate the 
commercial value of rights. 
 
For Gratton and Solberg (2007) the collective sale of sports rights is an 
example of horizontal integration between suppliers of inputs (the clubs 
organised in a league). This is cartel behaviour, it is regarded as illegal in 
other areas of economic activity but it is widely practiced in the sports 
broadcasting rights market. Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:90) provide a 
summary of arguments for and against league behaviour in respect of 
collective selling of sports broadcasting rights concluding, “the collective 
selling of broadcast rights is pro-competitive rather than anti-competitive 
and should be granted exemption from competition law” (2013:93). 
Considering that value arises from the creation of leagues and competitions, 
this research is in favour of the collective selling of broadcast rights by 
federations, agreeing that this is pro-competitive. 
 
Although US leagues benefit from anti-trust exemption granted under the 
US Broadcasting Act of 1961, this is not the case in Europe. Consequently, 
the activities of sports governing bodies, including the Premier League and 
UEFA (specifically the UEFA Champion’s League) when issuing rights has 
attracted the scrutiny of competition authorities. Evens, Iosifidis and Smith 
(2013:90) summarise the EC Competition Commissioner’s objections as: 1) 
collective selling agreements amount to price fixing, 2) they limit the rights 
Milne | June 2014 
 
62 
available to sports events (there are more events than are broadcast) and, 
3) they strengthen the market position of the broadcaster that wins rights. 
 
2.2.5 Regulation and competition  
As market forces increasingly shaped broadcasting markets in the UK from 
the early 1990s, in sports broadcasting intervention was twofold as it aimed 
to tackle market failure and market power.  
 
Market failure  
Welfare economic theory of broadcasting regulations identifies three sources 
of market failure that legitimise government intervention - public goods, 
merit goods and externalities. As the reception of TV signals is considered 
to be a public good, the argument for intervention considers that charging 
for television programmes introduces inefficiency because the fee deters 
some people from watching; charging also reduces the amount of goods in 
the public domain. Merits goods – goods that individuals would choose to 
consume too little of due to imperfect knowledge (Head, 1974) – are 
considered beneficial for the entire society, so there is a welfare economic 
rationale for government to intervene and to encourage the production and 
consumption of merit goods. For Gratton and Solberg (2007) this includes 
the enhanced pride and self-esteem that people enjoy when competitors 
have success in international sporting competitions. Externalities refer to 
incidental benefits, for example common sharing and feel good factors of 
the television coverage of the 2012 London Olympics and increased 
participation in exercise are externalities.  
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The migration of popular sporting events, like the Premier League, to pay-
TV channels represents a disadvantage for those who cannot afford to 
subscribe. As profit-maximising channels will prioritise sports that attract 
mass audiences and pay-TV channels will provide programmes that a 
sufficient number of viewers are willing to pay to watch, then the optimal 
level of programming that will generate externalities and merit goods will be 
difficult to achieve and this failure, it is argued, justifies market 
intervention. 
 
In the UK the best-known form of regulation is the protected list of events, 
or crown jewels in the annual British sporting calendar, identified in Section 
14 of the 1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act, formalised in the 1990 
Broadcasting Act and tightened up again in the 1996 Broadcasting Act. The 
protected list was conceived in the mid-1950s as a gentlemen’s agreement 
to limit the newly established ITV from acquiring exclusive rights to the 
most popular sports. It remains a mechanism to ensure sporting events 
with a broad-based national interest, or resonance, are available to at least 
95% of the population, effectively ruling out exclusive coverage on 
subscription-based broadcasting networks (Barnett, 1990:33).  
 
The European Union Television without Frontiers Directive adopted the idea 
of a protected list in 1989 as it aimed to establish a single market in EC 
television broadcasting. The Europeanisation of UK listed events legislation 
is significant; it became part of the regulation of television sports rights in 
the UK, particularly from the late 1990s, and it also takes a stance against 
leading pay-TV broadcasters’ domination of sports rights (Smith, 2009). In 
European regulation cultural and social values are also considered. Sport 
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cannot be reduced to just being an audience-generating mechanism; there 
is also a need to preserve the identity and independence of sport, EC 
(1999). EU law, part of the 2007 Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(amending and renaming the Television Without Frontiers Directive), 
prevents satellite broadcasters from circumventing the UK’s listed events 
legislation with a two-step safeguard for receiving countries. Advocates 
argue that the migration of major events like the FIFA World Cup Finals to 
pay-TV has been prevented by EU legislation. However, even supporters of 
protected events lists accept there is sometimes a lack of clear criteria 
against which to judge whether an event should be listed or not (Evens, 
Iosifidis and Smith, 2013:117). 
 
Whilst the UK’s protected list of events is periodically revised, sports 
federations do not always greet inclusion favourably. Most objections to 
inclusion come from federations that feel their access to the free market in 
sports rights is being restricted, or from pay-TV broadcasters wishing to 
purchase these rights. For example, in late 2009, the England and Wales 
Cricket Board (now the ECB) opposed inclusion on the basis it would reduce 
the economic value they could achieve for their sports broadcasting rights in 
a free market, in other words the fees they could receive from BSkyB. For 
Andreff and Bourg (2006) sports broadcasting has already become a private 
good, produced and consumed for profit in a fully-fledged market economy. 
Whilst, defending the public’s fundamental right to be informed about 
certain sports events, Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:120) point out (a) 
major event legislation is critical to enhance cultural citizenship and (b) the 
legislation is required alongside competition law as this, alone, cannot 
guarantee that rights to major sporting events are purchased by free-to-air 
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broadcasters rather than pay-TV broadcasters. Overall, this research 
supports a dual rights approach with the observation that, if they wanted 
to, sports federations could do more to address such issues. 
 
In contrast there is no list of protected events in the US. The US Major 
Leagues have not migrated to pay-TV but, instead, have maintained a 
strong presence on the 4 commercial free-to-air networks. In this case the 
ownership of the rights to all 4 major leagues by any one broadcaster is, for 
cost reasons alone, unlikely. Szymanski (2006) attributes the US experience 
to 4 key factors including: (1) US viewers are interested in a wider range of 
sports (NFL, NBA, MLB and NHL), (2) the economies of scale in US 
broadcasting enable free-to-air broadcasters to pay high rights fees and 
recover these via advertising and sponsorship, (3) US sports are, through 
their playing rules, more sympathetic to the inclusion of advertising breaks 
than, say, football is and, (4) in the US regulation has been slower to allow 
significant competition from pay-TV broadcasters for elite sports rights 
(Szymanski, 2006:157-98). Another key difference is the US Sport 
Broadcasting Act of 1961. This Act exempted the collective selling of 
sponsored telecasting (cartel behaviour) from anti-trust legislation as 
authorities accepted the need for a governance structure including 
horizontal arrangements aimed at enhancing competitive balance. From this 
point forward sports broadcasting rights rapidly increased in value and, in 
1996, the Telecommunications Act removed most price regulation. Whilst 
leagues in the US have, to some extent, limited the deregulation of sports 
broadcasting rights they have also adopted rules that, ultimately, maintain 
the value of their broadcasting rights. The three broad regulatory principles 
adopted by the leagues include, (a) a fair (equal) share of television rights 
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to all member clubs10, (b) salary caps for clubs and (c) a reverse-order-of-
finish draft system for players entering the league (Desbordes, 2006).  
 
Whilst there are occasional calls to apply similar systems in the UK and 
Europe, doubts remain about adopting a completely business-oriented 
closed system (in such a system a bad team can remain in the league as 
there is no relegation). However, with UEFA introducing the Financial Fair 
Play rule (FFP) in the Champion’s League from 2013-14, there is an 
increased likelihood that US style salary cap measures may be adopted in 
some form. In general terms, Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:228) 
conclude the US case illustrates that increased exposure and higher 
audience ratings via free-to-air television can serve the interest of teams, 
leagues, broadcasters, advertisers, sponsors and viewers alike.  
 
Market power   
In addition to addressing market failure, further reasons for intervention are 
concerned with tackling monopoly and market power issues.  
 
Since the 1980s changes to the market structure - from a scenario where 
analogue frequencies were scarce to a situation where appealing content is 
in short supply - caused an imbalance of supply and demand for exclusive 
sports broadcasting rights and a subsequent shift in power upstream away 
from the media providers (the buyers) to leagues engaged in horizontal 
collusion whilst selling broadcasting rights. As competition to acquire rights 
has intensified this has led to an upstream cartel. However, due to 
technological developments and the intervention of competition authorities 
                                           
10 Revenue from broadcasting rights is not shared evenly between Premier League clubs. 
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there has, in the case of the Premier League at least, been an unbundling of 
available rights packages and a reduction to 3 years in the license period 
granted by the Premier League to broadcasters. Some observers, including 
Gerrard (2006), see it as paradoxical that the supposed deregulation of the 
sports broadcasting rights market should serve to enhance rather than 
restrict monopoly power.  
 
Considering upstream market activities, sports broadcasting rights can be 
sold to (a) broadcasters, (b) groups of PSB broadcasters acting as joint-
purchasers (the EBU is an example) or (c) sports rights-holding agencies 
such as Sportfive or IMG. As noted, US leagues are exempt from anti-trust 
scrutiny, whilst UK and European leagues are not.  
 
The most common method of selling sports broadcasting rights is via an 
auction process. In the UK and Europe this process is subject to significantly 
increased attention from competition authorities: Ofcom, the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MMC), the Competition Directorate of the 
European Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (from 31 March 2014 
the OFT closed and responsibilities were split, with the Competitions and 
Markets Authority, OMA, bringing together the Competition Commission and 
certain functions of the OFT in a single body). In the downstream content 
selling market the EC states that in the free-to-air television market there is 
only a relationship between programme supplier and advertising industry, 
whereas in pay-TV the commercial relationship is established between the 
programme supplier and the viewer as subscriber (Fikentscher, 2006) - the 
willingness of audiences to pay for exclusive content. The analysis of 
demand for professional team sport follows the standard consumer choice 
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model with the caveat that uncertainty of outcome is a crucial feature, Noll 
(1988) and Quick and Fort (1997). In other words, live sports programmes 
are perishable goods that cannot be stored for any period without losing 
most of their commercial value; the high degree of time sensitivity 
increases the value of live broadcasting rights. Exclusivity is therefore 
acknowledged to be a condition of the product’s value. It can be argued 
that media providers’ wish to control high-profile sport content has been 
motivated by a desire to pre-empt competition. Strategic behaviour, 
including first mover advantages, can be anticipated as sports broadcasting 
is an oligopolistic market. The narrower the market, the greater risk that a 
dominant position will be considered to be an infringement of competition 
rules.  
 
Whilst broadcasting rights to league sports are more evenly shared among 
the major US broadcasters in the UK, BSkyB quickly came to dominate the 
sports broadcasting rights market.  BSkyB’s rivals argue that the satellite 
broadcaster had established a vicious circle of control within the UK pay-TV 
market, whereby it is able to use its control of premium content to attract 
subscribers, which, in turn, enables it to obtain more premium content, 
(Smith, 2009:20).  
 
To avoid anti-competitive practices and market foreclosure the Premier 
League and the UEFA Champion’s League have been forced to offer several 
balanced packages of broadcasting rights in an open bidding process11. 
                                           
11 In December 2002 the EC Directorate DG4 opened proceedings against the Premier 
League. The outcome saw 138 Premier League games split into 4 packages. BSkyB won all 4 
but were informed the tender was not fairly contested and was instructed to sell 1 package. 
As the price agreed between BSkyB and the EC was not met BSkyB retained the rights. For 
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Rather than create a more competitive market for selling sports 
broadcasting rights the material outcome of this intervention was, from 
2007 and in the case of the Premier League, an increase in the cost to 
viewers that wanted to access all live Premier League football available on 
Sky Sports and Setanta. Similarly, from the 2013-14 season fans needed 
subscriptions to both Sky Sports and BT Sport to see all the available 
matches. Whilst the material benefit to consumers is hard to identify, 
BSkyB’s monopoly of live broadcasting rights for Premier League football 
was ended by the European Commission’s competition authorities. 
However, in practical terms, BSkyB retained 5 out of 6 packages12 (115 of 
138 games) available in 2012. Although the Premier League has granted BT 
the rights to 38 live games (2 packages) from the start of the 2013-14 
season, BSkyB has ensured its continuing dominance by retaining the rights 
to 116 games (5 packages).  
 
Turning to the downstream market and content carriage, Ofcom challenged 
BSkyB in February 2010. Concluding a three-year review of the pay-TV 
market in the UK, the regulator found that BSkyB’s dominance of the sports 
broadcasting rights market was against consumer interest and that Sky 
Sports packages should be made available at viable wholesale prices to 
other carriers – a wholesale-must-offer system (Ofcom, 2010). As Evens, 
Iosifidis and Smith (2013) update developments, a legal challenge by 
                                                                                                                            
the period 2007-2010 the rights were split into 6 packages of 23 games each with Setanta 
winning 2 packages. 
12 With the collapse of Setanta, ESPN took over 2 packages of rights, but this was 
subsequently reduced to 1 in the next rights issue. In 2012 BT won 2 packages leaving ESPN 
with no rights from the start of the 2013/14 season.  
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BSkyB through the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) declared Ofcom’s 
core competition concern to be unfounded13. 
 
As	  a	  result,	  whilst	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  content	  to	  rival	  pay-­‐TV	  outlets	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  a	  
controversial	  issue	  within	  the	  UK	  sports	  broadcasting	  market,	  particularly	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  
BT’s	  recent	  acquisition	  of	  Premier	  League	  football	  rights,	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  at	  least	  
the	  terms	  of	  supply	  for	  premium	  sports	  programming	  are	  set	  to	  be	  left	  to	  commercial	  
competition.	  (Evens.	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith,	  2013:208)	  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature and sought a relevant contextual and 
conceptual context for an updated political economy of sports broadcasting. 
The challenge was to address the increasingly influential pre-production 
processes that, together, have come to shape the broadcast output of 
television sport. 
 
Key themes in the literature were transformation, value and the emergence 
of a sport-media-corporate axis following the expansion of transnational 
capitalism into media sport. It was argued that political economy remains 
most effective in framing the bigger picture and that more detailed research 
dealing with the significance of pre-production factors was scarce, as was a 
meaningful account of how such transformations impact on the supply side 
– the broadcasters, independent sports production companies, producers 
and directors that make the sports programmes we finally see.  
 
                                           
13 On 26.04.2014 BT was granted appeal of the CAT decision, see BSkyB (2013:13). 
Milne | June 2014 
 
71 
Literature concerning the politics, technology and economics of sports 
broadcasting was reviewed, including how ideas about value have changed. 
Inspired by neoliberal ideas, marketisation has been pursued through 4 
major policies including: privatisation, liberalisation, re-orienting regulation 
and corporatisation (Boyle, 2013:5). Consequently, the relegation of 
cultural and social values and the promotion of economic value above all 
others is considered to underpin the transformation of sports broadcasting 
rights and the marketisation of televised sport as a whole. The 
transformation of sport from a public good to its exploitation as a private 
good was noted. Whilst there are a number of interpretations about what 
constitutes the sports product, this research is specifically interested in the 
televised sport product. Consistent with a political economy approach, it is 
held that economic motives and power relationships largely determine 
which professional sports are supported, financed and eventually produced 
as a marketable commodity. In accord with Evens, Iosifidis and Smith 
(2013), the interaction between sports organisations and media firms is 
driven by major economic interests that dominate and shape market 
structures. 
 
Considering the relationship between media economics, sports economics 
and sports broadcasting rights it was argued that more prominence should 
be given to the role of sports economics, as the construction and 
assignment of sports broadcasting rights resides with sports leagues and 
federations – any view without this perspective is incomplete. It should be 
noted that leagues and federations could, if they wished to do so, change 
their priorities when assigning rights. As leagues have attained market 
power they have attracted the attention of competition authorities in the UK 
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and Europe; intervention has influenced the auctioning of sports 
broadcasting rights and ended BSkyB’s monopoly of Premier League rights.  
 
This research will unpack the roles of three influential pre-production 
factors, including technology, broadcasting rights and 
regulation/competition. It is argued that this process begins with national 
broadcasting policy but, following deregulation (or re-regulation that allows 
previously closed markets, like broadcasting, to operate on free market 
principles and with only light touch governance) and the introduction of 
fierce commercial competition, an overtly consumer-oriented system more 
akin to that found in the US has been adopted in the UK. This helps to 
explain what sport we see on television, where we can see it and what the 
final output looks and sounds like.  
 
The battle to control rights and subsequent television output is set against 
the increasing commercialisation of sport in the UK and the marketisation of 
broadcasting. As a result of unprecedented transformation many of the 
outcomes have yet to be researched including (a) the conditions that are 
increasingly added to broadcasting rights and (b) the expansion of 
federation activity into host broadcast operations and (c) provision of 
league-branded sports channels. The advent of digital technology has 
accelerated and intensified these activities.  
 
Among a general scarcity of literature a comparison of the development of 
television sport in the US and UK between 1945 and 1995 represents a 
particularly surprising gap. This follows in chapter 3.  
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 3 | History       
 
 
A surprising omission in the political economy interpretation of television 
sports is a comparison of technological, economic and political 
developments in the United States and UK between 1945 and 1995. 
Although Barnett (1990) cautioned against such comparisons he conceded 
American commercial television “signposted the road ahead” (Barnett, 
1990:153). With researchers considering a range of topics - from the 
incursion of marketing and promotional strategies (Giulianotti, 1999, 2005), 
how new types of corporate integration have been adopted (Whitson, 1998; 
Falcous, 2005) and the extension of transnational capitalism into sports 
(Nauright and Schimmel, 2005) - Boyle and Haynes (2000:66) claim this 
“reflects a mode of organisation that is more akin to the long-standing 
consumer-orientated configuration of sport in North America”. However, for 
long periods such changes were resisted in Britain, the subsequent speed at 
which overt commercialism and a more consumer-oriented approach was 
adopted is fascinating and a distinguishing feature between 1970 and 1995.  
In many ways the Premier League now demonstrates unprecedented levels 
of corporate behaviour and commodification that surpasses practice in US 
Major Leagues. Although there is some excellent work around the subject, 
no direct comparison of the development of sports television in the US and 
UK has been offered. This chapter addresses an omission as it extends the 
literature review and answers the first research question: how, despite 
some remarkable differences, many practices in the UK have gravitated 
towards those adopted in the US. 
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Post-World War II, the relationships between sport and television in the 
United States and UK could hardly have been further apart; the combination 
of professional sport and commercial entertainment-driven free-to-air 
network television in the United States contrasted starkly with the UK where 
there was an amateur ethos and paternalistic management of sport allied to 
a public service broadcast monopoly. Focussing on the NFL and English 
league football, the development of sports television through to 1970 is 
reviewed. 
 
The next section tracks the technological, economic (particularly the rising 
value of sports broadcasting rights) and political development trajectories in 
the United States and UK as free-market principles and commercialism 
became prevalent between 1970 and 1995. In conclusion, it is argued that 
by the early 1990s it had become the similarities rather than the differences 
in the ways that sport and television function in the United States and the 
UK that stand out.  
 
But something else was happening. Just how key attitudes attached to sport 
have radically changed in only 36 years can be seen in the transformation 
of the Olympics, from 1948 and the British Government-backed post-War 
London austerity games to 1984 and the aggressively commercial, privately 
financed, free-market funded model pioneered in Los Angeles. The impact 
of the 1984 Los Angeles Games sport-television-corporate model and the 
dramatic rise of global televised sports events are considered. The 
underlying theme is how market power has migrated from the broadcasters, 
moving upstream to the leagues and federations. This is important 
background context for subsequent discussion about how non-controversial 
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international television coverage is now provided directly by the federations 
– tracking this very significant development is essential to understanding 
just how much television sport has been transformed.  
 
3.1 Sport and television in United States and UK 1945 to 1970 
 
US Sport, open professionalism 
Pure amateurism simply never existed in the United States, argues Pope 
(1997). When baseball established itself in the 1870s as an entertainment 
business run by its owners, boards of directors and non-playing managers it 
was already openly professional. The very idea of sport as entertainment, or 
as a business, did not cause the sort of apoplexy it did in Britain. The four 
major US sports leagues are: Major League Baseball (MLB), the National 
Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the 
National Hockey League (NHL). Even though Major League Baseball (MLB) 
was a lucrative business for its owners it remained, from a legal point of 
view at least, defined as a game.  MLB also had the good fortune to be 
formed prior to the 1880 Sherman Antitrust Act that banned monopolies, so 
it was exempt from potential legal action. In other words, sport in the 
United States was not regarded as trade in the traditional sense and 
leagues, like the MLB, were subsequently free to engage in cartel behaviour 
(Fort, 2006:261; Pope, 1997:65). This important idea had a profound 
impact on US sports’ relationship with television; from the outset sport, 
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US television, advertiser-funded commercial broadcasting 
In some countries broadcasting was considered too important to be left to 
commercial exploitation; the United States was not one of them. By using 
formidable political leverage large corporations seized control of the US 
broadcasting industry before a public service system could be established 
(Herman and McChesney, 1997:14). These corporations had recognised the 
commercial potential of radio as an advertising-funded medium; the post-
World War II US television boom was funded by advertising. Advertising is 
central to the US free-to-air terrestrial broadcast networks because the 
economic forces favouring mass consumption of media is reinforced by the 
simultaneous production of audiences for sale to advertisers (Owen and 
Wildman, 1992:151; Picard, 1989). The viability of the free-to-air broadcast 
networks rests in their ability to remain the most convenient route for 
advertisers to reach mass audiences. The sheer scale of the US market is a 
key point of difference with the smaller UK market.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are consequences for relying on advertising 
to fund network television. Principally it is the value that advertisers place 
on the audience, rather than audience preferences that determines which 
programmes are provided. In this system the broadcaster has an incentive 
to maximise the supply of programmes that attract the audiences that 
advertisers will pay to reach14. As the US networks sought to correlate their 
advertising revenues with the ability to attract audiences, a preference 
                                           
14
 How broadcasters chose programmes explains copycat programming strategies that lead 
to increased uniformity of output. Owen and Wildman (1992) review a number of 
programme supply models (from Steiner and Beebe, to Spence-Owen and Wildman-Owen) 
that suggest likely outcomes for various forms of funding and for different levels of 
competition among broadcasters. For advertiser-funded television operating in a competitive 
market, they conclude that there is a bias in favour of programmes with large audiences and 
a bias against those that cater for minority interests.  
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developed for programmes that appeared at the same time each week. 
Programmes with familiar characters and storylines that were developed in 
only slightly varied situations and that carried over narratives from previous 
episodes were considered to generate viewer loyalty. According to Jay 
(2004:91) sports coverage fitted very neatly into this emerging pattern. As 
much as 30% of the prime-time schedule was devoted to sports coverage, 
making it a crucial part of early television programming in the United 
States. 
 
US television and sport 
In just 8 years, between 1948 and 1956, the percentage of American 
homes that had television jumped from 3% to 81%, (Jay, 2004:61). The 
arrival of television had several important consequences for sports 
including: 
a) The relocation of existing teams. This was the viable threat of moving 
a team to more lucrative media-markets created by new 
demographic shifts. From the mid 1950s teams began to move, 
including the Boston Braves to Milwaukee in 1953, then to Atlanta in 
1965; in 1957 the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants moved to 
Los Angeles and San Francisco respectively. 
b) The rapid expansion of professional sports leagues and the creation 
of new teams.  
c) The development of new leagues that challenged the monopoly of the 
existing order. The American Football League (AFL) was established 
in 1960 to challenge the NFL, baseball’s Continental League forced 
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the American League15 to admit two new teams in 1961, and in 
basketball the American Basketball Association (ABA) was formed in 
1967 to challenge the NBA. 
 
The location of a team or composition of a league was heavily influenced 
early on by the revenue that teams received from selling their broadcasting 
rights. Advertisers were attracted to the audiences that televised sports 
drew and were willing to pay networks for access to these audiences. 
Initially this was in the form of sponsorship. Gillette often sponsored the 
entire cost of a sports programme, supplying the networks with sufficient 
funds to pay the professional sports leagues for broadcasting rights (Jay, 
2004:102). In 1947 Gillette paid US$175,000 to attach its name to 
television coverage of the baseball World Series on NBC. Also attracted to 
the narratives of the emerging televised-sports marketplace, beer 
manufacturers established associations between consumer products and 
sport. Single company sponsorship of televised sports events continued 
throughout much of the 1950s. The mutual relationship between 
professional sport, entertainment, business and television was the American 
way writ large. 
 
UK Sport, paternalistic amateurism  
The historic hostility to commercialism among British sports ruling bodies is 
indisputable: “the rule of amateurs kept capitalism at bay in British sport” 
states Holt (1989:281). The roots of paternalistic amateurism lie in the 
Victorians’ organising genius for games. It was the British who invented 
                                           
15
 Although they operated together as the MLB, it wasn’t until 2000 that the National League 
and American Leagues were formally disbanded as legal entities with all their rights and 
interests vested in the MLB Commissioners Office.  
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many modern sports, codified their rules and exported them to the world16. 
Perelman (2012) links the origins of modern sport in England with the 
capitalist mode of production and the consolidation of imperialism. For the 
British, sportsmanship was the foundation stone. It was not so much what 
the British played, as the way that they played it that mattered most. 
Teams had very strong social and geographical links that went along way to 
defining their identity. Post-World War II the idea that sport might be an 
industry or a form of commercial entertainment would not have been 
acceptable to its managers who, themselves, were also amateurs. The FA in 
particular, as Conn (1997) points out, worked hard to protect football from 
“the corrosive idea that it [football] was purely entertainment, a business 
purely about money… The FA even had rules against directors making 
money out of clubs” (Conn, 1997:169). For most of the second half of the 
twentieth century British sport was poised between a rather idealised 
amateur past and a commercialised free-market future (Holt and Mason, 
2000). In terms of a battle, this was to prove a mismatch.  
 
The decline of amateurism in the UK 
Although amateurism remained popular in the 1950s it was soon in decline. 
Whilst Macmillan’s Britain was a very different place from Eisenhower’s 
America, the late 1950s and 1960s were still largely prosperous years that 
prompted Macmillan’s famous claim of 1957 that “Britons had never had it 
so good”. Football, boxing, golf, horse racing, cycling and cricket were also 
promising sports for budding professionals and, from the 1960s, 
amateurism began to lose its appeal. Contributory factors included the 
growth in international competition, changing expectations of what 
                                           
16
 For example, association football, rugby union and rugby league, cricket, tennis and golf. 
Milne | June 2014 
 
80 
constituted success, greater prosperity, and increased leisure options. The 
idea that sport was something to which financial value should not be 
attached began to seem rather out-dated. By the 1970s being an amateur 
came to mean little more than taking part. For Holt and Mason (2000), it 
was the market power of sports performers whose television appearances 
attracted the interest of advertisers and sponsors that triggered the demise 
of the amateur ethic.  
 
Of all Britain’s sports organisations it was football that claimed cultural 
centrality. The post-World War II repositioning of football signals the start 
of a general transformation in British sport. But sport on British television 
was valued very differently than in the United States. 
 
BBC Television and sport  
The reasons why a public service monopoly was chosen to address basic 
market failure in the UK, including a rejection of market forces are 
discussed in chapter 2. As was the case with the US networks BBC 
Television placed a great emphasis on broadcasting sport, but for quite 
different reasons. Re-iterating Whannel (1992), Gratton and Solberg (2007) 
argue it made economic sense as, post-World War II, the BBC benefited 
from an enormous inequality in market power between the buyers (the 
monopoly broadcaster BBC) and the sellers of broadcasting rights (the 
amateur sports organisations). An annual calendar of broadcast events - 
one that resonated with the winter and summer seasons of sport - had 
already been created on BBC radio as early as the 1930s (Scannell and 
Cardiff, 1991) so delivering important sporting events to a national 
audience became a cornerstone of the BBC’s PSB remit (Boyle and Haynes, 
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2000:69). As viewers joined the shared experience of BBC Television 
coverage, these events came to reinforce popular ideas about being 
British17. Arguing that it was promoting events to a national audience, the 
BBC resisted the payment of broadcasting rights fees to sport18. BBC 
Television’s first major sports broadcast came from the 1948 London 
Olympics, but it wasn’t until the 1950s that broadcasting attained any sort 
of momentum as previously modest sales of television sets were boosted in 
1953 by coverage of the Coronation.  
 
The BBC’s monopoly ended when independent television (ITV) was 
approved as part of the Television Act of 1954. Around the same time the 
era of sports broadcasting rights formally arrived in the UK. Copyright 
issues had led to a restriction of television access to sport in the UK.  
Significantly, the Labour government’s Committee on Copyrights (1952) 
announced that rights to television sports performances should be vested in 
the broadcaster on agreement of remuneration to sports promoters for any 
loss of revenue incurred. The BBC paid £1000 to broadcast the 1953 FA Cup 
Final with Stanley Matthews. However, sports governing bodies remained 
wary of the potential threat to attendances that television coverage might 
cause; such concerns kept coverage of live league football off British 
television screens until the early 1980s. In the UK, the staple diet of sport 
on television was edited highlights in a magazine format with live 
                                           
17
 The inclusion of events like the Oxford-Cambridge boat race said more about the tastes of 
BBC managers than the population at large. 
18
 Lamenting the payment of a facility fee of £1000 for the 1930 FA Cup Final the BBC’s 
head of OBs, Gerald Cock said: “It is a dismal prospect when the governing body of a sport 
originated, built up and entirely supported by amateurs, should be captured by professionals 
whose interest apparently is commercial.” Radio Times 28 March 1930, cited in Boyle and 
Haynes (2000). 
Milne | June 2014 
 
82 
presentation links, like Grandstand. The BBC’s Saturday afternoon sports 
magazine debuted in 1958 and ran until January 2007, almost forty years.  
 
Value and the monopoly provision of sport  
Meanwhile, in the United States, sport was changing television. As the cost 
of single company sponsorship of sports events rose sharply in the 1960s 
the networks started selling advertising spots to multiple companies, 
essentially the style of commercial breaks we see today. Advertisers were 
able to buy access to network television audiences in a number of ways, 
with as much as 80% of time committed in the up-front market, where 
segments are sold centrally by the networks on behalf of their affiliate 
stations19. The ability to make an immediate impact by attracting massive 
audiences, for example by broadcasting the most popular sports, came to 
command a special value for broadcasters and advertisers. As values began 
to rise, sports governing bodies adopted cartel behaviour to monopolise the 
provision of their sport to media providers.  
 
Ironically, it was amateur college sports that broke new ground. From 1949 
college sport commanded significant fees for its broadcasting rights when 
CBS paid US$100,000 for the rights to the annual Rose Bowl game from 
Pasadena, CA, (Jay, 2004:99). In 1952 the Television Plan allowed the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to negotiate the 
broadcasting rights collectively for all Division 1A college football.  
 
                                           
19 Owen and Wildman (1992) note 3 types of non-network television advertising: barter-
syndication (where advertising time is bundled together with programming and sold as a 
package), the national spot market (where time is purchased in local markets and therefore 
bypasses the networks altogether) and, from the 1980s, advertising sold on cable channels.  
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Whilst the NCAA led the way, the turning point in the relationship between 
professional sports and media providers came in the mid-1950s when team 
owners decided to establish the NFL as a single economic cartel with a 
monopoly provision of the sport to the television networks. By 1967 the NFL 
and AFL champion teams - still playing in parallel leagues - faced each other 
in a showdown game designed specifically for television that quickly became 
American sports’ most spectacular annual event – the SuperBowl. The cost 
of advertising slots within SuperBowl broadcasts and the transmission of 
bespoke advertising campaigns became a cult television event in itself and 
one that continues today. On the back of television exposure, by 1969 
professional football (NFL) had taken over from baseball (MLB) as America’s 
national game. The rising popularity of the NFL on television delivered 
important target demographics to advertisers. Media providers collected this 
value (the rates they charged advertisers for slot fees) and passed it 
through to the NFL in the form of sports broadcasting rights fees (Fort, 
2006:84). The correlation between the advertising revenue a televised sport 
can attract and the value of its broadcasting rights was established and 
remains a viable measure of value in many markets today.  
 
Sports broadcasting rights in the United States 
During the 1960s the market for sports broadcasting rights in the United 
States was changed by four factors described by McChesney (1989):  
 
1) For the first time television was available in most American homes. 
2) The technology of sports broadcasting was improving with slow 
motion and colour pictures increasing the quality of the viewing 
experience. 
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3) The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 allowed professional teams to 
negotiate together as a cartel with broadcasters and so substantially 
increased their market power. 
4) Media providers recognised the potential attraction of sports 
broadcasting to advertisers; this audience demographic was 
attractive to advertisers and a premium for those slots could be 
charged. 
 
As competition among broadcasters to capture the most popular sports 
broadcasting rights increased the result was scarcity. As the value of rights 
began to escalate market power migrated from broadcasters to the leagues. 
As noted, the NCAA was the first sports organisation to adopt cartel 
behaviour and from 1949, in a single decade, the price of broadcasting 
rights to NCAA college football increased almost 450% from US$1.14 
million, to US$5.1 million as CBS and NBC, now joined by ABC, raised their 
bids in successive contracts. 
 
The 1964 Tokyo Olympics is mentioned anecdotally as the turning point for 
a general upward spiral in sports broadcasting rights fees. However, there 
was an increase in competition for rights as the market adjusted from a 
duopoly to an oligopoly with the arrival of an ambitious and sports-oriented 
ABC. Whilst CBS acquired broadcasting rights to the 1960 Rome Olympics, 
it was ABC that won the rights for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The respective 
rights fees paid for subsequent summer Olympics were20:  
 
                                           
20 
www.facultygsb.stanford.edu/mcmillan/personal_page/documents/Bidding%20for%20Olymp
ic%20Broadcast%20Rights.pdf accessed 17.08.2010 
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Figure 3.1, Summer Olympics, US broadcasting rights fees 
Date Network Rights fees US$ 
1960 CBS $394,000 
1964 ABC $1.5 million 
1968 ABC $4.5 million 
1972 ABC $7.5 million 
1976 ABC $25 million 
 
Although the cost of broadcasting rights to the Olympics continued to rise, it 
can be argued that the burgeoning relationship between the NFL and 
television was more significant.  
 
In 1958, a game between the Indianapolis Colts and the New York Giants is 
credited with transforming the NFL into a major consumer product. Seen 
live on television by an audience estimated to be anywhere between 30 and 
45 million, the first sudden-death overtime championship game climaxed in 
a glorious finale for the Colts. For many fans, this game was the greatest 
ever played. Two years later, in 1960, the formation of the rival American 
Football League (AFL) demonstrated the growing importance of television to 
sports and vice versa. Whilst the AFL lost US$3 million in its first year of 
operation, in 1964 NBC offered a US$36 million contract for five years 
coverage, around US$7.2 million per season and a substantial fee paid not 
for the original NFL but for a rival league. According to Jay (2004) NBC’s bid 
came after CBS had offered the NFL US$14 million for the rights to 
broadcast games for two years. Between 1961 and 1963 ratings for football 
on both networks had risen by 50%, apparently justifying such strong 
investment. On January 15 1967, the first SuperBowl game was played. 
According to Gratton and Solberg (2007:70) between 1967 and 2005 the 
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average cost of a SuperBowl advertisement soared by more than 6,000%, 
which is 12 times the rate of the average network prime time’s inflation in 
advertising cost over the same period. During the 1960s NFL Commissioner, 
Pete Rozelle, realized the power of consolidation and the need for 
competitive balance between the league’s teams. He created a new 
business model for American football, ultimately making the NFL far more 
financially valuable than other American professional league sports, even 
though it had far fewer games per season to offer to television. Whilst the 
NFL continued to set the benchmark for the remarkable revenues it 
collected from the sale of broadcasting rights it should be remembered that 
broadcasters were, essentially, making massive bets on their ability to 
make a profit by selling access to large audiences to advertisers by 
televising sport. 
 
Sports broadcasting rights in the UK 
The impact of increased competition among broadcasters in the UK did not 
lead to a dramatic increase in the cost of acquiring broadcasting rights to 
sport as it had done in the United States.  Instead the BBC and ITV came to 
act as an informal cartel in suppressing the fees they paid for sports 
broadcasting rights. This practice lasted through to the mid-1970s. 
However, in the mid-1950s, parliamentary debate centred on whether or 
not there should be a free market in sporting events at all, or if the activity 
of commercial television in acquiring sports broadcasting rights should be 
strictly regulated. In 1956 government intervention came in the form of a 
national list of protected sports events. The listed events were considered to 
be of major importance to society and, consequently, they should be made 
available to as many television viewers as possible on free-to-air television. 
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According to the DCMS21 the original list was the result of a voluntary 
agreement between the BBC and ITA. The list consisted of the FA Cup Final, 
Wimbledon, England Test Matches, the Derby, the Grand National, the Boat 
Race and the Olympics and Commonwealth games when held in the UK.  
When BBC 2 launched in 1964, it gave the corporation the option to switch 
sports broadcasting between its channels therefore guaranteeing continued 
coverage in the case of an event over-running its planned duration; this 
became a useful negotiating tool. Neither the reallocation of ITV franchises 
in 1967, nor the arrival of Channel Four in 1982 had a significant impact on 
the prevailing BBC-ITV duopoly and the ability to acquire rights to the most 
popular sports at very favourable rates - by 1970 the BBC was only paying 
£120,000 per season for rights to show the football league on their popular 
Match of The Day highlights presentation. In contrast to developments in 
the US, market power remained very firmly with the BBC and ITV and did 
not migrate upstream to the sports organisations.  
 
For Boyle and Haynes (2000:38) a history of sport in the twentieth century 
is often presented as a history of televising sport. They also identify sport 
and the media as two great forces of the twentieth century, forces that 
“have become entwined in a global business relationship, which brings both 
pain and pleasure to many and increasingly generates profit for a select 
few.”  By the end of the 1960s many sports in the UK were facing a 
contested future, being pulled in one direction by increasingly out-dated 
amateur values and organisational structures and, in a new direction, by the 
influence of market forces and the lure of increased revenues via 
sponsorship and television exposure. British sport began for the first time to 
                                           
21
 www.culture.gov.uk/freetoair/faq.html#l7, accessed 30.07.2009 
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embrace commercialism. Whilst the process was usually cautious and 
gradual (Holt, 1989:354), the pace was beginning to quicken. The 1970s 
saw a new relationship develop between sport, television and sponsorship.   
 
3.2  Free-markets, commercialism, sport and television in USA 
and UK 1970 to 1995. 
Between 1970 and the mid-1990s the television business was transformed 
as restrictive regulations were lifted in the United States and UK. The 
technology of television production and of broadcast/distribution was 
revolutionised as a multitude of broadcasting platforms, some controlled by 
new owners, challenged the existing broadcasting order. With increased 
competition to acquire attractive content, the relationship between sport 
and television changed forever – the willingness to pay of advertisers, 
sponsors and viewers became an increasingly important factor. In the 
United States, the value of broadcasting rights to the most popular sports, 
like the NFL, began to rise dramatically in the 1970s followed by a further 
escalation in the 1980s. Although the value of broadcasting rights had been 
repressed in the UK these also began to rise quickly in the late 1980s, as 
competition to acquire live football rights gained momentum. By the 1990s 
it can be argued that the Premier League had created a more overtly 
commercial and corporate structure than its counterparts in the United 
States and was more profit-driven than any other professional sport before, 
including the NFL. These unprecedented changes and the economic 
consequences for sports broadcasting rights in the USA and UK are now 
reviewed. 
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The rise of the NFL 
Significant changes to the structure of US broadcasting from the 1970s are 
discussed in chapter 2.  However, among the consequences the broadcast 
networks turned more of their attention towards producing in-house sports 
and news programmes, activities that were not restricted by regulation 
policy to the extent that entertainment series were. The rise in popularity of 
the NFL on US network television during the 1970s is, at least in part, a 
consequence of broadcasting deregulation and the FinSyn rules that 
restricted in-house production of network prime-time entertainment series 
and option terms for syndication rights (see chapter 2 and Owen and 
Wildman, 1992).  
 
The 1970s was a golden decade for the NFL, its popularity grew steadily and 
advertisers and sponsors sought access to the large audiences live televised 
coverage of NFL games drew. The NFL was the first professional sports 
league to fully recognise and collect this value. Revenue from broadcasting 
rights soon overtook revenue from sponsorship (of events, teams and 
venues), ticket revenues and merchandising. For Fort (2006), it is the 
willingness of advertisers and sponsors to pay to access television 
audiences that altered the revenue side of professional sports forever. In a 
sense the NFL remains a voluntary organisation; it is an unincorporated 
association, which means that no single corporation is able to own any of 
the 32 franchises (teams)22. However, the teams, by acting collectively 
through the league and by adopting cartel behaviour, gained market power 
through monopoly control of media access to broadcasting rights.  
                                           
22 In contrast the Premier League in England is a formal corporation where the 20 member 
clubs act as shareholders. 
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It was Rottenberg (1956) who identified that the maintenance of 
competitive balance was fundamental to the economics of team sports and 
it was the NFL Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, who put this concept into 
practice. Recognising the power of consolidation among teams operating in 
strong geographic markets (in territories that were protected from 
competition through the league), Rozelle was able to create a league-wide 
equilibrium that made every NFL game potentially exciting to watch (Jay, 
2004). As explained by Fort (2006), an uncertainty of outcome must be 
preserved in games for fans to care and maintain their interest and that 
means there must be some overall balance of competition between teams. 
The NFL came up with a range of mechanisms to achieve consistent 
competitive balance and, consequently, was able to enhance the value of its 
broadcasting rights. Among the mechanisms are (a) salary cap agreements, 
(b) a reverse-order-of-finish draft system for players entering the league 
and, (c) an equal share of broadcasting revenues. With fewer teams and, 
therefore, less games played across a season to sell (a 14 week regular 
season followed by 3 rounds of play-offs), the major networks competed to 
acquire scarce broadcasting rights to the NFL and so the value increased 
substantially with each new contract. It was a seller’s market. For 1970, 
Gratton and Solberg (2007) cite the NFL as earning US$49 million a year 
from CBS (for NFC games) and NBC (for AFC games), both contracts were 
for four years. ABC contributed US$8.5 million for the rights to broadcast 
the newly created schedule of Monday night games. By contrast, in 1970 
the BBC paid £120,000 for the rights to show highlights from the Football 
League. Also of note: whilst NFL rights were split (or rationed) between the 
(then) 3 major networks the copyright to all NFL broadcast material resided 
with the league and not with the networks that produced the coverage. 
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Increased competition among US broadcasters 
The arrival of viable competition to the terrestrial free-to-air broadcasters 
increased the relative scarcity of broadcasting rights for the most popular 
sports driving up values, but what was different was the degree of inflation 
in the 1980s.  Despite the increased competition from new media providers 
including pay-TV channels, a competitive edge was retained by the free-to-
air networks because, as Jay (2004) reminds us, television sport is a 
medium for renting audiences to advertisers so the ability to deliver very 
large audiences combined with frequent breaks in play was a compelling 
proposition. This helps explain why, in contrast to the UK, Major League 
sports in the United States have retained a strong presence on the free-to-
air terrestrial broadcast networks resisting the temptation to migrate 
wholesale to subscription-based television networks. Illustrating this point, 
News Corporation purchased the Fox Broadcasting Company in 1985 and 
developed it into the fourth free-to-air independent television system, 
building on the existing network to compete with the three major US 
networks. FOX Sports was set up in 1994 following the acquisition of 
broadcasting rights to the NFL (NFC games23) for four years with FOX 
paying US$1.58 billion to strip CBS of the rights. Significantly FOX Sports, a 
sister corporation to BSkyB, was not set up as a stand-alone subscription-
based service or even as a direct broadcast satellite television service in the 
mould of BSkyB even though, like BSkyB, it was transformed by the 
acquisition of exclusive live broadcasting rights.  
 
                                           
23 The NFC has teams in most of the largest US markets, including New York, Washington, 
Philadelphia, Chicago and San Francisco. 
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It has been argued that US sport is less troubled when being described as a 
commodity, or as a business designed to generate profit. In another 
distinction from practices in the UK and Europe, the US Major Leagues were 
very much attuned to the needs of television from the outset, consequently 
the boundaries between what suited television coverage and what was 
enshrined in the rules of the game remained flexible and open to review. 
For example, the 2-minute time-out at the end of each half in NFL games is 
widely attributed to the need for a premium advertising break as the action 
mounted. Today, teams are allowed to challenge on-field refereeing 
decisions via a video replay seen by audiences at home and for which they 
are charged a time-out.  In the case of the NBA, innovations originally 
provided to enhance television coverage have become signature parts of the 
game, including the 3-point shot and the 24-second shot clock that was 
introduced in 1954 to encourage faster play.  
 
Leagues apart 
Between the 1970s and mid-1980s the contrast between English league 
football and the NFL could not have been greater, if anything they were 
even further apart than they had been in 1945. Whilst the protected list 
regulations and the BBC/ITV duopoly still dominated British broadcasting, 
the relationship between sport and television did begin a gradual process of 
intensification. In the early 1970s sponsorship, sport and television formed 
what Whannel (1992) called the sporting triangle signalling the first steps 
towards the corporate-media-sport alignment that was to follow. For Boyle 
and Haynes (2000:44) the 1970s and 1980s were a golden age for British 
sports television coverage whilst Holt and Mason (2000:120) concluded, 
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“Spectator sport and the media have fused together. The one is 
inconceivable without the other”.  
 
However, unlike the US where leagues like the NFL exercised market power, 
sport in the UK desperately needed television exposure in order to attract 
sponsorship and boost revenues. In the UK the market for sports 
broadcasting rights continued to heavily favour the buyers, the 
broadcasters. In the early 1970s developments in cricket, golf, tennis and 
Formula 1 illustrated the tensions as sports were being pulled in one 
direction by out-dated amateur values and organisational structures and, in 
a new direction, by the increasing influence of market forces and the lure of 
increased revenues. Ironically, the lack of advertising on the BBC appealed 
to sponsors and led to a number of sponsored made-for-television cricket 
events such as John Player Sunday League. British sport began, for the first 
time, to tentatively embrace commercialism, although the process was 
usually cautious and gradual (Holt, 1989:354). Profound changes in sport 
can be linked to a shift in values among the organising elite of sport and the 
changing role of television, such changes are most apparent in English 
league football.  
 
English league football rights undervalued 
For a long time the staple diet of English league football on television was 
edited highlights. Between 1968 and 1979 the value of broadcasting rights 
to football rose to £534,000 a season (Boyle and Haynes, 2004) as the BBC 
and ITV continued to keep fees depressed. In 1979, ITV tried to break the 
informal cartel by seeking an exclusive deal for Saturday night football 
highlights, but the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) intervened and the sought-
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after slot was subsequently rotated annually between ITV and the BBC. By 
1980 broadcasting rights had risen to £2.2 million (Boyle and Haynes, 
2004:17), still only a fraction of NFL revenues. With the market still tightly 
constricted by the ITV-BBC duopoly there was a growing sense among the 
clubs that English football had undersold itself (Conn, 1997); maybe making 
more live League football matches available for broadcast would improve 
revenue streams? 
 
In 1983 Canon became the Football League’s first sponsor and the 1983-84 
season saw live coverage of League matches return to British television on 
2 October 1983 with ITV’s The Big Match Live, the 2-year deal cost £5.2 
million for ten matches per season. With the exception of a single match 
shown on ITV in 1960, remarkably, there had been no live coverage of 
English league matches prior to this contract, in this respect the UK lagged 
far behind the United States. The 1983 contract is also significant as 
broadcasters allowed commercial sponsorship for the first time; this took 
the form of logos displayed on club shirts. With potential revenue from 
sponsors, and an emerging replica kit market to service, other clubs quickly 
followed trendsetters Hibernian and Liverpool24. By contrast, the NFL has 
never allowed advertising on team shirts. From today’s perspective it is 
hard to picture English football as unfashionable and out of favour, but it 
was not the only game in town as athletics provided an unexpected 




                                           
24 Derby County had a deal with SAAB in 1978, but the shirts were never worn. 




In 1984, ITV acquired the rights to broadcast athletics events previously 
held by the BBC. ITV presented a 5-year, £10.5 million deal that was 
superbly timed as the popular rivalry between Sebastian Coe and Steve 
Ovett was about to reach its peak. ITV had prized away a key component of 
BBC Sport’s portfolio of rights. The reason for the switch was not criticism 
of the coverage offered by the BBC, but was the sheer amount of money 
paid for the broadcasting rights by ITV. With the exception of those events 
identified on the government’s list of protected events, from now on notice 
was served: whoever could pay the most to acquire broadcasting rights in 
the UK would win the bidding process.  
 
Back at the Football League in 1985 an offer of £4 million a season for 19 
live matches plus highlights was offered jointly by the BBC and ITV. Whilst 
revenue from television was creeping upwards the game itself was still 
beset with problems. 1985 provided further crisis points when, between 11 
and 29 May, there were tragedies involving loss of life at football stadiums 
in Bradford City and Heysel25. When, some 6 months later, the Football 
League’s broadcasting rights deal was finally completed it was for a reduced 
fee. Significantly, the new contract, which came into effect in 1986, was the 
first to breach the principle of equal distribution of revenues among all 92-
league member clubs (Dobson and Goddard, 2007:81). From now on the 
rich would get richer. 
 
 
                                           
25 56 fans died in a fire in the main stand in Bradford, and 42 Juventus fans died after a wall 
collapsed during fighting with Liverpool supporters at the European Cup Final in Brussels. 
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Live televised league football in the UK 
In 1988, the cost of broadcasting rights escalated dramatically when ITV 
paid £44 million to cover a 4-year period from 1989 to 1992; £11 million to 
show 18 live matches per season. This is a landmark contract in the history 
of British televised football because, as Boyle and Haynes (2004:19) note, 
“it enshrined the notion of live football as an integral part of the regular 
televisual diet of football supporters”. It was ITV, and not Sky Sports, that 
raised the number of cameras used for football coverage from around 6 to 
17 per game. In only five years from 1983, the acquisition of broadcasting 
rights to live coverage of league football had become more sought after 
than highlights - this is an important shift. And, with challengers to the 
BBC/ITV duopoly waiting in the wings, the competition to acquire the 
broadcasting rights to live league football was about to become more 
intense and more costly than before.  
 
British broadcasting, deregulation and satellite broadcasting  
Regulation played a significant part in determining economic practice in 
media markets and among media firms in the UK. However, competition to 
the BBC-ITV duopoly, at least as far as sport is concerned, did not come 
from cable networks but, instead, from direct satellite broadcasting. This 
was not the supplemental add-on broadcasting model found in the United 
States, it was all or nothing full-on competition for viewers. As Boyle and 
Haynes (2004) point out, it was not the arrival of ITV in 1955 that signalled 
the beginning of real commercial competition, but the arrival of BSkyB. 
 
With competition between the BBC and ITV to acquire live football rights 
already intensifying and an offer of £9 million a season for ten years on the 
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table from BSB (prior to its merger with Sky), the top football clubs were 
encouraged to form a new super league. According to Conn (1997) club 
owners reasoned that such a league would increase bargaining power with 
the broadcasters by creating scarcity; clubs could collect enhanced 
television revenue and keep these fees for themselves without sharing with 
teams from the lower divisions. But disaster was to overtake English 
football once again when, in April 1989, 96 fans lost their lives at an FA Cup 
semi-final match at Hillsborough. The subsequent Taylor Report published in 
1990, forced football to rethink its relationship with supporters including the 
provision of all-seat stadia for top-flight matches26. Boyle and Haynes 
(2000) argue that without the fundamental changes pushed through by the 
Taylor Report it is doubtful whether commercial television would have 
shown as much interest in football in the early 1990s as it did.  
 
The FA Premier League  
Following the Taylor Report of 1990, Conn takes the view that:  
 
If	  football	  had	  had	  a	  strong	  governing	  body,	  proud,	  sure	  of	  its	  game	  and	  its	  ethos,	  to	  
undertake	  the	  fullest	  reassessment	  of	  policy	  called	  for	  by	  Lord	  Taylor,	  it	  would	  have	  felt	  a	  
weighty	  duty	  and	  responsibility	  to	  reorganise	  the	  game	  for	  the	  good	  of	  all	  who	  loved	  it.	  
(Conn,	  1997:153)	  
 
In the early 1990s, English football was most concerned with economic re-
organisation. Even without television revenue unprecedented amounts of 
money were flooding into the game - Conn (1997) confirms that football 
was receiving public money in the form of a substantial tax break 
                                           
26
 In economic terms the reduction in capacity created scarcity forcing the price of tickets 
up.   
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amounting to £200 million over 4 years. For Conn (1997) the rush for 
profit, that had become the defining principle of British life in the early 
1990s, was applied to football by the FA Premier League.  
 
Following a battle for power between the Football League and the Football 
Association (FA), proposals to unify football from the Football League were 
rejected and the FA’s document The Blueprint for the Future of Football 
(1991) carried the day. This 118-page document expressed the idea for a 
breakaway league to serve the richest clubs in England. As such, it set the 
tone for the takeover of football by businessmen and owners interested in 
making money from clubs whose assets they viewed as seriously 
undervalued and from which profit could be realised. For Falcous (2005) the 
consequences were clear: 
 
…	  these	  shifts	  were	  associated	  with	  reconfiguring	  power	  relations,	  the	  commercial	  
realignment	  of	  playing	  structures,	  revamped	  administrative	  structures	  and	  revolutionised	  
spectator	  provisions	  and	  event	  presentation.	  The	  historical	  legacies	  of	  paternalistic	  
amateurism,	  limited	  entrepreneurial	  investment,	  which	  had	  previously	  constrained	  




The new league was set up as a corporation owned by the 22-member 
clubs27, each receiving a single vote. The new league also had commercial 
independence from the Football League and the FA, allowing it to negotiate 
its own broadcast rights and sponsorship agreements and to route those 
revenues to the top clubs without sharing with all 92 Football League 
                                           
27
 From 1995 this was reduced to 20 clubs.  
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members. For all the commercial developments driven through by the NFL 
in the United States, it has always retained the principle that clubs shared 
broadcasting revenue equally.  
 
The FA Premier League was formed on 27 May 1992. Holt and Mason 
(2000) note the future of football was now in private-hands. Operating as a 
business, Premier League football now charged what the market could bear 
to pay for its product and the cost of match tickets rose. On the 
rehabilitation of football, Dobson and Goddard (2007:69) considered the 
game’s re-emergence as “the most popular and fashionable national sport 
was aided by skilful exploitation by the industry of selective aspects of its 
own heritage”. When considering the creation of the Premier League it 
should also be noted that this is an extremely rare example of a rival league 
replacing an incumbent league. The Premier League overturned the 
significant advantages held by the dominant league (the Football League); 
rivals to the NFL in the US have never been so successful. 
 
Premier League broadcasting rights 
Recognising that new technology allowed broadcasting rights holders to 
collect value directly from the consumer - via an encrypted subscription 
service, lessening the overall reliance on advertising and exploiting the 
audiences willingness to pay - the BBC saw that it was, effectively, out of 
the competition to acquire live rights to the Premier League, so it acted 
strategically by collaborating with BSkyB28 to offer a joint bid, with the BBC 
retaining the rights to show match highlights on Match of The Day.  
                                           
28 The BBC had previously done a deal with BSB to acquire the rights to FA Cup and 
international matches, Dobson and Goddard, (2007). 
Milne | June 2014 
 
100 
Both ITV and BSkyB had lobbied the clubs and the new league intensely in 
order to secure exclusive live broadcasting rights29. ITV’s sealed bid was for 
£262 million. Hearing of this bid from a Premier League official, BSkyB 
faxed over a revised bid of £304 million for 60 matches per season for five 
seasons. BSkyB’s offer30 included a top up for overseas rights and a fee for 
highlights rights provide by the BBC (Horsman, 1997: 91-105).  This was an 
increase of £30 million on BSkyB’s previous offer, whilst Conn (1997:20) 
places the BBC contribution as high as £44 million. The previous agreement 
between the Football League and ITV (1988-1992) was £11 million for 18 
matches per season, whilst the combined BSkyB/BBC offer for exclusive 
rights to Premier League matches was an average of £60 million for 60 
matches per season, a rise from just over £600,000 per match to around £1 
million. Between 1983 and 1992, the average value of broadcasting rights 
per match to live League football in England had risen by close to 200%. 
Top-flight English league football had, some twenty years later than the 
NFL, come to exercise market power. The UK broadcasting rights market, at 
least for the Premier League, had become a sellers’ market. Economically, 
live football was more important to the commercial future of BSkyB than it 
ever was for the BBC. Live Premier League football was scheduled across a 
range of new kick-off times and was aggressively promoted by Sky Sports. 
Premier League football was no longer available on free-to-air television in 
the UK, but was accessed via an annual subscription and additional PPV 
fees. 
 
                                           
29 An account of the negotiations surrounding the first broadcasting rights issued by the 
Premier League are found in Fynn and Guest (1994) and Horsman (1998). 
30 Cave (2000) suggests that BSkyB’s offer for their exclusive UK broadcasting rights is 
closer to UK£191 million in the initial contract. 
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However, the acquisition of sports broadcasting rights, partly due to the 
remarkable sums now involved, and partly because a number of large 
transnational corporations dominated the emerging global media markets, 
was not limited to knowledge of a single market. Gratton and Solberg 
(2007) suggest that, via News Corporation and FOX, BSkyB was acquainted 
with the strong competition involved in acquiring sports rights in the US 
market. This connection may have been influential when BSkyB successfully 
negotiated a further four-year extension with the Premier League costing 
£743 million, a 250% rise according to Dobson and Goddard (2007:82). 
However, it is just as likely to have informed FOX in its acquisition of NFL 
rights via BSkyB’s experience with the Premier League.  
 
The transformation of English league football did not happen in isolation 
and, among other influences, the rapid growth of global televised sports 
events, including the IOC Olympics and the FIFA World Cup Finals should be 
also considered. Of particular significance is the period 1982 to 1986, 
including the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics (that showcased the growing 
influence of global corporate interests in televised sport) and the increasing 
ambition of the organising federations to provide sympathetic television 
coverage on behalf of their commercial partners. 
 
3.3 The rise of the global televised-sport event 
As sports broadcasting developed in the United States and UK, economically 
it was league sport that provided the bread and butter – regular games that 
were easily scheduled across several months and that delivered predictable 
audiences for broadcasters. But something new was happening. The shared 
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experience of watching sport on television was becoming an occasion in its 
own right, particularly with the Olympics and the World Cup Finals 
broadcast every four years. The IOC Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup 
Finals grew from modest events to new levels of global prominence 
primarily through television exposure allied to increasing levels of corporate 
interest. Four important case studies are now reviewed: the transformation 
of the IOC Olympic Games (3.3.1), the commercialisation of the FIFA World 
Cup Finals (3.3.2), the NBA and the global television market (3.3.3) and the 
UEFA Champions League (3.3.4). 
 
3.3.1 The transformation of the Olympics 
The 1968 Mexico Games were the first to attract a significant television 
audience. For the first time television coverage was in colour and included 
live slow-motion replays. In the United States ABC packaged the games as 
a dramatic mini-series, a narrative full of human drama and emotion. In the 
UK, satellite relays enabled the BBC to broadcast breakfast-time Olympic 
programmes, a novelty at the time31. In 1972, television coverage of the 
Munich Games was split between sport and news after eight Palestinian 
gunmen took eleven Israeli athletes hostage. Despite the tragic death toll, 
the IOC declared: “the games must go on”. In 1972, for the first time, the 
IOC appointed a private advertising agency and sold the rights to use the 
official Olympic emblem as a marketing tool.  
 
However, the Olympic movement nearly collapsed as a consequence of the 
1976 Montreal Games. Significantly, the International Olympic Committee 
                                           
31
 Ex-athlete, MP and Chairman of London 2012 LOCOG, Sebastian Coe attributes the start 
of his Olympic career to watching television coverage of the 1968 Mexico Olympics.  
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(IOC) does not pay to stage the Games. Instead, each Olympics is funded 
by the host city: a combination of the Local Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games (LOCOG), and their National Olympic Committee (NOC). 
Although the event attracted 628 sponsors and suppliers it generated only 
US$7 million for the Local Organising Committee. It took the city fully 30 
years to pay off the debt incurred in staging the games, with interest 
included estimated to be US$2 billion (Smit, 2006:184). Hosting an 
Olympics could be a liability.  
 
The Olympics’ reputation fell further with the widespread boycott of the 
1980 Moscow games. NBC had agreed to pay US$87 million for the US 
television rights before President Carter withdrew the US team in protest 
over Soviet military action in Afghanistan. The EBU obtained rights 
collectively on behalf of its PSB members so British broadcasters paid much 
lower rights fees. There was still British television interest in the discredited 
competition as the British boycott was much less effective than the 
American one. But the Olympic movement was struggling to find its way. In 
1980 Juan Antonio Samaranch was appointed Chairman. Determined to find 
new sources of revenue, Samaranch proposed to repackage the Olympics to 
make them more attractive for broadcasters and sponsors. The IOC opted 
to handle all broadcasting rights negotiations itself, rather than via an 
agency like International Sport and Leisure (ISL).  
 
According to the IOC32, broadcasting rights fees continue to account for 
53% of Olympic revenue. The majority of this revenue has, since 1980, 
come from the US free-to-air networks. Revenue from broadcasting rights 
                                           
32
 www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/facts/revenue/broadcast_uk accessed 01/07/2009. 
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rose from US$287 million in 1984 to US$1.706 billion in 2006 – an increase 
of nearly 600% in 22 years. McCarthy (2014) reports that NBC secured a 
US$7.5 billion deal to broadcast the Olympics between 2021 and 2032, 
having paid US$4.4 billion for the period 2014 to 2020. The turning point 
for the IOC was the 1984 Los Angeles Games. If the 1980 Moscow Games 
were an advertisement for state socialism, then the 1984 LA Games were 
all about the benefits of private enterprise and the neoliberal values of the 
Regan-era. The impact of the 1984 Los Angeles Games on the organisation 
of sport in general should not be underestimated. The age of massive 
corporate sponsorship of sport had arrived33. 
 
The US broadcasting rights for the LA Games tripled from US$87 million 
paid by NBC in 1980, to US$225 million paid by ABC in 1984. According to 
Jay (2004) this meant that ABC had to sell more commercials and devote 
even more airtime to the LA Games in order to recover the broadcasting 
rights fees and production costs. However, it wasn’t the television coverage 
but the organisation of the Games that was to prove revolutionary.  
 
The Los Angeles LOCOG separated sponsorship into three categories: (a) 34 
companies that signed on as Official Sponsors, (b) 64 companies who 
purchased supplier rights, and (c) 65 companies that were licensees. Each 
category provided designated rights and exclusivity. The IOC official website 
confirms that the sponsors were mostly large, multinational corporations - 
Boyle and Haynes (2000:55) list Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Kodak, Levi-
Strauss, Visa and Anheuser-Busch among the official sponsors who paid 
                                           
33 Corporate sponsorship had been around on a smaller scale since the 1964 Tokyo Games 
when technical support from sponsors companies, like Seiko’s creation of quartz-timing 
technology, began to take on a greater prominence. 
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between US$4 million and US$15 million each to be associated with the LA 
Games. More wryly, Jay (2004:181) observes someone even bought the 
rights to pick up the Olympic garbage. Under its organiser Peter Ueberroth, 
over half a billion US dollars was raised and, by making commercial 
sponsorships such a significant revenue stream, the first-ever privately 
financed games paid for themselves and turned a profit of US$215 million. 
But this profit did not go to the IOC thus triggering further re-organisation 
within the Olympic Movement.  
 
By the 1988 Seoul Games the IOC had established its own worldwide 
marketing programme. The designation worldwide comes from the business 
categories created for The Olympic Programme (TOP). These are limited to 
products and services that were considered to be marketable globally. For 
London 2012 there were 11 TOP worldwide partners34. Smit (2006) 
attributes the creation of TOP to the broadcasting rights holding and 
marketing firm ISL, rather than the IOC. The IOC reasoned the fewer 
corporations involved the more valuable individual sponsorships would be. 
Magdalinski et al (2005) note that the IOC benefits as consumers develop 
brand loyalty to the games, while its TOP partners rely on consumers 
developing brand loyalty via the games. They conclude: “Perhaps the 
Olympics are more capable of naturalising, even mystifying capitalist 
relations than are other forms of collective consumption” (Magdalinski et al, 
2005:52).  
                                           
34 http://www.olympic.org/sponsors accessed 15.10.2012 
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Even more so than twenty years of television coverage, what Ueberroth35 
had ultimately achieved with the 1984 Los Angeles games was to reshape 
the Olympics as a commodity presented to an unprecedented global 
audience via television. For Jay (2004:182) “from 1984 the Olympics 
became a packaged spectacle, an ideal medium through which corporations 
could sell their products.” And, for Gruneau and Cantelon (1988:347), the 
change in organisation to a more hierarchical partnership signified the 
transformation of the Olympics into an increasingly market-orientated 
project where “a more fully developed expression of incorporation of 
sporting practice into the ever-expanding marketplace of international 
capitalism” is seen. For Boyle and Haynes the step change is significant: 
 
For	  many	  the	  LA	  Games	  were	  a	  celebration	  of	  corporate	  capitalism,	  an	  arena	  where	  human	  
activity	  was	  transformed	  into	  an	  economic	  process	  that	  fuelled	  the	  consumption	  of	  
corporate	  goods	  and	  services.	  It	  was	  a	  process	  that	  television	  both	  mediated	  and	  played	  a	  
central	  role	  in	  sustaining.	  Sport	  had	  become	  synonymous	  with	  corporate	  image,	  television	  
entertainment	  and	  consumer	  capitalism	  and,	  for	  sponsors	  and	  marketers,	  global	  sporting	  
events	  would	  never	  be	  the	  same	  again.	  (Boyle	  and	  Haynes,	  2000:56.)	  
 
 
Whilst IOC revenues are now split between the fees they attract for 
broadcasting rights and a sophisticated marketing plan to promote key 
sponsors, it is the amalgamation of television and corporate marketing into 
a single output that defines the Olympics. This move was central to the 
Olympics’ transformation over eight years, from a point of near collapse in 
1976 to the spectacular growth seen from 1984 on. 
                                           
35 Ueberroth went on to become MLB Commissioner between 1984 and 1989. His daughter, 
Heidi, became a senior executive at the NBA during its global expansion of the 1990s. 
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3.3.2 The commercialisation of the FIFA World Cup Finals 
The governing body for world football, FIFA, was radically transformed 
between 1974 and 1998. Previously known as an unadventurous 
organisation, FIFA became a more commercially aligned operation under 
João Havelange and, as with the Olympics, the 1980s saw significant 
changes.  
 
From 1982, the FIFA World Cup began to expand. Between 1934 and 1978, 
16 national teams took part in the World Cup Finals36 before the 
competition was expanded to include 24 teams in 1982 and then 32 teams 
in 1998. The FIFA World Cup was first televised in 1954 and the primary 
sale of broadcasting rights was to the World TV consortium of public 
broadcasters with the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) leading the 
negotiations (Jennings, 2006). This arrangement remained unchallenged 
until 1996 when FIFA, advised by ISL, were convinced that the PSB 
monopoly led by the EBU was acquiring broadcasting rights for well under 
the potential market value - without demand created by competition, prices 
for broadcasting rights remained relatively deflated. Unlike the Olympics, 
there was virtually no demand from US broadcasters for the World Cup. On 
the other hand, the massive audiences attracted to the free-to-air terrestrial 
PSBs had tremendous appeal to potential corporate sponsors. Paradoxically, 
achieving the highest price for broadcasting rights did not necessarily 
deliver the most profitable outcome to FIFA.  
 
FIFA’s transformation was initially linked to the rapid expansion of the 
football marketing business, but it is the subsequent amalgamation of: (a) 
                                           
36 With one exception, in 1938 when 15 teams took part. 
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the interests of large corporate sponsors with, (b) sympathetic event 
management and television coverage that (c) provides access to mass 
audiences that is significant. FIFA’s own sales pitch says: “Together with the 
official broadcasters who deliver worldwide TV and radio coverage of the 
events, the sponsors and licensees are the pillars that support the staging 
and promotion of a FIFA event” (FIFA, 2009).  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the football marketing business was largely 
formed by two men: Patrick Nally and Horst Dassler, son of Adi Dassler the 
founder of the Adidas sporting goods firm. Nally advised sports organisers 
how to package their events in ways that would be appealing to 
broadcasters and sponsors then he would persuade companies like Coca-
Cola to become sponsors of these events. Ahead of the 1982 World Cup, 
Nally set out a formal sponsorship practice titled Intersoccer that identified 
exactly what rights would be accorded to sponsors and how these rights 
would be protected on their behalf (Nally, 1979). Intersoccer was broadly 
similar to Ueberroth’s three-tier structure for the 1984 LA Olympics; it 
became a very influential template.  
 
Nally also cooperated with Dassler at the 1978 World Cup in Argentina 
selling advertising space, but Dassler became convinced it was the business 
of sports broadcasting rights that had the greatest potential (Smit, 2006). 
Up to this point, no third party company beyond a sports federation or 
broadcasters had held the broadcasting rights to a major sports event. 
Dassler jettisoned Nally and teamed up with the Japanese advertising giant 
Dentsu. In the autumn of 1982, a marketing and broadcasting rights 
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holding company called International Sport and Leisure (ISL37) was set up 
in Lucerne, Switzerland. The new firm quickly corralled the football 
marketing business.  
 
Dassler38 continued to advise Havelange and, from 1982, FIFA greatly 
expanded its commercial ventures including advertising and merchandising. 
ISL paid 45 million Swiss francs for the 1986 World Cup in Mexico and they 
raised over 200 million Swiss francs from assorted sponsors, profit that 
went directly to FIFA, unlike the relationship between the 1984 LOCOG in 
LA and the IOC (Smit, 2006:196). In 1988, the award of the 1994 World 
Cup to the United States appeared to underline FIFA’s interest in profit and 
engaging corporate interests.  
 
According to Smit, for several years ISL were issued huge broadcasting 
rights contracts for both the Olympics and the World Cup Finals without a 
second thought given to the process (Smit, 2006:196). For the first time, 
broadcasting rights from sports governing bodies were held by a third party 
for subsequent sale to broadcasters without the need for ISL to make any 
programmes – it can be argued that the creation of value, as a separate 
process from production, reflected the general swing away from the 
production of goods to the provision of services that was taking place in the 
wider economy. The ISL operation was a trailblazer for other rights holding 
companies to follow, including IMG, Kirch Media and SportFive.  
 
                                           
37
 ISL was jointly owned by Dassler and Dentsu. Smit (2006:210) claims Dassler persuaded 
Dentsu to give him a 51% share in ISL that he placed in a holding company called Sporis.   
38
 Anecdotally, it is said that Dassler taught Havelange to sell the World Cup and Samaranch 
how to market the Olympic Games. 
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As was the case with the Olympics, the World Cup Finals were redefined in 
ways that mostly benefited FIFA. This included placing the marketing 
strategies of large transnational corporations at the very heart of 
tournament staging and television presentation. In a set up reminiscent of 
The Olympic Programme (TOP) - believed by Smit (2006) to have been 
conceived by ISL - signing a group of primary sponsors was designed to (a) 
spread the financial risk of the World Cup Finals and (b) result in less 
dependence on revenue from the sale of broadcasting rights alone. 
However, the two activities remain intricately linked. The conversion of the 
governing institution of football into a corporate organisation that, for 
example, now hedges against variations in currency exchange valuations, or 
that requests tax-free status and fast-track work permits when operating in 
a host country (Jennings, 200639) is part of the overall transformation. The 
ISL-FIFA joint marketing strategy provided a commercial base from which 
international football - now being sold as a highly commercialised 
entertainment industry and marketed as “the World’s game” - could extend 
its relationship with the transnational corporate world. In other words, the 
four-year period between 1982 and 1986 saw a new corporate–sport–media 
axis emerge that enabled the dramatic rise of global televised sport events 
from the mid-1980s well into the 21st Century. As the rest of the sports 
world assimilated these new business models, the next step was their 




                                           
39 Jennings reiterated his argument in a high profile Panorama documentary titled “Fifa’s 
Dirty Secrets” and broadcast on BBC One at 20.30 on 29.11.2010 
(www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00wfl8t, accessed 12.10.2012). 
Milne | June 2014 
 
111 
3.3.3 The NBA, sports marketing and globalisation  
The NBA was the first league to align their television product with growing 
global marketing trends. Entertainment values and an overt association 
between celebrity and sports superstars were key ingredients in the NBA 
brand.  
 
In the early 1980s, the NBA came very close to collapse (Jay, 2004:202). 
The increase in competition, particularly from new media providers, to 
acquire sports broadcasting rights was critical to the NBA’s development 
and came at a very opportune time. In 1984, David Stern was appointed 
NBA Commissioner. Four months later Michael Jordan was drafted into the 
NBA by the Chicago Bulls. Jordan’s rise to global superstardom is attributed 
to David Falk40 and the ProServ agency. ProServ set up Jordan Universal 
Marketing and Promotions (JUMP) wrapping Jordan’s commercial activities 
into a corporation. Jordan’s popularity was enhanced through his 
endorsement of Nike sports products. Falk persuaded Nike to create a 
signature shoe for Jordan called “Air Jordan” (Jay, 2004). From 1985, Air 
Jordan shoes were advertised widely on television. The commercials shot by 
movie director Spike Lee, who appeared in the commercials reiterating his 
successful Mars Blackmon character41, achieved a cult status and were 
instrumental in propelling the increasingly commercial culture of modern 
sport into the mainstream. Jordan’s example illustrates how athletic ability 
was no longer enough to define top sports stars; “they also needed to 
promote themselves, to turn their skills into something that sells” (Jay, 
                                           
40
 Falk, like Stern, is a practising lawyer. 
41
 Lee played Blackmon in his 1986 film She’s Gotta Have it. 
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2004:241). By 1992 only US$4 million of the US$25 million Jordan earned 
annually came from the Chicago Bulls42. 
 
Off the back of Jordan’s success the NBA adopted an aggressive global 
marketing strategy. Nike founder Phil Knight suspected that the NBA was 
free-riding on the advertising campaigns of Nike as the league set about 
constructing it’s own personality-based sports brand. In selling NBA 
broadcasting rights abroad, the NBA had an advantage over the NFL insofar 
as basketball was played more widely elsewhere than American football. 
NBA Entertainment also produced a number of in-house basketball 
magazine and lifestyle programmes. NBA Inside Stuff was one of several 
well produced programmes that were offered as a bundle to international 
broadcasters, often for free, when they bought the rights to live coverage of 
regular NBA games43. These entertainment programmes added value to the 
rights packages offered.  “That’s the beauty of television,” explained Stern 
(Jay, 2004:229). “Other brands have to buy their way on through 
advertising. Our core product is a two-hour commercial that someone pays 
us to run.” For Stern, then, NBA games were used to drive the NBA’s global 
commercial activities. As part of the marketing process dozens of A-list 
Hollywood stars plugged the league by repeating the NBA’s marketing 
mantra  “I love this game” to camera whilst watching the action from 
expensive courtside seats. Stars like Bill Murray (Chicago), Jack Nicholson 
(LA Lakers) and Spike Lee (NY Knicks) were frequently picked out during 
                                           
42 Jordan’s corporate clients included McDonalds, Coca-Cola, Wheaties, plus Haynes and 
Gatorade.  
43 Although the programmes were often “free” this was subject to a guarantee that they 
would be shown on air in a reasonably prominent slot. Programmes such as Inside Stuff and 
NBA Jam had substantial budgets and were presented by frontline talent such as Ahmad 
Rashad. The launch of NBA programming in any given territory is often accompanied by a 
marketing campaign for NBA merchandise and sometime exhibition games featuring two NBA 
teams. 
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live coverage as ideas about sports, entertainment, celebrity, superstardom 
and commercialism began to merge44. 
 
The epitome of the personality-basketball-sporting goods marketing formula 
came in 1992 with the appearance of the NBA Dream Team at the 
Barcelona Olympics. Twelve of the highest paid professional basketball 
players were selected as national pride and commercial goals became fused 
together. The Dream Team won gold spurring the NBA’s global commercial 
activities on to a peak in the mid-1990s. The NBA, a US domestic league, 
established a global market for sports broadcasting rights in addition to 
quadrennial events like the Olympics and World Cup. Executives of the 
newly formed Premier League were attentive to the NBA’s commercial 
activities. Rick Parry, the Premier League’s chief executive, accompanied 
representatives from Chrysalis Sport (where I was producer of NBA 
coverage for Channel Four) to review NBA operations in Secaucus, NJ. 
 
3.3.4 UEFA Champions League, embedded sponsorship and output 
control 
UEFA is one of the six regional federations within FIFA, it runs a number of 
high-profile football competitions at national and at club level. In 1955, the 
newly formed UEFA came up with a bold formula for football that combined, 
(a) mid-week football matches held under new floodlighting systems, (b) 
improving airline services to transport clubs to matches across Europe and 
(c) emerging pan-European television coverage.  
                                           
44 An interesting footnote concerns Channel 4’s coverage of the NBA in the UK in the mid-
1990s. In a 3-year deal the NBA ceded copyright of the finished programmes to Channel 4. 
However, the NBA failed to understand that they could not exercise editorial control over the 
programmes, despite many efforts to do so. In future deals NBA retained the copyright.  
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By the early 1990s under pressure from Europe’s leading clubs – that were 
threatening their own breakaway European super league - UEFA introduced 
a league system that guaranteed all qualifying clubs a minimum number of 
games, with these games came additional revenue. A dedicated company - 
The Event Agency and Marketing AG (TEAM Marketing) - was formed in 
1991 to secure “the greatest monetary gain through marketing of television 
rights and sponsorship opportunities of the UEFA Champion’s League” 
(Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998:93-97). The approach adopted by UEFA and 
TEAM Marketing owed much to the models created for the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympics, Nally’s influential InterSoccer template and by the activities of 
FIFA and ISL. The new Champions League format was launched in the 
1992-93 season. By 1998, TEAM Marketing was estimated to receive £30 
million from the competition per year, from an estimated income of £185 
million to UEFA with the participating clubs sharing £100 million (Banks, 
2002:128). 
 
What distinguishes the UEFA Champions League is that television coverage 
comes with an onscreen presence for UEFA’s corporate sponsors (8 in 2013-
14) already attached. Guaranteed exposure for UEFA’s commercial partners 
is embedded within a highly prescribed television production and event-
wide presentation methodology. Acquiring the broadcasting rights to the 
Champions League means that broadcasters must follow the procedures 
and practices set out in the UEFA Champions League Production Manual. 
The manual has grown to nearly 150 pages (2013-2014 season); it is 
written by TEAM Marketing and describes all aspects of Matchday (-1) and 
Matchday television coverage and distribution in detail. It also includes 
timed multi-lateral running orders that all broadcasters must follow pre-
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match, in and out of each half, at half-time and at fulltime. TEAM Marketing 
executives are present at every match to advise the host broadcaster on 
production, they also monitor the television coverage for every Champions 
League match. The UEFA Champions League host broadcast operation 
represents an unprecedented level of control exerted by a governing body 
over the broadcast output on behalf of its corporate sponsors. 
“Developments in the commercial and media world have gone hand in hand 
with football’s evolution in recent years. Consequently, UEFA’s marketing, 
commercial and technological activities have intensified considerably” 
(UEFA, 2009)45. Alex Fynn, one of the original architects of the Premier 
League (Boyle and Haynes, 2004:64), confirms UEFA “Now recognise 
through control of sponsorship, advertising and TV rights, that they have 
the power”. Such market power goes a very long way to define what sports 
we can see, where we can see them and what the final programmes look 




Chapter 3 argued that sport and television in the UK have become realigned 
along commercial and consumer-oriented structures more typically seen in 
the US. This is despite starting from virtually opposite positions post-World 
War II.  The Premier League now demonstrates unprecedented levels of 
corporate organisation and profit-driven motivation, surpassing some of the 
activities of the NFL, a League that, for so long, set the benchmark for 
commercial activity.  
 
                                           
45 www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=131072/index.html, accessed 07/07/2009  
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The comparison between the development of sport and television in the 
USA and UK addresses a surprising gap in the literature and underlines the 
scale and the speed with which sport and television in the UK has changed. 
It also embraces the “peculiar economics of sport” (Neale, 1964) a critical 
dimension frequently overlooked in media studies and political economy 
interpretations.  
 
From 1945 until 1970 British sport was pulled between an idealised amateur 
past and a commercialised free-market future - a legacy is found in the 
British government’s list of protected sports events. However, from 1970 
the development of sport in the UK was increasingly influenced by the 
combined needs of television, sponsorship and advertising. In the late 
1980s significant technological and regulatory change subjected sport and 
broadcasting in the UK to free market principles.  
 
It was argued that the behaviour of the NFL in the US was very significant.  
The 1964 Tokyo Olympics are commonly held to have triggered an 
escalation in rights fees, but a more convincing argument arises from the 
consequences of competition between the 3 major US networks to acquire 
NFL broadcasting rights. The NFL was the first professional sports league to 
understand the importance of (a) the collective sale of sports broadcasting 
rights (cartel behaviour), (b) providing league-wide sporting equilibrium 
(competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome) and (c) exercising its 
market power to collect this value. This took the form of rationing the 
broadcasting rights which created scarcity; as there was no effective 
substitute for the NFL it became a seller’s market and the price of NFL 
rights rose steadily from the 1970s. Economists including Fort (2006) have 
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identified the willingness to pay of sponsors and advertisers to access 
audiences as highly significant in (a) determining what content is broadcast 
and (b) in changing the revenue side of sports forever. 
 
It was also argued that the NBA, in the 1980s, overtly allied its sport 
product to entertainment values and celebrity endorsements that, together, 
helped to propel the commercial culture of modern sport into the 
mainstream.  
 
The 1980s also saw the formalisation of large-scale corporate sponsorship 
as a viable alternative to advertising. This had a profound impact on the 
growth of global televised sports events including the Olympics and the 
World Cup Finals. From a point of near collapse, the IOC set out to make 
the Olympic Games more appealing to broadcasters and large corporate 
sponsors. The amalgamation of sport, television and corporate interests into 
a single package was commercially successful and, from the landmark 1984 
Los Angeles Games, the IOC moved forward on a more aggressively 
commercial basis. Similarly, FIFA greatly increased its revenues from 
advertising, sponsorship and broadcasting rights from the early 1980s, with 
the biggest gains coming from 1986 onwards. International Sport and 
Leisure (ISL) was an influential company in developing lucrative methods of 
sports marketing for the IOC and FIFA. The company also pioneered the 
third party acquisition of sports broadcasting rights and how to sell these 
rights on to media providers. In 1992, the UEFA Champions League was 
launched adopting many of the lessons learned by the IOC and FIFA. UEFA 
required participating broadcasters to follow their highly prescribed 
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Production Manual and to ensure that the embedded sponsorship from 
UEFA’s key commercial partners was correctly woven into the coverage.  
  
Meanwhile in the UK, the BBC/ITV broadcasting duopoly operating in 
tandem with the government’s list of protected events had stifled the value 
of sports rights, with live football remaining undervalued until the late 
1980s. However, as was the case in the US over a decade earlier, a 
combination of technological development and deregulation rapidly changed 
the broadcasting landscape. In the UK this meant the 1990 Broadcasting 
Act and the arrival of direct satellite broadcasting. BSkyB did not see itself 
as supplemental to the existing broadcaster order but sought to overturn 
the established players and dominate the market – an era of fierce 
commercial competition had begun.  In 1992 the creation of the Premier 
League signalled the most rational approach to capital accumulation yet by 
a British sport.  With its corporate structure and commercial autonomy the 
Premier League is driven by an unambiguous profit motive. In some 
important ways it can be argued that the Premier League has become even 
more commercial and profit-driven than the NFL, both in terms of its 
structure where members act as shareholders and the global sales revenues 
for broadcasting rights it has achieved. 
 
The undertow to chapter 3 is how economic, political and technological 
forces combined in various ways from the early 1970s to create a world 
where what is good for business is considered to be good for us all. 
“Neoliberalism…” claimed Harvey (2005:166), “…has unquestionably rolled 
back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal 
contracts”. Among the consequences was the “financialisation of 
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everything” (2005:33). By the early 1990s, sport had come to matter a 
great deal to big business and managers of increasingly commercial and 
global media industries. “Sports now stress the need to be business like and 
efficient, offer sites for the celebration of corporate capitalism… and, in 
general have become prime sites for the construction and reproduction of 
an entrepreneurial culture”, concludes Whannel (1992:208). For 
professional sport this meant realignment with the interests of corporate 
investment and the managerial tenets of advertising, marketing and public 
relations (Falcous, 2005).  
 
The US market structure has meant that the Major League sports have 
retained a strong presence on the free-to-air broadcast networks. The 
model of increased exposure and higher audience ratings via free-to-air 
television has served the interests of teams, leagues, broadcasters, 
advertisers, sponsors and viewers alike. It is ironic that free-to-air 
broadcasting provided the foundations on which the highly commercialised 
modern sports industry is built to the extent, today, that media regulation, 
in the form of listed events protection, and competition law is all that has 
prevented wholesale migration to pay-TV in the UK. 
 
This chapter filled a surprising gap in the literature. It also addressed the 
first research question – how television sport in the UK came to adopt a 
more overtly consumer-oriented approach more consistent with that found 
in the US. The chapter provided further context prior to the detailed 
discussion of technology, broadcasting rights and regulation that follows in 
part two. 
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Part two | Pre-production processes in television 
sport  
 
In part one it was argued that the transformation of television sports 
production in the past two decades has been driven by a combination of 
forces including broadcasting policy (media markets), technology, 
economics (broadcasting rights) and media regulation. In practice, 
developments in technology (encompassing transmission, production and 
distribution technology) are often re-articulated via the range of 
broadcasting rights subsequently issued in the next cycle. The competition 
to acquire broadcasting rights is mitigated (usually a further cycle behind) 
by industry regulators; these regulators and competition authorities echo 
the prevailing national or regional media policy.  
 
Figure 2.1, Policy, technology, economics and regulation 
 


















It was also argued that although political economy was good at explaining 
the big picture, the literature was less effective when describing the middle 
ground of organisational structures and workplace practices (Cottle, 
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broadcasters and sports producers and directors. As there is a general 
scarcity of literature about television sports production, the research is 
aimed at this space. More specifically, there is no convincing account of 
activities on the supply side of contemporary content provision and this 
appears to be a significant gap. 
 
The aim of part two is answer the second research question: how do largely 
unseen upstream pre-production processes – technology, economics 
(specifically sports broadcasting rights, but also the economics of sports 
organisations and media providers) and politics (as applied via competition 
law and media regulation) - increasingly influence what television sport 
looks and sounds like, where it can be seen and who can see it? A key 
objective is to demonstrate the sheer scale of transformation that has taken 
place since the early 1990s, including how a significant increase in demand 
has been supplied by a combination of digital technology and new 
production workflows.  
 
Part two also reveals the addition of prescriptive conditions to broadcasting 
rights agreements. These prescriptions are indicative of the wider interests 
of sports leagues and federations as they become involved in host 
broadcast operations providing approved coverage and even running their 
own dedicated content channels. Cottle (2003:20) describes macro-level 
influences that condition the operation and output of media organisations at 
global to local levels. However, in a main point of divergence from Cottle, 
technology, broadcasting rights and regulation are not forces that are 
negotiated at the point of production, or even within the general production 
domain, but have come to exert a very significant influence much further 
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upstream and long before the traditional production processes carried out 
by broadcasters or producers.  
 
Todreas (1999) explains changes to the television supply chain by referring 
to the conduit and the content, arguing that value migrates upstream 
meaning profitability switches from the owners of the conduit to the owners 
of the content. In a new contribution, part two demonstrates that a very 
significant degree of control over the final output now rests with the leagues 
and federations. 
 
When it comes to evaluating the influence of technology on sports 
television, this would make a PhD in itself.  Throughout the history of 
television sport, technology has played a pivotal role; with the exception of 
news production, no other television genre is so closely associated with 
technological developments and logistical aspects of coverage than sport. 
As noted in chapter 2, Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013) identify 3 phases in 
the history of television in the UK: (1) public service regulated 
monopoly/duopoly (under conditions of spectrum scarcity), (2) from the 
1980s to the mid 1990s the emergence of new delivery systems, the end of 
public service duopoly and the introduction of commercial competition and, 
(3) the current phase, the transition from analogue to digital.  As 
technological developments apply widely and embrace (a) transmission, 
including new viewing options, (b) production, (c) distribution, and (d) 
archive, the argument here is not in favour of technological determinism but 
for viewing transformation as part of a wider process of marketisation and 
how the market has become the central frame of reference for cultural 
activity (Boyle and Haynes, 2004:52).  
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Chapter 4 considers technological transformations. Todreas (1999) 
identifies three phases since 1992 including: (1) the limits of linear 
analogue technology, (2) the transition from tape-based media to digital 
media and (3) high definition and beyond. This research expands 
understanding with: (a) a brief overview of transmission technology as an 
important forerunner in the switch to digital, (b) by examining the limits of 
analogue technology in sports production, (c) identifying pivotal 
developments in digital technology,  (d) comparing analogue and digital 
workflows to illustrate the sheer scale of transformation and (e) reviewing 
the extraordinary increase in volume and scope of content that can be 
produced rapidly in a digital workplace. A political economy perspective is 
added by asking who does what and why, with the Premier League 
providing a new case study.  
 
Transformations in both transmission and production technology are linked 
to developments in broadcasting rights. Rights tend to follow one cycle 
behind technological developments and include important new ways of 
distributing content plus the emergence of lucrative overseas markets. 
Consequently, chapter 5 tackles sports broadcasting rights by considering: 
(a) what is copyright and intellectual property and how this is connected to 
the market (b) the changing values and definitions of sports broadcasting 
rights and (c) the implications of rights for producers, with a new case 
study from the UEFA Champions League.  
 
Chapter 6 then focuses on the role of regulation from (a) national and 
international level broadcasting policies such as the list of protected events, 
(b) examples of intervention directed at the Premier League and the UEFA 
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Champions League, (c) the regulation of both markets and content in the 
UK and (d) the widening gap between regulatory intention and actual 
output as seen in regional production quotas and the application of the 
Transfer of Undertakings Regulations (TUPE). 
 
Part two is quite wide-ranging. The research draws on primary evidence, 
including extensive field notes taken as a participant–observer working in 
sports television. Contributor testimony is added via both short and longer 
form semi-formal interviews. Secondary evidence is added from access to 
production manuals issued by the federations, press reports and specialist 
business reports. Consequently, the ways that broadcasters and producers 
engage with technology, broadcasting rights and regulation is framed from 
several angles.  
 
The overall orientation of part two is towards the supply side (production), 
rather than the demand side interpretation favoured in political economy 
critiques. It is hoped this new perspective will complement existing studies 
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4 | Technology 
 
Examining broadcasting we can see: (a) the platforms, technology and 
workflows used for transmission and (b) the services that are presented on 
these platforms: the schedules and content. Increased demand for sports 
content comes from broadcasters and pay-TV providers, who are not 
broadcasters in the traditional sense. Looking at production technology, 
whilst this may initially be considered a third category of activity, recent 
convergence - particularly the widespread adoption of digital media servers 
– means the boundaries between transmission, production and distribution 
have narrowed substantially.  
 
This chapter considers the transformation from analogue to digital and, 
crucially, how digital technology became the basis for new workflows in 
sports television, including how accelerated workflows deliver dramatic 
increases in the volume and scope of content.  
 
As most political economy discussion tends to focus on the demand side – 
on the creation and ownership of content and channels – this chapter adds 
an important account from supply side; of how radical developments in 
sports production technology including new workflows were essential in 
meeting a rapidly escalating demand for sports content. Meeting this 
demand would not have been possible working in the analogue paradigm. 
The research avoids charges of technological determinism by looking at who 
is using new technology, how it is used and for what purposes, why. The 
extent to which football, and the Premier League in particular, has entered 
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a new phase of intense commodification is remarkable, this is revealed in a 
new case study. As Doyle (2002) notes, the continuous expansion in the 
ways in which television can be distributed to viewers is significant. The 
ways very large volumes of content is (a) received by broadcasters, (b) 
organised into recognisable schedules and (c) disseminated in a structured 
way is now reviewed.  
 
4.1 Transmission technology 
It was the creation of viable alternatives to previously limited and strictly 
controlled analogue frequencies that radically changed television 
broadcasting in the UK. The volume of available sports content, plus the 
numerous ways this content can be consumed has been transformed in 20 
years, with a great deal of momentum added in the past decade. Such 
processes, argues Schimmel (2005:3), accelerate “the commodification and 
commercialisation of sport and deliver sport product on ever increasing 
scales to international consumers”. A vanguard of technological change was 
transmission. 
 
1992, analogue, tape-based transmission systems  
By the early 1990s terrestrial broadcasters had developed well-understood 
transmission processes that did not vary much. This was an analogue, tape-
based operation where workflows were determined by the hardware that 
was used to organise and transmit content. Broadcasters acquired content 
on videotape. Tapes were barcoded, given a quality control check and 
copied for transmission. Presentation schedules contained interstitials, 
channel-branding, content promotion, information and programme links. 
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Commercial broadcasters incorporated advertisements into their schedules. 
With robotic machines (Odetics) or flexicarts physically moving media into 
place it was a straightforward mechanical operation.  
 
In transmission, physical tapes and play-out machines were visible assets 
and content could be seen as it progressed through linear workflow towards 
a live broadcast output controlled via a dedicated transmission area and 
supervised by a presentation director or transmission controller46. However, 
computer software and new digital, server-based technology would soon 
trigger the re-organisation and eventual automation of transmission 
systems. 
 
Beyond traditional terrestrial TV  
From 1993, the established terrestrial broadcasting order in the UK faced a 
number of challenges with new channels launching and innovative ways of 
consuming content becoming available. On 1 September 1993, the BSkyB 
multi-channel satellite service was launched. BSkyB introduced monthly 
subscriptions and the electronic turnstile or pay-per-view broadcasting47. An 
analogue service, it ran until September 2001 when it was superseded by 
the Sky Digital platform.  
 
All broadcasting systems are essentially downlink transmissions. Linear 
broadcasters offer programmes in a fixed schedule, a timed sequence used 
                                           
46 Each BBC broadcast channel had a dedicated transmission gallery with an on-air 
presentation director, production assistant and technical staff ensuring that all content was 
played in and all live voiced links, or live programmes ran to time, so content flowed as if run 
by a well-oiled machine. The prospect of live sports upsetting these schedules was seldom 
well received. 
 
47 In 1996, 660,000 customers paid to see the boxing match between Frank Bruno and Mike 
Tyson. 
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to order content. But ideas about viewing content were starting to change, 
options surrounding choice of content and about when this content could be 
viewed, were becoming available.  Notable steps include:  
• The arrival of Amazon (1994), DVD (1995) and the TiVo personal 
hard disk recorder (1997).  
• In October 1998 BSkyB launched an all-digital satellite service, 
including an interactive red-button service now known as Sky Active. 
• In 2001 the Sky+ box was launched.  
• With the new millennium came Google, the iPod and Xbox. 2002 saw 
the launch of RIM’s Blackberry popular email-linking service. Internet 
2.0 helped establish iTunes (April 2003), Facebook, Flickr and Gmail 
all of which followed in 2004. 
• In 2005, Sky News and Sky Sports were streamed to mobile phones.  
The first YouTube video was uploaded in April 2005. Videos and TV 
shows were available to download at the iTunes store.  
• In 2006, Sky+ HD became the UK’s first nationwide high-definition 
service. The online social networking and micro blogging service, 
Twitter, was launched.  
• 2008 saw the BBC and ITV offer a joint-venture service on Freesat, a 
UK oriented free-to-air digital satellite service.  
• By 2010, BSkyB offered a 3-D service. 
• Turning to mobile platforms, a significant incentive to advertisers 
using Internet and mobile services was the ability to collect more 
detailed data, including customer usage and preferences. The iPhone 
was launched in 2007. In 2010 Apple launched the iPad, this type of 
device is attributed with establishing a notable change in viewing 
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habits as more media, including television content, could now be 
accessed remotely (wirelessly).  
 
A range of video on demand (VOD) services had also been introduced. The 
BBC iPlayer had been around since 2005, going live on 25 December 2007, 
and Sky Anytime+ was launched in 2010. By 2011, the BBC iPlayer included 
links to programmes from other broadcasters –the ITV Player, 4oD and 
Demand 5. Specific iPlayer applications for mobile platforms were launched 
in February 2011. Sky Go, also launched in 2011, enabled its customers to 
watch live television on the move via laptops, smartphones and tablets as 
part of their monthly subscription.  
 
During this period the value of live sport, particularly football continued to 
rise – for media providers there was no viable substitute. 2012 saw BT 
Sport enter the market for sports rights - BT’s intention was to use high 
profile sports content to drive customers towards using its fibre-based 
services. The old analogue system was switched off in 2012 and by 2013 
content could now be viewed via: 
 
1) Digital satellite television 
2) Cable television 
3) Digital terrestrial television 
4) IPTV 
5) Laptop, mobile and tablet 
6) DVD 
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A range of enhanced television broadcasting developments had also been 
introduced, including: 
a) TV anytime, viewer-determined consumption utilising time shifting 
b) TV anywhere, content viewed via laptop and tablet computers, plus 
smart phones 
c) Interactivity, viewers could participate by giving comments, voting 
and receiving additional information or VOD programmes. Smart TVs 
were Internet compatible, connecting via the TV receiver, set-top-
box, broadband router or a manufacturer application. 
 
Against a backdrop of wider change, the ways broadcasters organised and 
transmitted their content began to move on from established and largely 
manual methods. 
 
The transition to digital transmission  
From the mid-1990s broadcasters began to introduce software and digital 
media server-based systems to control key aspects of the transmission 
workflow. A broadcast technology expert, speaking in 2013, confirmed 
these media servers “enabled true multi-channel broadcasting, which was 
never possible using videotape.” It is the ability to simultaneously broadcast 
several channels to different territories that is significant48. Early in the new 
millennium media servers became pivotal to transmission operations.  As 
more affordable media storage and more powerful servers became 
available, managers realised that more media could be placed on the 
central server for play out; a senior transmission manager recalls how 
servers were introduced: 
                                           
48 This was particularly important for multinational broadcasters like Discovery. 
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Although	  tape	  formats	  remained	  for	  long	  form	  programme	  material	  and	  for	  interstitials,	  by	  
2000	  or	  so,	  commercials	  in	  the	  UK	  were	  being	  delivered	  on	  MPEG2	  files	  to	  play	  out	  
providers.	  These	  files	  required	  boxes	  to	  receive	  material	  and	  servers	  to	  store	  the	  high-­‐
resolution	  files.	  (Senior	  broadcast	  transmission	  manager,	  2013)	  	  
 
By using specialist scheduling-software, transmission could be fully 
automated. In 2002 Quantel introduced scalable hardware and software 
solutions49 that combined browsing and broadcasting at the same time – 
again, when working with large volumes of content, it is the ability to do 
different things at the same time that is significant.  
 
In 2004, the first ingest-to-air workflow automation was introduced and, 
from 2005, broadcasters began to ingest their entire broadcast content onto 
central servers.  But transmission was not yet tapeless; the reliability of 
Digital Betacam systems moderated the introduction of file-based systems, 
plus broadcasters’ libraries were still full of videotape. Tapes were used for 
making copies of programmes and for re-versioning purposes, like adding 
different languages or subtitles. Unlike tapes, which were visible assets, file-
based content had to be ingested with the correct metadata attached 
otherwise it could disappear on the system. Speaking in 2013, a director of 
transmission notes: “storing and transferring files, particularly via the 
Internet, also raised the risk of piracy”; this remains a global concern 




                                           
49 The sQ server part of the generationQ product line. 
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The digital hangover 
The transition from analogue to digital transmission has been beset with 
operational issues. As different files are created using different codecs50, 
difficulties in reading files can arise; transmission experts confirmed 
incompatibility was a wide-ranging problem in transmission suites at all 
media providers. Media Asset Management (MAM) systems were introduced 
to help move files through the full transmission workflow, from receipt and 
ingesting, QC, encoding and transcoding, playout, repurposing and 
archiving. However, speaking in 2014, an experienced Director of 
Transmission had “yet to see a system that offers a definitive benchmark in 
reliability and performance”. An unwanted by-product in the proliferation of 
content delivery platforms is a loss of a common operational standard 
across the array of file-based formats now used, in other words the more 
platforms using file-based media there are, the more confusion is created.  
 
Transmission in 2014 
Digital transmission saw the number of channels available in the UK 
increase dramatically. In 1992 there had been 4 terrestrial broadcast 
channels; 22 years later the Sky platform alone listed 36 exclusively sports-
based channels. In 2014, BSkyB and BT are engaged in communications 
technology convergence. BSkyB offers television, broadband, Wi-Fi and 
telephone services, as does BT; both use high profile sports content to 
attract customers. All major terrestrial broadcasters offer additional viewing 
platforms like iPlayer for viewing content, either live or on demand. And 
                                           
50 Codecs are the structure used to create a file. Transcoding is the transfer of a file from 
one format to another. Encoding is the creation of a file as a result of transferring content 
from videotape.  
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beyond that, providers like Yahoo offer clip-based content services, many of 
which can be viewed streamed on national newspaper sites.  
 
From this brief overview we can take away the following:  
1) The tapeless transmission workflows adopted by many broadcasters 
have yet to offer a coherent path from content creation through to 
final broadcast. 
2) Quality levels for different outputs has expanded, making it 
impractical for all output to be delivered from a single point. 
Workflows must take into account the various ways that content is to 
be used, as this varies significantly from platform to platform.  
3) There has been a rise in multinational broadcasters that 
simultaneously provide global markets with repurposed content51, 
from large providers like Discovery and NBC Universal to micro-
broadcasters like Paris-based Trace Sports Stars52.  
4) The ability of domestic UK media providers to handle many more 
feeds has allowed additional pop-up channels, or where, for example, 
Sky Sports viewers can chose to watch up to 8 UEFA Champions 
League matches at the same time via the red button option. 
 
These developments are relevant because (a) transmission was the first 
area to adopt digital server technology, (b) sport is an important driver in 
the take up of new broadcasting technology, (c) live sport broadcasting 
rights have escalated in value due to increased demand, (d) the distribution 
of television content has generally become much more specialised, (e) 
                                           
51 A single original programme can have 13 distinct outputs in different languages. 
52 Trace Sports launched in the UK in late 2011 (channel 442 on the Sky platform) In May 
2014 it is no longer broadcasting on Sky in the UK.   
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content can be more tightly focussed on smaller groups of consumers, 
particularly via pay-TV and (f) further consumption data can be tracked and 
compiled and this, in itself, has a financial value to broadcasters as they sell 
access to audiences to sponsors and advertisers.   
 
4.2 Production technology, the analogue paradigm 
In the early 1990s sports production workflows were constrained within an 
analogue paradigm, this section explains the limits of analogue technology 
and production methods including an indicative workflow from 1992. This 
football production workflow is used to benchmark the transformation from 
analogue to digital and to pinpoint how production methods have changed. 
 
Analogue technology and tape-based workflows 
The key limitations of analogue technology and tape-based workflows are 
particularly evident when looking at videotape recording, videotape editing, 
graphics inputs and audio recording. 
 
In 1992 videotape was the primary medium on which to record, edit, play 
out and archive sports content. Incremental advances were made, like 
variable replay speeds and increased portability of smaller formats (like 
Sony Betacam) and videotape operations remained at the heart of all sports 
productions – in a sense this was the engine room53. The two most obvious 
limitations of analogue videotape are (1) the ability to make copies (this 
was done in real time and introduced deterioration with each copy made) 
and in (2) editing, where the fixed timelines of videotape were very 
restrictive. Once an edit was made the timeline was fixed, it wasn’t possible 
                                           
53 Producers that worked at a broadcaster in the 1990s would know this term. 
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to replace one sequence with a longer or shorter sequence as it was with 
film, where the edited sequence is literally cut open and the new sequence 
inserted. As sports content was mostly prepared using 2 machines, then 
creating a wipe or a mix, rather than a cut, was troublesome and involved 
copying material to a third machine. The independent production company 
Cheerleader54 introduced 3-machine video editing to sport, 3-machine 
editing was more typically found in entertainment programmes and US 
sports presentations. 
 
Videotape recordings were crucially important and a hand-written log sheet 
accompanied each tape. The log was a description of all content along the 
timeline (typically time-of-day timecode that looks like a digital clock), the 
log was made by an assistant producer during recording and was the only 
method of knowing what was on each tape, if the log was lost the tape was 
useless until re-logged. 
 
For graphics, input was mostly limited to the Aston caption generator, with 
the Chyron equivalent providing a bolder US style. The telestrator was an 
infrequently used device that allowed a commentator to draw basic lines on 
screen (for example, over a video replay) to highlight relevant action. As 
this was used on US television it was not encouraged in the UK. However, 
BBC Sport became an early-adopter of digital technology when it introduced 
a computer-based results service in the late 1980s. The system was able to 
handle very quick data input – for example Saturday afternoon football 
results (when most games were still played on a Saturday afternoon) – and 
                                           
54 I worked at Cheerleader across all output between 1987 and 1994.  
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tie this input (the scores) to pre-designed fixtures lists allowing for much 
quicker presentation of the final scores. 
 
Finally, audio recording and mixing was subject to the same generic 
limitations as videotape editing. Recording was restricted to the number of 
tracks available on videotape. As new tape formats like Betacam were 
introduced, even recording basic stereo became challenging (due to limited 
tracks) so, in some important respects, audio recording was very limited for 
a while. However, in 1993, audio provided an introduction to digital 
technology for many producers. The ability of digital audio mixing to move 
material around on the timeline felt revolutionary in the flexibility it offered.  
 
Experienced producers recall that, in most respects, working in analogue 
demanded conscious preparation (finding tapes, logs and timecodes) was 
generally laborious and slow to achieve even modest results. 
 
Typical workflows, 1992 
Turning to football for an example of the analogue paradigm, around 6 
cameras were typically used on any match. Of these, at least two would 
have long telephoto lenses to provide close ups of players and reactions of 
managers (figure 4.1).  
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For a 6 camera outside broadcast, using 3 videotape replay machines was 
typical. Any videotape replays required the machine to stop recording, spool 
back and re-cue the action before it was ready to play back at a reduced 
speed. The mixer console handled camera and graphics inputs and offered a 
variety of transitions from cuts to wipes. A typical desk would have a 
maximum of 48 inputs and a single graphics source. A separate, smaller 
truck would be on location to handle onwards distribution of output, via BT 
Tower to the broadcaster’s base. 
 
An outside broadcast of this nature could be self-contained and would not 
require a large number of production staff; normally a producer (or 
producer/director), an assistant producer and a production assistant would 
suffice. For the BBC, outside broadcasts were not often stand-alone, but 
part of a larger presentation, such as Grandstand or Match of The Day 
(MoTD), but even the BBC’s flagship football magazine was not an 
onerously complex production. 
 
Match of The Day was presented from a dedicated sports studio at 
Television Centre. A programme editor ran the production with an assistant 
editor, a studio producer/director, production assistant and a team of 
assistant producers in the videotape area preparing match action and any 
analysis clips for broadcast.  
 
Key to the MoTD operation was a network of incoming lines that carried 
feeds of each game back to Television Centre. From 1992 this included 
shared feeds from games covered by Sky Sports, but minus Sky’s 
commentary team, graphics and video effects – known as a clean feed. As 
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each game was received an assistant producer would log the action, using 
timecode as a reference, then work with a VT editor to edit the match to 
duration.  
 
Match of the Day typically broadcast 3 matches, and, from 1992, included a 
round up of the goals scored at all other matches. Each segment was routed 
to the studio via the VT multiplexer, a switching device that handled a large 
number of VT inputs, but offered just 2 outputs to the studio gallery. A 
senior assistant producer, or for bigger productions a VT producer, would 
run the multiplexer to ensure the correct content reached the studio. After 
each broadcast, tapes and logsheets were gathered for archiving the key 
recordings in the sports library. 
 
A bit like the practices previously used in transmission, equipment behaved 
as expected and worked well (within its limits) and these workflows were 
seldom subject to much in the way of change.  
 
Live Premier League football, Sky Sports style  
As noted in chapter 3, in 1988 ITV acquired the rights to show 18 live 
league matches a year. Coverage moved from 6 cameras to 17. As a result 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:19) consider ITV to have raised the status of live 
football coverage, but it was the launch of the Premier League of Sky Sports 
that really moved the goalposts. From August 1992 Sky Sports offered live 
and exclusive coverage of 60 live Premier League matches per year. In 
terms of technology, a significant change was the introduction of 
subscription-based broadcasting that used encryption of the satellite signal 
as a turnstile for viewers. Reviewing production technology, the Sky Sports 
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formula was less about new technology than using more of the existing 
technology and doing so in different ways.  
 
Several aspects of coverage immediately stood out: the introduction of the 
game clock and the always on score caption, a consistently high number of 
cameras covering action, more close ups including the use of Steadicam55 
along the touchline, the prominent Quantel swoop (with sound effects) that 
accompanied replays, more frequent use of reverse angle replays, and Sky 
Sport’s distinctive graphics. But the presentation style was not entirely new, 
as a dedicated sports channel executive observes:    
Sky	  went	  about	  copying	  a	  variety	  of	  styles	  and	  looks	  from	  US	  TV	  and	  rolled	  them	  out	  in	  the	  
UK,	  including	  presenters	  looking	  to	  camera	  and	  presenting	  styles	  that	  were	  direct	  lifts	  from	  
US	  TV.	  (Sports	  channel	  executive,	  2012)	  
 
The similarities with US sports broadcasting did not end there, some 
programme titles even sounded American, including The Monday Night 
Football taken from ABC’s long-running NFL flagship Monday Night 
Football56, or Super Sunday again used on NFL. Where Sky Sports did begin 
a new chapter in television coverage was with more detailed match 
analysis, in part this was due to the additional time the channel had to fill. 
Also evident was an aggressive new marketing philosophy used to promote 
the Sky Sports brand.  
 
                                           
55 Steadicam is a camera stabilising harness that allows tracking with much smoother results 
than if hand-held. 
56 With the introduction of Sky’s Sports Centre US broadcaster ESPN seriously considered 
legal action against BSkyB for copyright infringement for its own format the ESPN Sports 
Center. From discussions with an ESPN executive in 1993. 
Milne | June 2014 
 
141 
For Sky Sports it is the different ways technology was used that is more 
significant than what was used. In ways that are reminiscent of ABC 
executive Roone Arledge’s up close and personal philosophy, Sky Sports 
used more technology as it sought to stand out. Soon competing channels 
were promoting key points of difference in their coverage to lure potential 
customers. Speaking in an article in the Daily Telegraph (18 April 2011) 
Andy Melvin Sky Sports deputy-managing director captures the mood: 
 
I	  had	  spent	  10	  years	  covering	  football	  in	  Glasgow	  where	  everyone	  looked	  down	  on	  sports	  
broadcasting	  as	  an	  irrelevance.	  TV	  then	  was	  dominated	  by	  luvvies	  and	  by	  news	  junkies,	  
neither	  of	  whom	  had	  the	  slightest	  interest	  in	  sport.	  But	  then	  I	  joined	  Sky	  and	  felt	  we	  had	  
been	  given	  this	  incredible	  opportunity.	  
	  
It	  was	  a	  huge	  gamble,	  and	  the	  sceptics	  said,	  'This	  will	  be	  shit	  TV,	  real	  lowbrow	  stuff’.	  But	  we	  
were	  a	  team	  of	  football	  people,	  making	  programmes	  for	  football	  people,	  and	  we	  were	  
determined	  to	  make	  it	  work.	  (Briggs,	  2011)	  
 
The mantra was more, but just how far could outside broadcast operations 
grow? As an independent producer I recall how outside broadcast trucks 
began to literally expand to accommodate more equipment and people. At 
the biggest sports events there were separate trucks for the gallery, 
another housing videotape operations, sometimes yet another truck to 
control the presentation studio output. In terms of videotape operations, it 
was possible to increase the number of inputs but that meant increasing the 
number of tape machines and finding (a) a place to put them, (b) means of 
wiring them into the system and (c) managing the mountains of tape 
recordings generated. The analogue paradigm soon presented a very real 
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physical limit to what could be achieved. The sheer size of equipment racks, 
the amount of cabling, the number of logging and editing stations, the 
ability to input raw material from different sources, including more and 
more cameras, into more powerful mixing desks, plus the ability to output 
the final programme could only expand so far.   
 
Vertical integration or free market provision of technology?  
A change in the impetus in the development of production technology in the 
UK can also be noted in the 1990s. Historically, technical support for 
studios, outside broadcasts and editing systems was a matter of vertical 
integration, particularly at the BBC where virtually all aspects of technology, 
engineering and logistics were all under one roof, or at least one 
metaphorical roof. To some extent the regional ITV companies replicated 
this as they shared resources. Whilst BSkyB had built their own matrix of 
incoming and outgoing lines, editing and studio facilities at their base in 
Isleworth, significantly the company did not invest in outside broadcast 
equipment and, instead, chose to rely on external firms to provide 
technology for location use. This clearly reduced the need for large-scale 
capital investment whilst allowing access to the newest equipment as it 
became available on the facilities market.    
 
The provision of production technology was also altered by the activities of 
specialist technical service suppliers working with independent sports 
production companies. The Broadcasting Act of 1990 with the introduction 
of independent and regional production quotas had already boosted free 
market provision. As independent sports production companies generally 
lacked the capital to own expensive production equipment, so they entered 
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commercial relationships with specialist outside broadcast facility firms and 
post-production houses. 
 
For video editing, it wasn’t traditional broadcasters that were on the 
frontline when it came to providing state-of-the-art equipment; it was often 
commercial post-production houses. The role of post-production houses and 
other technical service providers is often overlooked.  Independent sports 
production companies now had more choice and access to the latest 
technology without incurring prohibitive capital costs. This market paved 
the way for some important innovations as digital technology was rolled 
out. 
 
4.3 Digital production technology arrives 
The mid-1990s was a critical period as digital production was introduced to 
television sport, changing work practices and output in several significant 
ways.  
 
Although live broadcasts were growing in prominence, videotape remained 
the hub of television sports productions. But the capability of videotape was 
changing. From 1994 Digital Betacam enabled the entire acquisition to edit 
path to be converted to digital. In addition to higher quality and more 
robust video and audio signals, more creative options in editing became 
possible57.  
 
                                           
57 Digital Betacam meant media could be pre-read using this as the edit source without 
needing an additional machine. Cloning (copying) of tapes could be achieved without the 
significant loss of quality associated with analogue tape. 
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However, the two most significant introductions combined to (a) provide a 
dramatic change in sports production workflows, particularly large-scale 
productions, (b) revolutionise the volume and scope of sports content, 
including (c) the speed at which content could be produced. These were 
non-linear editing systems and tapeless digital media technologies. 
 
In terms of non-linear editing systems, AVID became the preferred tool. 
Essentially AVID is a hard disk (computer) system with software that 
mimicked the flexibility of 16mm film editing. Once media has been 
ingested58 to the AVID content could be edited and re-edited as required. As 
this is non-linear and non-destructive, sequences can be dropped into the 
timeline with the remaining material pushed down the timeline (in effect 
extended to accommodate the new sequence) – this is very different to 
linear videotape editing with its fixed timeline. As AVID marketing put it 
producers could now “change your mind without losing your mind”.  This 
claim was severely tested in early AVIDs as one producer recalls: 
It	  [AVID]	  was	  horrible.	  Not	  because	  it	  was	  a	  bad	  thing	  but	  because	  of	  the	  bugs.	  It	  was	  hard	  
to	  do	  anything.	  It	  would	  always	  freeze	  up.	  (Senior	  sports	  producer,	  independent	  sport	  
production,	  2012)	  
 
New iterations of AVID offered more processing power (they got quicker) 
and storage for more media (they became more useful). As AVID was 
widely adopted a demand grew for a central storage facility, or central 
server, that could provide regular back up as well as shared access for 
multiple AVID users. The AVID Unity was that device and could serve up to 
                                           
58 Content is played in from tape, the AVID makes a virtual copy that can be broken down 
into smaller sequences and allocated to bins from where it can be retrieved. 
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20 clients, this made it an appealing tool for host broadcast operations 
where multiple rights holding broadcasters wanted to access all material as 
quickly as possible. This system provided a very significant breakthrough in 
production workflows, with coverage of the World Rally Championship 
provided by Chrysalis Sport, one of the earliest examples of AVID Unity 
deployment. There are three breakthroughs of note: (1) the ability to use 
non-linear editing to construct entire programmes, (2) simultaneous access 
to the original content for (3) numerous users. This meant no more copying 
of videotapes in real time, just plug-in with AVID, access the server and 
edit. Multiple output versions could now be generated from the same 
original source content as different productions worked in parallel. The 
increase in volume, scope and speed this provided wasn’t just substantial it 
was a game changer. 
 
Turning to tapeless digital media technologies, EVS is the key development. 
The power of EVS rests in its capacity to ingest live input from multiple 
sources (cameras) and to replay, and/or clip together sequences virtually 
instantaneously, without any interruptions to workflow – no action need 
ever be missed. Experienced directors confirm that EVS operators became 
essential members of the outside broadcast team. A highly respected 
international live sports producer describes the advent of EVS and servers: 
The	  tape-­‐based	  environment	  was	  gone	  and	  an	  8	  channel	  EVS,	  whilst	  taking	  up	  the	  same	  
space	  as	  4	  videotape	  machines,	  was	  much,	  much	  more	  capable.	  If	  you	  wanted	  to,	  you	  could	  
start	  a	  replay	  of	  a	  cricket	  ball	  being	  bowled	  before	  the	  delivery	  was	  actually	  finished…	  it	  was	  
simply	  revolutionary.	  (International	  sports	  television	  director,	  2012)	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Another veteran live sport producer sees the development of replays in 
digital production as creating a major talking point among viewers:  
EVS	  allows	  you	  to	  isolate	  nearly	  every	  camera	  and	  to	  choose	  from	  around	  20	  different	  
replay	  angles.	  So,	  when	  you	  want	  to	  review,	  say,	  a	  penalty	  incident,	  you	  have	  7	  or	  8	  angles	  
ready	  to	  look	  at	  immediately.	  The	  way	  replays	  have	  changed	  is	  one	  of	  the	  single	  biggest	  
step	  changes	  in	  sports	  coverage.	  (Live	  sports	  director,	  2013)	  
 
The EVS was extremely fast and delivered multiple replays. Soon EVS 
servers could be linked, this meant that very large amounts of media could 
be moved rapidly before being played out from another EVS. Speaking in 
2012 an experienced live sports director sums up the consequences: “with 
digital, the scale of outside broadcast ambitions really began to increase.”  
 
Post-2000, EVS provided media management systems that could be linked 
to a permanent archive system59. Content could be pushed between 
locations but was still available for instant broadcast. The implications for 
sports production methods were enormous as, unlike transmission, sports 
production now had a fully integrated digital workflow with common 
standards that everyone could work with. 
 
EVS has also had an impact on incoming feeds of live sports. An example is 
Sky Sports coverage of NFL, this feed has US pattern commercial breaks 
with internal US programme promotions and numerous sponsored 
segments. Sky Sports routes the incoming feed through EVS where it is 
delayed for up to 3 minutes allowing Sky Sports producers to manoeuvre 
                                           
59 Using EVS Logging and IP Director software in combination with a central server housed at 
a fixed location. Media storage included ‘nearside’ storage for day-to-day use and ‘far side’ 
for longer-term archiving. 
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their way in and out of unwanted material via their own studio presentation. 
The result is a presentation minus the distractions that still feels as if it is 
live60. 
 
Although new digital recording formats were introduced for cameras and a 
range of specialist computer graphic paintboxes also developed, the 
introduction of AVID, central servers and EVS was by far the most 
significant development as new workflows offered a combination of speed, 
volume and scope that was radically different to the limitations of the 
analogue methods they replaced.  
 
Digital broadcasting takes over 
In the UK the launch of Sky Digital in 1998 was significant. Digital broadcast 
signals are more robust than analogue, plus improved compression 
methods meant that the scarcity issue with analogue frequencies was no 
longer relevant. With continual improvements in compression not only were 
there more channels but these channels could also be cheaper to operate.  
 
A further development was high definition (HD). HD is not clearly defined; it 
is simply a higher definition than standard definition. According to an 
experienced senior Sky Sports director speaking in 2012, HD was the 
“logical expression in the up-scaling in capability that digital allowed”. The 
director continues to explain:  
The	  switchover	  to	  HD	  was	  taken	  very	  seriously	  by	  Sky	  Sports.	  For	  example,	  a	  4	  day	  cricket	  
match	  at	  the	  Oval	  was	  used	  as	  a	  test	  bed	  for	  the	  entire	  production	  team,	  including	  the	  
                                           
60 Athletics and golf coverage also goes through EVS. 
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signal	  pathway	  from	  the	  Oval,	  via	  BT	  Tower	  and	  back	  to	  Sky	  Sports	  (but	  was	  not	  sent	  to	  air).	  
(Sky	  Sports	  director,	  2012)	  
 
Whilst the production team wondered whether they could track a fast-
moving cricket ball with HD cameras, or how a presenter’s make up might 
look under increased scrutiny, the director confirmed: 
The	  picture	  side	  worked	  out	  smoothly,	  it	  was	  in	  EVS/VT61	  and	  sound	  where	  they	  had	  to	  
work	  hardest.	  Sky	  Sports	  also	  introduced	  5.1	  Dolby	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  this	  had	  different	  
delays	  compared	  to	  2	  track	  stereo	  so,	  altogether,	  this	  was	  a	  big	  step	  up.	  	  In	  EVS/VT,	  the	  
biggest	  headache	  was	  how	  to	  incorporate	  an	  SD	  picture	  [4x3]	  in	  the	  HD	  output	  [16x9].	  (Sky	  
Sports	  director,	  2012)	  	  
 
Since 2004-05 the adoption of digital technology has revolutionised sports 
production workflows; it has enabled an exponential increase in the volume 
of sport produced, it allows a wider scope of sports content to be made and 
production is accelerated.  
 
 
4.4  Contemporary digital production technology and 
workflows  
 
Digital technology facilitated a dramatic increase in sports production output 
- it was the extension of ways the same original content could be 
simultaneously re-packaged in alternative formats by different users that 
was pivotal in meeting the rising demand for sports content. In addition to 
the technological dimension, a political economy approach requires an 
interest in who does what and why. To help answer these questions, and to 
                                           
61 Although EVS is the predominant technology, the traditional VT (videotape) name was 
retained. 
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gauge the full scale of this remarkable transformation, previous analogue 
workflows can be compared with a contemporary case study. 
 
Football on the frontline 
In 1992 the BBC’s Match of The Day format provided a sample workflow 
(see 4.2 above). By the 2013-14 season a battle for the UK’s live football 
viewers was being fought between challenger, BT Sport, and market leader 
BSkyB. But, away from the headlines, there is another Premier League 
football provider. Without attracting much media attention the Premier 
League operates its own production service.  
 
Why does the Premier League offer this service? Whilst domestic rights for 
2013-16 are valued at around £3 billion, the international rights are worth a 
further £2 billion (Harris, 2012), this is an important new market. Seeking 
to collect this revenue the Premier League controls its intellectual property 
according to a senior executive in charge of output speaking in 2013, “via a 
guaranteed standardised and high quality output aimed at a global rather 
than a local (UK) audience”. How the Premier League provides this service 
is now discussed. 
 
Premier League Productions (PLP) 
Set up in 2004, Premier League Productions (PLP) is funded by the Premier 
League and operated by IMG Sports Media. PLP offers content production, 
distribution and archive management for the Premier League. The following 
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account is based on testimony from participants plus fieldwork as 
participant-observer62 during summer 2013. 
 
At the start of the 2013-14 season, Premier League Productions delivered 
content to Premier League Licensees in 212 different territories. Using 
digital technologies and integrated production workflows this is a modern 
football content factory; the scale is unmatched by any other sports league. 
 
What does PLP do? 
Primarily, PLP takes the original match coverage provided by the Premier 
League’s host broadcast partners, Sky Sports and BT Sport, and, with some 
modifications, re-broadcasts all 10 matchday fixtures across a weekend 
making these available to the Premier League’s international Licensees.  
 
Figure 4.2, Host to Licensee pathway 
 
On behalf of licensees, PLP also provides small local enhancements to this 
coverage, including in-vision customisation from Premier League venues. 
Specially enhanced feeds and multiple-match packages are also offered.  
 
PLP produces a very high volume of content in a variety of live and pre-
recorded formats, from news to classic matches. Together, the live 
                                           
62 I wrote a consultancy document for the German Bundesliga whilst executive producer at 
IMG in 2012. This involved extensive benchmarking and content comparison with a range of 
football-based content including the Premier League. 
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matches, special feeds and formatted programming comprise a core 
production offer.   
 
By adding further studio-based programming, both live and pre-recorded, 
PLP has, since 2010, also offered a full content service (in other words, a 
stand alone fully scheduled channel that runs 24 hours a day 7 days a week 
for 42 weeks each year). Via a dedicated digital department PLP also 
provides short-form material for www.premierleague.com.  
 
As the domestic broadcasting rights to live Premier League football in the 
UK (154 games per season, 2013-16) are held by Sky Sports and BT Sport, 
PLP content is focussed towards the Premier League’s overseas partners. If 
you see a Premier League match outside the UK then you will be watching 
PLP output.  
 
Digital technology applied 
This section explains (a) the technology used in a contemporary digital 
production environment like PLP and (b) how this technology has been 
configured to enable a remarkable increase in the volume and scope of 
output including the speed with which this output can be produced.  This 
example also underlines Mosco’s claim (1996) about how commodification 
and different outputs:  
…	  intensify	  the	  commodification	  process	  by	  linking	  increasingly	  specific	  kinds	  of	  
programming	  to	  increasingly	  well-­‐defined	  audiences.	  	  (Mosco,	  1996:	  152).	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The technology used is EVS and AVID. EVS is at the hub of contemporary 
sport production operations, managing media at outside broadcasts or a 
studio base. The combination of EVS technologies and software systems – 
IP Logger and IP Director software– is the foundation for content logging 
(descriptions of content and other relevant metadata), clipping together 
content (a faster option than AVID editing) and the storage and movement 
of large amounts of media instantaneously between galleries, edit suites 
and MCR (MCR is the technical control area where all routing is managed).  
 
AVID non-linear edit suites are the factory floor, the edit rooms where 
content is assembled before output. AVID edit bays are linked together via 
nearside archive systems – these can be EVS, Viz Ardome63 or AVID Unity – 
shared media can be accessed quickly and by multiple producers. Far side 
storage is a longer-term archiving solution where content is held offline and 
is, therefore, not available for immediate use.  
 
The key points are: (1) these systems feature a high degree of connectivity 
which allows large amounts of media to be moved around rapidly, (2) 
multiple producers can work on the same source material simultaneously, 
therefore (3) the volume and scope of output is dramatically increased as is 
(4) the speed of production. This is a quantum leap from earlier linear tape-
based analogue systems. An example of how content flows from the initial 
match to international licensees follows. 
 
                                           
63 Viz Ardome is media management system that allows multiple users to check the 
availability of media directly from a desktop link. Available information includes when 
material was last used and if there are any special rights restrictions.  
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Premier League, from stadium to international licensee 
 
Host Broadcast Partners 
The Premier League’s host broadcast partners are Sky Sports and BT Sport. 
They are responsible for covering 154 matches a season (2013-16) for UK 
broadcast, with all 380 matches covered for international output. An 
illustrative camera plan64 for a match in the 2013-24 season is set out 
below, followed by the onward production pathway, via PLP, to the 
Licensee. 
 
Compared to a 6 camera plan from 1992, there are now, typically, 26 
cameras deployed. 6 cameras provide Super Slow Motion. 2 Ultra Motion 
cameras provide additional high levels of detail. All camera output is strictly 
assigned to EVS; this is done to ensure superfast replay reactions whenever 




















                                           
64 This is an indicative plan as all camera positioning is subject to case-by-case restrictions 
imposed by the individual stadia. 
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In a typical analogue outside broadcast truck the vision mixer console was 
limited to a maximum of 48 inputs, an international sports director explains 
the differences: 
Digital	  switchers	  [vision	  mixer	  desks]	  now	  have	  up	  to	  168	  inputs,	  8	  channels	  of	  EVS	  is	  pretty	  
standard,	  plus	  3	  different	  graphics	  sources	  are	  a	  fairly	  normal	  specification.	  The	  
technological	  changes	  within	  a	  fully	  digital	  operation	  mean	  that,	  in	  the	  same	  space	  as	  older	  
outside	  broadcasts,	  there	  is	  just	  so	  much	  more	  capability.	  (International	  sports	  director,	  
2012)	  
 
Being able to generate many more replays via EVS also means more 
production and/or EVS operators are required to select and manage this 
media. Similarly, the increased demand for statistics and graphics means 
either 1 or 2 assistant producers are assigned to this task. Whilst the host 
broadcast partner match coverage is for local UK viewers, Premier League 
Productions re-orients all match presentation towards a global audience. 
How this is done is now reviewed. 
 
 
The digital production environment 
Premier League Productions receives a clean feed (match coverage minus 
Sky Sports and BT Sport commentators, graphics and other embellishments 
such as station identification) from all Premier League matches covered by 
the host broadcast partners.  
 
To provide a standardised high quality output of all matches, the PLP 
production team consists of about 8 people - a director/vision mixer, 2 
producers, 2 assistant producers, 2 EVS operators and a graphics operator. 
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Standardised high quality output is a crucial idea that recurs in the context 
of UEFA, FIFA and Olympic host broadcast operations. In essence, this 
means adding a new commentary and bespoke Premier League graphics 
(information on the teams, their line ups and scores/duration during the 
match). Highlights are also provided at half time and at full time, statistics 
are added plus any reports, flash interviews and press conference material 
when available. 
 
As the match is fed into the production gallery, an assistant producer uses 
IP Logger software to produce a detailed description for editorial and 
Archive use. This metadata remains attached to the media as it moves from 
EVS nearside storage, to the AVID, back to EVS or Ardome and then to 
archive. Compared to the hand-written notes made in the early 1990s 
(which could be of variable quality and were prone to being misplaced) IP 
Logger provides comprehensive data for multiple users.  
 
The new output from the gallery is returned to MCR before onward routing 
to European, Asian and American satellite distribution and then to its final 
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Premier League Stadia 
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Digital production workflows 
The power of digital workflows, as expressed by Doyle (2002:30), is the 
ability “to reduce all sorts of images, sounds and text to a common format 
and to transport these via a common distribution infrastructure”. What 
should to be added to this understanding is the ability of numerous outputs 
to be created simultaneously, hence output is accelerated and volume 
increased. This is the fulcrum around which sports production processes 
now revolve – in a sense it is a powerful digital hub that allows content to 
be ingested, produced, modified and re-packaged, broadcast and then 
archived.  
 
Looking at the Premier League, the objective is to take 154 matches 
produced locally in the UK and reversion output as an international 
standardised high-quality presentation for use by up to 212 global 
licensees. In doing so Premier League Productions delivers the Premier 
League brand to the world.  
 
Turning now to the full service content service, this is simply a more 
structured format for content delivery, one that allows licensees to lift out 
and broadcast individual programmes or, if preferred, to use the schedule 
as a standalone channel. This option is appealing for telecommunications 
companies that do not have the same infrastructure as broadcasters, 
including production staff. The full content service includes material from 
the core service, but adds a range of live and pre-recorded studio 
programmes, plus more match re-runs and archive-based content. The full 
service content is a live stream; this feed is routed to a series of regional 
satellites, where it is available for Premier League Licensees to access. The 
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step up to providing a full channel schedule requires a much larger volume 
of content (168 hours per week) plus a wider scope of programme formats.  
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Analysis and additional studio-based production 
To provide enough content to fill an entire channel PLP use a two-tiered 
approach: (1) sophisticated analysis tools are used as a focus for additional 
discussions with (2) studio-based programmes providing the primary format 
for this expansion. 
 
In contrast to EVS, AVID and Ardome these analysis devices do not share a 
single operating system, meaning their incorporation is technically more 
challenging. However, they are important tools when adding scope to 
output. Of these the most notable are tOG-SPORTS Pro, the Viz-RT 
Touchscreen and Venatrack Real View65. 
 
For the 2013-14 season the Premier League introduced Goal Decision 
System from Hawkeye. Used during the match the referee is informed (via 
a receiver worn on his wrist) if a goal has been scored, subsequent 
animations can be shown on the venue screens and used in match 
coverage. In 2014 there is no indication the appetite for performance 
related information is diminishing with more and more data being made 
available for dissection66.  
 
What is crucial here is not the technological embellishment per se, but the 
ability to recycle original media in an increasingly wide range of new 
                                           
65 Red Bee Piero is used in the BBC’s sports coverage and available to independent 
producers for an annual license fee. 
66 Also worth mentioning is the adoption of the ‘1st and 10’ graphics system developed by 
Sportvision for ESPN in 1998. Further versions were developed by Princeton Video Image 
(PVI) for CBS and SportsMEDIA for NBC. These systems create virtual 10 yard lines for NFL 
coverage, showing how far the offensive team has to move the ball from the line of 
scrimmage to secure a first down. These graphics systems have become embedded in NFL 
coverage. 
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programme formats. With more and more versions being generated from a 
limited quantity of original material the commodification process, as 
described by Mosco (1996) and Schimmel (2005), enters an unprecedented 
new level of activity. Whilst Sky Sports was the first media provider to 
provide significantly extended scope, this is an important development that 
is now being driven by the leagues and federations as they seek more 
control of their own output and additional revenues, particularly in 
international media markets. The output provided by Premier League 
productions provides a useful example. 
 
4.5 Output: significantly increased volume and scope  
Comparing the BBC’s Match of The Day output from 1992 with Premier 
League Productions output in 2014 illustrates the remarkable increase in 
volume and scope that is possible using digital technology and workflows. 
In 1992 the weekly MoTD presentation was limited to 90 minutes. By 
contrast, Premier League Productions’ full content service runs 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week devouring 168 hours of content per week, around 65 
hours of which is newly produced material. 
 
Premier League Production’s output is split into 4 categories for distribution 
to Licensees, including: 
• Core Production - a range of live and recorded programmes, plus an 
additional 5 packages featuring enhanced feeds. 
• Full Content Service – a fully scheduled channel (launched in August 
2010) that delivers, Premier League content 24 hours a day, 7 days 
per week across 42 weeks per year in high definition. 
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• Archive-based Content - a selection of classic matches, greatest goals 
and golden moments from the Premier League. 
• Digital Production – news feeds, press conference coverage, club 
guides and short features re-versioned from the core production. 
• Distribution – from acquisition to multipoint distribution. Premier 
League Productions offer 3 packages with differing scales of cost and 
signal quality/reliability. 
 
A brief review of each of the 4 output categories and distribution follows. 
 
4.5.1 Core Production: live 
Beyond the guaranteed standard of live match production, output is 
extended up to 40 times per year with a super feed. This is an enhanced 
live offer where licensees have the option for 5-10 minutes access to their 
own unilateral feed (for example, to have their reporter appear in vision 
inside the ground before the match). Additional replays of key match 
incidents, as well as isolated camera angles tracking individual players are 
provided. The Football Feast feed, is an extended presentation that includes 
up to 3 consecutive matches, plus a compilation of all the goals scored on a 
Saturday. Approximately 30 Football Feasts are offered per season.  
 
Core Production: pre-recorded and magazine content 
In addition to live coverage, weekly preview and review shows are offered, 
plus season preview and review programmes and a goals of the season 
compilation. There is a weekly magazine programme that focuses on 
lifestyle stories featuring Premier League players in the UK and from around 
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the world67, Premier League World offers high levels of production value 
and, reminiscent of the NBA’s Inside Stuff magazine, it acts as a useful 
promotional tool for the Premier League. 
 
4.5.2 Full content service 
According to a senior PLP executive producer, from around 2007 there was 
a significant shift in the ownership of broadcasting rights:  
  
Telecommunications	  corporations	  (Telcos)	  started	  to	  acquire	  broadcasting	  rights	  in	  direct	  
competition	  with	  more	  conventional	  broadcasters.	  Whilst	  Telcos	  often	  have	  multiple	  digital	  
broadcast	  platforms	  at	  their	  disposal,	  they	  seldom	  carry	  the	  support	  infrastructure	  
associated	  with	  conventional	  broadcasters,	  including	  the	  technical	  facilities	  and	  
experienced	  production	  staff	  to	  receive,	  make,	  schedule	  and	  deliver	  their	  programmes.	  	  
 
Although	  Telcos	  were	  hungry	  for	  attractive	  new	  content,	  many	  of	  these	  firms	  remained	  
reluctant	  to	  undertake	  the	  financial	  commitment	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  programming	  to	  
accompany	  their	  content	  acquisitions.	  (PLP	  executive	  producer,	  2013)	  
 
Considering changes to market conditions, the Premier League and PLP 
devised a full content service model - this is a fully structured service that 
runs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for 42 weeks a year. The high definition 
service provides licensees with content that can be aired as a standalone 
channel. In the 2013-14 season the channel is broadcast in South Africa 
and the Middle East, but in Singapore and on Sport 24 local programming is 
added at peak times in the schedule. 
                                           
67 A story might follow Didier Drogba to the Ivory Coast to see some of his charity work. 
Interestingly, players’ agents are often keen to expose their clients in Premier League World. 
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For the 2013-14 season, a typical week (168 hours) of full content Premier 
League service included: 
• 42.5 hours of exclusive live content 
• 52 hours of full match re-runs 
• 22.5 hours of magazine content 
• 25.5 of Premier League Archive material 
• 25.5 hours of studio-based content repeats 
 
The Premier League full content service combines the core production 
content and archive-based content and is bolstered further by live and pre-
recorded studio programmes and magazine shows, including a football quiz 
format. The service turns to a range of studio-based formats to fill out the 
schedule. The studio formats include an exclusive Premier League news 
service; the Premier League claims, in 2013-14, it is the only football 
league that provides a 30 minute news programme, 3 days a week68. 
Further studio-based formats include a matchday goals round-up service, a 
daily highlights/review/discussion format, including detailed analysis. There 
is a heavy reliance on player performance statistics and subjective player 
ratings69.  
 
A fanzone format includes fan access with contributors via Skype, in 
addition to the usual methods, such as SMS text, email, and Twitter. Fans 
provide a studio audience for a quiz format featuring representatives of all 
20 Premier League clubs. To populate the various studio formats a 
substantial cast of presenters, pundits and named guests is required. The 
                                           
68 Confirmed by a senior PLP executive producer speaking in summer 2013. 
69 Control of football related data is a growing business – the Premier League has a 
partnership with Football DataCo.  
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on-screen team stretches to around 30 people, including: 10 established 
presenters, approximately 12 football pundits and another dozen or so 
regular guests.  
 
The full content service does not distribute commercial (paid for) content, 
but commercial time is offered to the licensees across the schedule. When 
licensees do not use this time it is filled with a range of interstitials, short 
promotions, archive clips, clips from magazine shows, picks of the week and 
top five/top ten lists.  
 
4.5.3 Archive-based content 
Since the early 1990s leagues and federations have realised the financial 
value of sports media archives. In 2013-14 the Premier League Archive is 
managed by IMG Sports Media via a separate contract: IMG seeks to exploit 
potential synergies between the Premier League Archive and Premier 
League Productions. The PL Archive team is responsible for advising on 
rights values and for additional one-off sales of Premier League content in 
the market. However, the contract with Premier League Productions also 
provides access to a range of archive-based content in various formats, 
including classic matches.  
 
For the core production offer, archive content includes 75 classic matches, 
40 golden moments, greatest goals programmes and a format called a 
whole new ball game. Unsurprisingly, archive use is extended further for the 
full content service offer, where 104 classic matches are presented. Best 
classics is another archive-based strand; these matches, sometimes 
featuring teams not currently in the Premier League, are broadcast over the 
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dark weeks when there is a break in Premier League matches to 
accommodate international football fixtures and during the summer recess. 
Archive-based content accounts for just over 15% (25.5 hours) of the full 
service content provision.  
 
4.5.4 Digital production 
Content produced by Premier League Productions has been re-versioned for 
use on www.premierleague.com since 2007. The bulk of digital production is 
made up of: 1 minute news bulletins, club guides, press conference 
presentations and short form features. There is also an audio podcast. 
Speaking to executives involved, digital production is often treated like a 
miniaturised content operation, but with the final delivery taking different 
forms (e.g. encoding for use on multiple devices70). Premier League 
Productions also produces Premier League content for Yahoo UK, insofar as 
Yahoo’s Internet rights in the UK allow. This includes highlights of 380 
matches, 35 matchday previews, news segments and up to 6 specially 
produced features. The preference is for short form content packaged 
together under a clear theme. 
 
4.5.5 Distribution 
Delivering high volumes of content to multiple points is a key element of 
the service.  Satellite delivery is the basis of Premier League Productions 
distribution operation; the large number of licensees and their global 
locations, taken in conjunction with the 3 year cycle of broadcasting rights, 
underpins the practicality of delivery by satellite.  
                                           
70 For mobile use content must be encoded separately for each platform, for example, Apple 
IoS, Android and Blackberry. 
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Whilst some licensees may prefer file-based delivery, satellite systems 
remain the dominant method. As redundancy is a very costly insurance 
policy (redundancy is the back up route used to ensure delivery of content, 
particularly for live feeds for which expensive advertising may have been 
sold by the licensees), so PLP uses satellite distribution to offer 3 levels of 
service based on price, quality and technology. The tiers are distinguished 
by preference, from extra cautious triple redundancy through to no 
redundancy at all. The editorial content provided remains the same for 3 all 
packages.  
 
Premier League Productions, a new level of commodification  
Measured against the BBC’s 1992 edition of Match of The Day, the volume 
and scope of output now generated by Premier League Productions (PLP) 
from a single Premier League matchday (10 matches across a weekend) is 
worth considering.  
 
PLP’s core production offer includes 8 different editorial strands, from live 
match coverage through to studio-based programmes organised around 
analysis, discussion, previews and reviews. The offer also provides a further 
5 special feed packages, with additional matches and enhancement options.  
 
Scaling up, the full content service delivers a further 11 variations on output 
available on a channel that runs 24 hours a day, 7 days of the week for 42 
weeks of the year. On top of this, archive-based content and digital 
production deliver another 4 strands of programming each.  
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This remarkable volume - a minimum of 32 different formats scheduled 
across 168 hours of broadcasting - is derived from the coverage of 10 
Premier League matches across a weekend, this is a little over 900 
minutes71 of football action. Or, for every single minute of on-the-field 
Premier League action, Premier League Productions generates over 11 
minutes of on-screen content – a multiplication factor of 11x1.  This 
increased output is made possible by digital technology and fully integrated 
production workflows. 
 
When researchers describe a continuous expansion in the way in which 
television can be distributed (Doyle, 2002), look at how the 
commodification process has intensified with ever more specific 
programmes for increasingly well-defined audiences (Mosco, 1996), or how 
commodification is bound up in the processes of economic production and 
distribution (Mason, 1999) then the example of how technology has 
transformed the production (supply) of Premier League content is 
particularly revealing.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 considered the different ways that technology has radically 
transformed transmission and sports television production workflows.  
 
In transmission, and against a background of changing expectations, 
manual videotape-based methods were replaced by automated systems 
utilising powerful media servers and software that was capable of 
                                           
71 Even with an average of 4 minutes added to the end of each game, the total only reaches 
940 minutes. 
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scheduling and transmitting multiple channels to numerous territories and 
time zones at the same time. However, the transition to a fully digital and 
tape-free workflow in transmission was not straightforward. It was delayed 
due to the reliability of Digital Betacam videotape and a lack of standardised 
encoding standards for file-based delivery systems. In 2014, this lack of 
standards remains problematic in transmission. 
 
With the arrival of Sky Sports live coverage rapidly became the 
predominant style of sports broadcasting, rising to similar levels of 
importance found in the US. Aggressive channel marketing was also 
introduced. Working within the existing analogue paradigm Sky Sports 
escalated the amount of technology deployed for coverage. Adopting 
several overtly US methods Sky Sports extended Roone Arledge’s 
philosophy of close up and personal coverage.  
 
The arrival of digital production technology, with new workflows and faster 
ways of working, dovetailed perfectly into the sports television 
environment. It totally transformed potential output. Large volumes of 
media could be quickly transferred between locations but what was most 
revolutionary was the capacity to allow simultaneous access by numerous 
clients to the same original material.  
 
Since 1992 there have been two important phases for sport production: (1) 
between 1994 and 2004 key non-linear editing and tapeless media 
technology was rolled out; introduced to production workflows this enabled 
a much greater volume and scope of sports content to be produced than 
ever before, and; (2) from 2004 onwards sports federations, including the 
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Premier League, were able to harness the potential of new technology and 
workflows to produce, under their own control, a guaranteed standard or 
global output that closely aligned with their own brand values.  
 
In a new case study the Premier League’s production arm, Premier League 
Productions, was unpacked and contemporary workflows and output 
examined, including the ways that a single minute of live football action is 
transformed into 11 minutes of general programming for worldwide 
consumption via a dedicated Premier League channel. Representing a new 
level of intensity in the commodification process, PLP output has come a 
very long way from the BBC’s 1992 Match of The Day operation.  
 
The chapter also addressed a scarcity of literature on television sports 
production; including the question of how vastly increased demand for 
sports content has been met. Consequently, the chapter was oriented 
towards the supply side rather than the demand side interpretation 
favoured by political economy critiques. In many instances developments in 
technology, including new distribution platforms and means of producing 
content, are expressed as new broadcasting rights are issued. As many 
important broadcasting rights are issued every three years then the 
technological paradigm is, in a sense, only updated a full cycle of rights 
behind technological developments.  
 
The role of broadcasting rights, as the second of three influential pre-
production factors, is discussed in chapter 5. 
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5 | Sports broadcasting rights 
 
If chapter 4 was concerned with fast-moving developments in technology 
including the creation of more platforms and accelerated means of 
producing ever more content, then turning to a discussion of broadcasting 
rights means, more or less, hitting the brakes; rights are very often about 
what you cannot do as a broadcaster or producer.  
 
Competition between broadcasters to acquire the most appealing sports 
broadcasting rights is extremely intense. Political economists argue that 
understanding why live sports coverage is so important to contemporary 
global media requires knowledge of how the power relations between sports 
authorities and broadcasters have changed over time. A strong expression 
of how the balance of power has shifted is seen in the process of issuing 
broadcasting rights. As Haynes (2005) points out:  
  
What	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  specific	  sports	  to	  drive	  uptake	  of	  new	  media	  technologies	  
and	  pay-­‐TV	  services.	  Sport,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  form	  of	  media	  content,	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  
weapon	  to	  break	  into	  new	  markets,	  undermine	  competitors	  and	  ultimately	  dominate	  
certain	  sectors	  of	  the	  media	  industry.	  (Haynes,	  2005:6)	  
 
Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:10) add: “… the marketisation of the 
television industry had fundamental implications for the selling and 
exploitation of sports broadcasting rights”. However, the story of rights is 
incomplete as it tends to be told with most emphasis on the demand side. 
Contracts for sports broadcasting rights have another, less understood 
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dimension: the addition of increasingly detailed prescriptions from 
federations including UEFA, FIFA and the IOC about how sports content 
should be shown on screen. This trend merits examination. As Drahos and 
Braithwaite (2002:4) note, such activity represents a “quiet accretion of 
restrictions...” and is often hidden from the public gaze. Discussion of how 
increasingly prescriptive controls are added to broadcasting rights is very 
scarce, so this chapter aims to address this gap. 
 
Without advocating technological determinism, this research argues that 
broadcasting rights often reflect important aspects of technological change. 
Chapter 4 reviewed the ways new technology and workflows combined to 
reshape the content supply side and meet escalating demand for sports 
content. Whilst reflecting economic and business imperatives, broadcasting 
rights are frequently linked to technology via new distribution platforms and 
means of producing content.  
 
Following intervention by competition authorities in the UK and Europe, 
broadcasting rights to the most popular sports events are typically tendered 
every three years; the majority of expert contributors interviewed thought 
broadcasting rights operated one cycle [of rights] behind technology. The 
pattern that emerges is of ever more specific rights being issued. This 
involves the unbundling of what were once more generic broadcasting 
rights, to be replaced with discrete categories identifying more rights, 
platforms, markets and territories that command further fees, for example 
the introduction of overseas, Internet and mobile rights. Chapter 5 focuses 
on sports broadcasting rights.  
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There are 2 dimensions to consider, (a) the ways sports broadcasting rights 
impact on broadcasters and (b) how the subsequent rights contracts can go 
a long way to determining production output – in other words, how these 
contracts increasingly tell producers what to do. Again, political economy 
discussion has had a lot to say about the wider impact on broadcasters and 
the ownership of rights but has had a lot less to say about the supply side, 
about how broadcasting rights influence the final output that we see on 
television. Speaking in 2013, a widely respected sports television executive 
summarises: 
In	  terms	  of	  limiting	  creativity,	  prescriptive	  is	  the	  right	  word	  for	  these	  contracts…	  Is	  there	  
more	  and	  more	  prescription	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  you	  are	  allowed	  to	  do	  and	  less	  and	  less	  input	  
from	  producers?	  Yes.	  That’s	  the	  case”.	  	  	  (Executive	  producer,	  independent	  sport	  
production,	  2013)	  
 
Haynes (2005) recognises this is a story of:   
…	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  everyday	  activities	  of	  media	  
organisations	  and	  how	  they	  have	  become	  the	  most	  important	  assets	  in	  media	  markets.	  
(Haynes,	  2005:12)	  
 
The chapter opens with some basic questions before looking in more detail 
at the composition of broadcasting rights. Since the mid-1990s a large part 
of my work as an executive producer has been responding to Requests for 
Production (RFP) or Invitations to Tender (ITT) that follow successful rights 
acquisitions; this specialist experience is used in the research. As before, 
new field notes as a participant-observer are used to support testimony 
from leading production experts. Two further methods are also adopted: 
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short form interviews, these deal with more specific topics (many of which 
arose off the back of work situations). These quick-fire interviews appear to 
suit producers’ willingness to respond and were often more informative than 
longer interviews. When approaching more sensitive areas – such as the 
application of the UEFA Production Manual – testimony is backed up with 
reference to the Manual itself. It is telling that contributors were much more 
reluctant to comment in interviews when the influence of federations was 
scrutinised, even though the contributions were anonymous. As with the 
Premier League case study in chapter 4, the introduction of highly 




5.1 What is intellectual property and what is it for?  
Gratton and Solberg (2007:146) argue that sports broadcasting rights serve 
the same purpose as copyrights do for books, films and music. However, 
historically there has not been any clear understanding of copyrights of 
sporting events. Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:88), following Szymanski 
(2009), provide a useful summary of claims to rights ownership. As sports 
broadcasting rights are a form of intellectual property, my position is that 
ownership resides with the leagues and federations that provide the 
competitive context. 
 
The ultimate structure of intellectual property regulations, such as 
copyright, has its roots in political philosophy; John Locke created a political 
philosophy of property in the 17th Century.  All patents, trademarks, design 
rights and rights in databases are based on intangible property rights; an 
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example of something tangible might include a plot of land. Consequently, 
intellectual property rights are based on an abstract object. The WTO 
(2004) suggests that intellectual property rights are given to people over 
the creation of the mind. However, rights are only extended to fixed, 
original and creative expressions, in other words any ideas need to be 
written down, as the ideas themselves are not protected. The initial idea to 
form a breakaway league of football clubs in England would not be 
protected, but the proposed new league’s title (The Premier League), its 
constitution, playing structure, schedule of matches and other operating 
parameters, could be identified, set down and, at that point, would be 
protected. In copyright law this is known as the idea/expression dichotomy 
and is a source of confusion. As Haynes (2005) notes: 
Unlike	  tangible	  property,	  which	  may	  have	  clear	  lines	  of	  demarcation,	  intellectual	  property	  
knows	  no	  bounds…	  Policing	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  copying,	  use	  and	  exploitation	  of	  IP	  rights	  
is	  therefore	  a	  key	  mechanism	  for	  society	  –	  largely	  led	  by	  business	  interests	  –	  to	  demarcate	  
who	  owns	  what.	  (Haynes,	  2005:14)	  
 
Once you own an intellectual property, the next step is to attach a value. 
The original owner holds various rights to copy until they are assigned to 
someone else, either by being sold or licensed. The bundle of rights that 
can, according to Haynes (2005:17), be assigned includes reproduction, 
derivative works adaptation or translation, broadcast, and public 
performance. These are the primary rights. Secondary rights protect against 
secondary infringement of copyright and include unauthorised distribution 
and exploitation of copied, importation, rent for hire, exhibiting for public 
trade, and selling. For example, a UK broadcaster may have the right to 
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show Premier League football, but these primary rights would not allow the 
broadcaster to sell their coverage on to a third party, a foreign broadcaster, 
as this would require a secondary rights deal. In the initial (1992) Premier 
League broadcasting rights deal BSkyB added £30 million for the overseas 
rights (Horsman, 1997). For the period 2013-16 broadcasting rights for 
Premier League overseas sales were worth close to £2 billion (Harris, 2012), 
unsurprisingly the Premier League actively protects its intellectual property 
rights. Utilitarian, market-driven principles of copyright (as they are 
interpreted by contemporary global media companies) have increasingly 
become the de facto understanding of how media rights are valued, 
organised and distributed. This suggests that much of copyright law is 
arbitrary and is designed on behalf of powerful interests. 
 
5.2  How has copyright law developed and how it is connected 
to the market?  
Whilst media markets have expanded globally (as has their protection under 
intellectual property law) there is no such thing as a homogenised 
international copyright and individual nation states therefore have their own 
histories of copyright legislation. Numerous international agreements72 have 
attempted to iron out disparities and divergences around the world. Where 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) acts as a secretariat for 
global intellectual property conventions, the World Trade organisation 
(WTO) carries powerful economic remedies and sanctions over nations that 
fail to meet the minimum standards for Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). As Herman and McChesney note (1997:51), “along with 
                                           
72 100 nations signed the Berne Convention in 1886, the Universal Copyright Convention was 
agreed under UNESCO in 1952, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) was 
founded under the United Nations in 1967 and, under the Final Act (1994) of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT, TRIPS, Trade Related Property Rights, was formed (Haynes, 2005:22). 
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pharmaceuticals, media and computer software copyright are the primary 
topics for global intellectual property rights negotiations.” 
 
Considering intellectual property, three factors stand out:  
1) Individual states sanction and regulate rules by which intellectual 
property rights operate; regulations vary from country to country. 
2) The growth in importance of intellectual property rights (including 
their definition and control) has been heavily influenced by the 
organisations that have promoted the virtues of free trade and non-
interference of governments, in other words WTO, GATT and NAFTA 
and the EC. 
3) IP Rights are invariably vested in large transnational corporations 
whose economic power often translates into political and cultural 
power. Recent trends in IP rights are often concerned with what 
cannot be done and this, as Haynes (2005:10) notes, means IP rights 
are used to “actually inhibit innovation and creativity”.  
 
Haynes (2005:13) continues to argue that intellectual property rights serve 
the interests of transnational corporations and the global business elite. 
Why such intellectual property rights exist in their present form, and what 
they protect, reveals how their meaning and function are changing to 
benefit the few (owners) over the wider (public) interest (this also appears 
to be linked to the transformation of citizens into consumers). Sports 
broadcasting rights were, for Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation, a 
battering ram forcing entry into new markets following the deregulation (in 
the UK, the 1990 Broadcasting Act). The goal was to dominate global TV 
sport rights ownership. It has proved a successful technique in the UK with 
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BSkyB’s coverage of Premier League and in the US with Fox’s presentation 
of the NFL. 
 
Linked to media regulation, international treaties governed by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) have influenced developments in copyright that are manifested in 
directives by the European Union, adopted by the UK in 200373 in what 
might be loosely termed as a trickle down effect of policy from a global to a 
national context. This brief discussion demonstrates that the world of 
intellectual property is often confusing and there is little evidence that it is 
getting any easier to understand. Two further factors add complication: (a) 
the Internet, the ease with which material can be copied and exchanged 
threatens the copyright control of global media providers, and; (b) the way 
encryption on digital delivery systems has been used to lock out users74. 
This is known as the copyright grab whereby copy-circumvention and 
access-circumvention have been bundled together in digital rights 
management technology to limit fair use. Copyright law does not have any 
bearing in access provisions, so this debate will continue.  
 
5.3 Sports broadcasting rights, changing values and 
definitions 
As Szymanski (2006:149) points out, the television industry consists of a 
set of vertically related markets. “The nature of competition at each stage 
                                           
73 Copyright Designs and Patents Act (1988) and the Copyright Related Rights Regulations 
(2003) 
74 When BSkyB acquired exclusive live broadcasting rights to the Premier League in 1992, 
the argument over the benefit of wider public access – football as a ‘public good’ – was 
voiced, as football became a ‘private good’ hidden behind a pay wall.  
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of the television industry, like any other, is determined by the nature of 
technology.” 
 
The first sign that the long-running arrangement between the BBC and ITV 
(that suppressed the value of sports broadcasting rights) was ending came 
in 1979 when LWT bid £5 million for exclusive rights to show league 
football. The press dubbed the attempted highjack of the BBC’s flagship 
show, Match of The Day, as “snatch of the day”. As described in chapter 3, 
it was in 1988, with broadcasting deregulation on the horizon, that the cost 
of domestic UK broadcasting rights to football began to escalate with ITV 
bidding £44 million for 18 matches per season for 4 seasons. As Gratton 
and Solberg (2007:5) summarise, in 1992 BSkyB raised ITV’s 1988 offer by 
250% and, when the rights were renegotiated in 1997, tabled a further 
337% rise in rights fees. Economically, the ownership of Premier League 
rights remains central to BSkyB strategy.  
 
Valuing and Auctioning Broadcasting Rights 
How do broadcasters evaluate their bids for sports broadcasting rights? 
Gratton and Solberg (2007) note that sports programming: 
…	  almost	  uniquely	  has	  this	  ability	  to	  attract	  the	  size	  and	  characteristics	  of	  audiences	  most	  
attractive	  to	  distributors,	  sponsors	  and	  advertisers.	  These	  audiences	  were	  also	  willing	  to	  
pay	  a	  premium	  price	  to	  broadcasters	  to	  receive	  more	  of	  the	  sports	  content	  than	  had	  
previously	  been	  supplied	  by	  the	  old	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  channels. (Gratton	  and	  Solberg,	  2007:10)	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However, Gerrard (2006:31) argues that, “sports media and image rights 
are intangible assets and invariably there are severe valuation problems75”. 
Among the drivers that shape sports broadcasting rights values are: 
a) The size and purchasing power of the population in the viewing 
market 
b) The popularity of the sport among the general audience 
c) The quality of the tournament, playing talent, uncertainty of outcome 
and contest significance 
d) The type of media coverage offered 
e) The level of competition on the demand side 
 
Haynes (2005) also points out that: 
Sport	  is	  ready	  made	  for	  television.	  Its	  use	  by	  television	  adds	  an	  important	  dimension	  to	  
media	  rights,	  because	  how	  we	  value	  sport	  in	  society	  has	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  licensing,	  
acquisition,	  distribution	  and	  ultimate	  consumption	  of	  sport.	  (Haynes,	  2005:67)	  
 
A very high barrier of confidentiality, legal process and regulatory 
requirements surrounds the auctioning of broadcast rights by sports such as 
the Premier League. Detailed information on rights, on the valuation and 






                                           
75 Gerrard (2006) notes the methods used to value rights, like discounted cash flow analysis 
(DCF), and points out various shortcomings. 
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Premier League UK Broadcasting Rights 
Working with specialist media, business and commercial, legal and 
regulatory advisors leagues and federations define the broadcasting rights 
to their events by considering: 
1) The range of programme packages offered, from live coverage, 
delayed presentation, highlights and clip rights including availability 
(broadcast times) for each package. 
2) The distribution platform, including digital satellite and cable (usually 
pay-TV), terrestrial broadcast (free-to-air), Internet streaming and 
mobile. This may include further definitions such as anytime and 
anywhere options defined by platform.  
3) The broadcast territory, usually defined as domestic (UK) or overseas 
(in the case of the Premier league this becomes 212 different 
territories) 
4) The period of the license, this is now typically 3 years but varies, 
most obviously with quadrennial events including the Olympics and 
World Cup Finals. 
 
Leagues, federations and their advisors consider all areas that can be 
exploited by the sale of their rights. Domestic rights have been the most 
valuable, but overseas rights have risen dramatically in recent years. 
Revenue from Internet and mobile rights remains modest. Live audio-visual 
UK broadcasting rights to the Premier League have, since 2001, been sold 
in three year/season licenses. The number of matches offered for live 
broadcast has increased from 60 (1992-97) to 154 (2013-16).  
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Looking at the 2013-16 rights76, 154 matches were offered by the Premier 
League. Correlating several sources77 shows 7 packages structured A to G, 
with each package distinguished by the time at which matches are 
broadcast.  
 
Figure 5.1, PL Broadcasting Rights Values 2013-2016 
 
Pack* Purchaser Matches Picks ** Cost Cost 
per 
match 
      
A  BT Sat 12.45 13x1 & 
13x4 
£534m £6.85m 






C  BSkyB Sun 13.30 13x2 & 
13x3 
£495m £6.35m 
D BSkyB Sun 16.00 20x1 & 
6x4 
£642m £8.23m 
E BSkyB Mon 20.00 






F BSkyB Sat 17.30 8x2 & 4x4 £196m £5.5m 
G BT 2 x Sat 12.45 
Plus midweek 
evening 17.45 
5x1 & 5x2  
& 2x5 
£204m £5.67m 
    £3.018bn  
 
* Packs A through E offer 26 matches per pack, F and G just 12 matches 
per pack = 154 matches 
** There are 5 rounds of match picks; this indicates which broadcaster has 
the right to choose preferred matches and when. For example, for 1st round 
match picks BSkyB has 20 picks and BT has 18. 
Breaking down the 2013-16 UK domestic rights as issued: 
                                           
76 Accessing the Premier League’s official website in October 2013 – 
http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/fans/faqs/how-does-the-premier-league-sell-its-tv-
rights.html - describes its broadcasting rights as being sold in 6 packages of 23 matches 
and, due to EU regulation, that no single broadcaster is allowed to purchase all 6 packages.  
This was the model for 2010-13 and 138 matches and not for 154 matches in 2013-16. 
77 Sources include the Premier League, BSkyB, BT and newspapers including the Guardian, 
Telegraph and Daily Mail and specialist sports industry journals. 
78 Games for clubs involved in playing in the Europa League on a Thursday night are 
frequently re-scheduled from Saturday to Sunday lunchtime kick offs. 
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• BSkyB purchased 5 packages, comprising 116 matches for a total of 
£2.28 billion in rights fees 
• BT Sport purchased 2 packages, comprising 38 matches for £738 
million 
 
The Premier League sells the broadcasting rights of all member clubs on a 
collective basis (see chapter 2). Revenue from domestic rights sales is 
divided on a 50:25:25 basis; 50% is shared equally between all 20 clubs: 
25% is awarded on a merit basis determined by each club’s final league 
position and the final 25% is distributed as a facilities fee for the matches 
involving any club shown live on television. In other words, a highly placed 
club with more live television appearances receives more revenue than a 
club finishing at the foot of the table with fewer appearances. For 2013-16 
the championship-winning club is expected to earn close to £100 million in 
broadcast earnings each season, while the bottom club can expect £63 
million (Ziegler, 2013). Additional revenue, the income generated from 
selling Premier League broadcasting rights overseas – approximately £2 
billion for 2013-16 – is divided equally between the 20 premier league 
clubs.  Figure 5.2 demonstrates the average cost paid per match for 
domestic UK broadcasting rights has escalated from around £630,000 to 
£6.53 million. This represents a ten-fold increase in rights fees since 1992. 
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 cross-reference various sources, where estimated costs 
vary a close approximate value is shown. In figure 5.2 the overseas rights 
are an additional revenue source (except for the entry in 1992-97 which is 
extrapolated from the figure for overseas rights that was added to BSkyB’s 
final offer).  




Figure 5.2, Rising PL Broadcasting Rights Values  
 
Period Duration Domestic 
UK£  
Purchaser + Overseas 
UK£ 
     
1992-1997 5 years £304m  BSkyB | 60 matches £30m 
1997-2001 4 years £743m BSkyB | 60 matches £98m 
2001-2004 3 years £1.2bn BSkyB | 106 matches £178m 
2004-2007 3 years £1.024bn BSkyB | 138 matches £325m 
2007-2010 3 years £1.706bn  BSkyB | 92 matches 
Setanta | 46 matches 
£625m 
2010-2013 3 years £1.78bn BSkyB | 115 matches 
ESPN | 23 matches 
£1.4bn 
2013-2016 3 years £3.018bn BSkyB | 116 matches 




From 2001-04, 3 packages of rights were offered and rights were issued 
every three years. BSkyB won the majority of matches, NTL secured pay-
per-view rights and ITV won highlights rights. As NTL could not afford its 
offer it withdrew its bid.  
 
For 2004-07, 4 packages were auctioned and BSkyB won all 4. Pressure 
from the EU Competition Commission saw BSkyB attempt to sublicense 8 
games but the agreed reserve price was not met and rights reverted to 
BSkyB.  
 
EU pressure paved the way for the 2007-10 license when 6 packages were 
offered, with no single bidder being able to secure all 6 (European 
Commission, 2005). This allowed Setanta to become the first broadcaster 
other than BSkyB to broadcast live Premier League matches. BSkyB’s 
domination was ended by the EU Competition Commission, rather than via 
free market competition. 
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In terms of further revenue for UK-based rights, the BBC paid £105m 
(2004-07), £172m (2007-10) and £173m (2013-16) to secure highlights 
rights for Match of The Day.  From 2007, additional costs were raised for 
the rights to show delayed coverage - the Sky Sports match broadcast in 
full at 20.00 on a Saturday night, followed by 50 minute highlights of each 
BSkyB game at 22.15. UK Internet and mobile rights have been added 
recently, as an ex-Sky Sports executive speaking in 2013 confirmed, “It 
was only 6 years ago [2007] that mobile broadcasting rights appeared for 
the first time.”  
 
Reviewing the growth of the Premier League’s domestic broadcasting rights, 
the explosion in value of rights licensed for top-flight football in the UK is 
not unique. It can be argued that the increases for Premier League 
broadcasting rights echoed the dramatic increases in rights fees paid for 
NFL coverage in the USA in the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 3). Since the 
1960s it has been the NFL that has set the benchmark for broadcasting 
rights income79. It can also be noted that the success of the Premier 
League, as a rival set up to challenge the incumbent Football League, was 
not guaranteed as, historically, in professional sports the single dominant 
league always prevails, Fort (2006:150). The risk involved in the newly 




                                           
79 The NFL was the first governing body to pitch itself as an entertainment, with ABC’s 
Monday Night Football becoming an American broadcasting institution. The way in which the 
NFL rotated rights packages between competing broadcasters was the envy of sports 
authorities around the world. 
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Overseas broadcasting rights 
Chapter 3 noted the NBA was actively engaged in building overseas rights 
values in the 1990s. The NBA borrowed heavily from advertising and 
branding cultures to create a global phenomenon around televised 
basketball and its leading player, Michael Jordan80. Securing significant 
revenue from overseas rights sales was not entirely new and NBA activities 
were well known to the Premier League81. As shown in figure 5.3 the 
revenues raised by the Premier League for its overseas distribution shows 
growth that roughly doubles with each period of rights: 
 
Figure 5.3, Overseas revenue for Premier League rights 
1992-1997 £30 million 
1997-2001 £98 million 
2001-2004 £178 million 
2004-2007 £325 million 
2007-2010 £625 million 
2010-2013 £1.2 billion 
2013-2016 ≥ UK£2 billion 
 
Recalling Fort (2006:53) and how earnings from broadcasting rights have 
altered the revenue side of sport forever, for 2013-16 the Premier League 
anticipates total rights revenues to reach £5.5 billion (Harris, 2012). But 
where does the escalating cost of rights leave broadcasters? 
 
 
                                           
80 The role of sports goods manufacturers like adidas and Nike should be considered. Smit 
(2006) explains the role Horst Dassler in the emergence of the Olympic Games and the FIFA 
World Cup, as ISL controlled early television and marketing rights. In golf and tennis Mark 
McCormack and IMG/TWI also had a leading role in generating rights and promoting players. 
81 In 1996, then chief executive of the Premier League Rick Parry was introduced to the NBA 
by Chrysalis Sport and subsequently visited the NBA in New York to review production 
operations. I was executive producer of NBA on Channel Four for Chrysalis. 
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Escalating costs  
Reasons for the escalation in the value of broadcasting rights include: 
a) The supply of broadcasting rights to elite sports is less than the 
demand from broadcasters. The number of competing media 
providers increased substantially from 1992, whilst the number of 
attractive sports events has remained relatively fixed.  
b) Live sports programmes are perishable goods they cannot be stored 
without losing most of their value. The high degree of time sensitivity 
of sport represents a major difference from other entertainment 
products. 
c) Similarly, exclusivity is particularly important as rights lose value 
once there is no longer uncertainty over the result. However, 
exclusive delayed broadcast rights and highlights rights do retain 
some value.  
d) The many ways sports coverage can be used on television, including 
live coverage, highlights programmes, rolling news bulletins, 
previews and promotions and nostalgia programmes featuring archive 
content, adds an important dimension to broadcasting rights. As 
revealed in chapter 4, Premier League Productions produces 11 
minutes of content for every single minute of football played on the 
pitch. 
e) The ways sports coverage can be adapted for distribution on 
alternative platforms, such as Internet streaming and mobile 
consumption is becoming more significant culturally but is not yet 
financially rewarding. 
f) In a fragmented broadcasting landscape, live coverage of major 
sports events continues to attract very large audiences (including 
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audience demographics that strongly appeal to advertisers and 
sponsors). 
g) Sport is one of the few programme genres that television audiences 
have demonstrated they are prepared to pay to watch. 
h) There is a lack of viable substitutes for live sports coverage. 
i) However, sport does have a finite value as the crash of ITV Digital82, 
and the failure of Premier League rights holders Setanta and, to a 
lesser extent, ESPN all demonstrate. 
 
Broadcasting rights, the buyer’s perspective 
Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006) argue the amount broadcasters are willing 
to pay for premium sports rights cannot solely be explained by what they 
are able to earn from subscription fees, sponsorship and advertising 
revenues.  
 
By	  showing	  the	  most	  popular	  sports,	  broadcasters	  expect	  to	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  better	  
image	  and	  identity,	  a	  stronger	  market	  position	  and	  a	  sustained	  increase	  in	  viewers.	  
(Jeanrenaud	  and	  Kesenne,	  2006:2).	  	  
 
The most prestigious events are the live global mega-events such as the 
IOC Olympics and the FIFA World Cup Finals. These marquee events 
provide a broadcaster with a degree of prominence that has value; in the 
UK, the BBC gains status as the Olympics broadcaster and, in the USA, 
NBC’s long-term association with the Olympics provides a similar benefit. 
But there are several issues with such rights: (1) rights to these global 
                                           
82 The 2002 crash was a result of massive over-valuation of the rights to Football League 
coverage by On Digital, later re-branded as ITV Digital. 
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events are first purchased by competing sports rights agencies, for example 
Infront (formerly the Kirch Group), Sportfive and TEAM Marketing before 
being marketed to national broadcasters territory by territory. (2) The 
Olympic Games and World Cup Finals are staged every four years83 and, (3) 
audience ratings are often determined by the performance of national 
athletes or, for the World Cup, the national team; when local interest is 
eliminated, then viewing figures tend to diminish and the value of 
advertising slots decrease.  
 
As broadcasters seek to build their audiences, it is the ability of national 
leagues and federation-based competitions to offer popular, talent-led, 
high-quality sports contests, with matches played week in and week out, 
across a well-defined schedule that are the most highly valued and 
subsequently attract the highest rights fees. BSkyB has consistently used 
first mover strategy to secure important rights. Sky Sports MD, Barney 
Francis maintains: “The Premier League has never been more popular with 
our customers” (Premierleague.com, 2012). Football continues to be used 
to drive take up of new services, for example Sky Go. 
 
In comparison to league football, the value of Formula 1 Grand Prix rights is 
less due to the varying start times of races; races are not held every week 
and frequently involve significant time shifts due to the different 
international time zones in a Formula 1 season. The relative uncertainty of 
when F1 races will be available to broadcast is slightly less appealing to 
audiences, advertisers and sponsors.  
                                           
83 In 1992 the IOC split the summer and winter Olympics and placed them 2 years apart to 
minimize the time the Games are ‘off the television screen’. 
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Illustrating this point, by March 1998 the BBC had lost all its football 
coverage, including Match of The Day and was looking for another flagship 
sport. UEFA Champions League coverage was ruled out, as the BBC could 
not broadcast the embedded sponsorship.  Meanwhile, at ITV, executives 
were keen to placate their advertisers by opting out of their contract to 
show Formula 1 and secure UEFA Champions League coverage. The appeal 
of regular mid-week prime time slots provided by elite European football 
outweighed the confusing schedule of F1 races. What was surprising was 
ITV was happy to openly admit this (Gibson, 2008). The BBC stepped in to 
secure F1 coverage. As Haynes (2005:68) argues, “Sports rights can be, 
and usually are, the flagship and distinguishing factor of a television 
station’s brand identity, and are lost at their peril”. In the case of the BBC, 
its inability to monetise the most expensive rights, via subscriptions, 
sponsorship or advertising is an economic disadvantage that is increasingly 
hard to overcome in a competitive market.  
 
Moving away from elite sports, broadcasting rights for more localised or less 
popular sports can still provide value. Broadcasters can acquire advertising-
funded coverage of some niche sports free of charge. 
 
Figure 5.4, Illustrative Categories of Sports Rights 
Global Mega Events IOC Summer Olympic Games 
FIFA World Cup Finals 
IOC Winter Olympic Games 





Various World Championships (e.g. IAAF athletics, 
swimming, gymnastics, rowing, sailing and so on) 
Rugby World Cup Finals 
Cricket World Cup Finals 
Paralympics, Summer and Winter 
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Regional Events with 









The EURO Championships 
Copa America (South American national 
championships) 
NFL SuperBowl & AFC/NFC Conference Finals 
UEFA Champions League 
EUROPA League 
Formula 1 Grand Prix 
Moto GP (motorcycle racing) 
USPG and ETP men’s professional Golf circuits 
ATP Tennis Tour 
6 Nations Rugby Union 
Regional Events, with 
less widespread appeal 
 
World Rally Championships 
Federation-based football tournaments, national and 
club-level – e.g. Liberatores Cup  
Asian Games 
Commonwealth Games 
Heineken European Cup (Rugby Union) 
Southern hemisphere international rugby 
tournaments 
National Leagues & 
competitions with 
significant global appeal 
and that provide regular 
season-long schedules 
 
Premier League (UK) 
FA Cup (UK) 
La Liga (Spain) 




National leagues & 
competitions with less 
global appeal 
Horse racing – both flat and hurdles seasons 
League-based rugby union 
Super League – rugby league 
County cricket 
Major League Baseball 







MoTD (BBC PL football highlights magazine) 
BBC The Football League Show (Highlights) 
Recycled sports preview/review programmes (e.g. 
Goals on Sunday, Sky Sports) 
Assorted magazine programmes made by both 
broadcasters and federations (e.g. FIFA Futbol 






Mundial Football, UEFA Champions League Magazine) 
and independent magazines, such as TransWorld 
Sport 
Special cases Rolling sports news (e.g. Sky Sports News) 
 
Sponsored content Many niche and extreme sports are funded by brands 
and/or sponsors and aired for free, e.g. Channel Four 
Freesports.  
Archive-based content Recycled nostalgia-based programmes 
Sports Entertainment Trace Sports Stars, lifestyle-based content 
 
These are illustrative categories set out by perceived value, by region and 
reach, rather than by the actual rights fees paid. Whilst subjective, this list 
demonstrates the difference between prominent sporting events that act 
like special offers attracting viewers to a broadcaster’s schedule every four 
years and the regular menu of domestic leagues and federation-run 
competitions, with schedules that provide volume and quality across a well 
defined season, that run year after year, are proven to deliver viewers and 
appeal to advertisers and sponsors84.  
 
In general terms, broadcasters engage with federations selling rights:  
1) When a league or federation auctions its domestic broadcasting rights 
a confidential tender document is circulated to interested parties. 
(Occasionally interested parties are invited to request a tender 
document alongside a non-disclosure agreement to cover the tender 
process).  
2) A deadline is set for broadcasters to submit first round sealed bids for 
the various rights they may wish to purchase.  
                                           
84 Agencies like IMG and Sportfive are appointed to run Archive services for leagues and 
federations and manage one-off sales.  
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3) Once bids are received, broadcasters may be required to make a 
presentation to the league or federation.  
4) In larger and more complicated tenders a second round of bids may 
be required, or a set of clarifications may be requested.  
5) Usually there is a small window for exclusive negotiation between the 
leagues or federations and the preferred bidder. 
6) The auction winners are announced subject to contract.  
 
Rights auctions are a time-consuming and increasingly expensive process 
for bidders; costs cannot be recovered if a bid fails. As bids require 
specialist commercial, financial and legal input then costs quickly mount up. 
In 2012, BT Sport successfully bid for 2 Premier League packages (38 
matches). Within sports television this success is credited to the additional 
input of Tony Ball, a former BSkyB chief executive who worked closely with 
Vic Wakeling at Sky Sports. Ball was hired by BT as a non-executive 
director and brought first-hand experience and strategic insight to the 
Premier League rights bidding process. BT Vision also called on Marc 
Watson, its own chief executive (Sweney, 2012). Previously Watson had 
been a director at the sports rights consultancy firm Reel Enterprises a 
long-standing advisor to the Premier League in rights negotiations. Adding 
detailed inside knowledge of processes and politics appears to be a critical 
component of successful rights bids. 
 
Production services auctions 
When a broadcaster does secure broadcasting rights there may follow a 
further tender process, a Request for Production (RFP) or an Invitation to 
Tender (ITT). This is where a broadcaster, for a variety of reasons including 
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meeting regional production quotas, may wish to place the production with 
an independent producer to deliver the final content. These responses can 
also be expensive to produce, costs are seldom recovered and I have seen 
cases where the tender operator seeks to retain ownership of any ideas 
submitted85, even if the tender is not successful and no costs are paid. 
Whilst it might be argued that this is an abuse of market power I am not 
aware of any example where an independent production company has 
chosen to challenge. 
 
Rights holding federations may also wish to tender directly with an 
independent production company for coverage and subsequent distribution 
of an event. In responding to tenders a trend I have noticed is for more 
legalistic terms to be used. As some of these events are relatively small, 
then production companies may take a view on whether a limited 
opportunity may lead to further, more lucrative, work in future. As 
federations adopt legal frameworks the situation is reminiscent of Harvey 
(2005:3) and the  “significance of [extending] contractual relations in the 
marketplace”.  
 
Risk, the broadcasters’ dilemma  
As fierce competition has propelled the value of broadcasting rights, the 
risks associated with acquiring expensive rights have also increased. Since 
1992 only four companies have owned live broadcasting rights for the 
Premier League; two of these companies have failed. When Setanta lost one 
of the two packages (of 23 games each) it had acquired as a result of EU 
                                           
85 RFPs increasingly include such clauses. In 2012 the IOC adopted this position when 
tendering for digital production services.  
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intervention, the company failed to meet its commercial targets and 
collapsed in June 2009 (Mason and Moore, 2009).  Within a few weeks 
ESPN acquired Setanta’s rights but was unable to hold onto these rights in 
2012 due to intense competition from newcomer BT Sport. BT Sport began 
to broadcast in the 2013-14 season, so whether its expensive acquisition of 
2 packages (totalling 38 games for £738 million) is successful remains to be 
seen, leaving BSkyB as the only company with a proven track record in 
monetising its ownership of domestic UK rights to live Premier League 
matches.  
 
When considering sports broadcasting rights broadcasters’ evaluation needs 
to account for the full costs incurred, from buying rights to delivering 
programmes to audiences. Solberg (2006:108) explains the cost structure 
of sports broadcasting: 
1) Total costs = fixed costs + variable costs 
2) Fixed costs = production related costs + sunk costs (usually 
including broadcasting rights fees and infrastructure costs) 
3) Variable costs = variable costs of broadcasting + variable costs of 
production + opportunity costs 
 
Solberg (2006) also notes the very different outcome from a contract that 
obliges the purchaser to broadcast a fixed number of games – the case with 
the Premier League – and a contract that allows a broadcaster to air up to 
(but not necessarily all of) the games offered.  As BSkyB in particular has 
invested heavily in acquiring attractive football rights and in their 
broadcasting infrastructure, then there is a much higher degree of sunk 
costs. As Solberg (2006) continues, among other things this has allowed 
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sellers to dictate the contract terms leaving the broadcasters to carry the 
entire risk in the event of negative shifts in demand – of an audience 
switching off. Running a commercial sports broadcasting business, even 
when rights fees are discounted, is extremely expensive and represents a 
very high barrier to entry. Whilst not referring to the acquisition of 
expensive sports broadcasting rights, the element of risk implied in the 
term casino capitalism (Strange, 1986) seems an appropriate description. 
But, the right sport can deliver large numbers of viewers to broadcasters.  
 
With the shift in market power away from broadcasters upstream to the 
leagues and federations (see chapter 2) there is another, largely unseen but 
significant trend: the detailed prescriptions that are increasingly written in 
to broadcasting rights and that frequently determine key aspects of 
production output and that remind us, again, of “a quiet accretion of 
restrictions…”  (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002:4) 
 
5.4  Broadcasting rights and prescriptive practices, examples 
from Formula 1 and the UEFA Champions League 
 
Formula 1 
In 1995, ITV won the rights to broadcast live Formula 1 offering Formula 
One Management £60 million for four seasons from 1997. ITV retained the 
broadcasting rights until 2009. Following its acquisition, ITV tendered a 
Request for Production (RFP) to ITV Sport, IMG and a broadcaster-
independent producer partnership of Meridian, Anglia and Chrysalis 
Television (MACh 1). Working at Chrysalis Television, I was lead author of 
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the successful MACh 1 response and was subsequently involved in setting 
up the coverage and monitoring output in further seasons.  
 
Formula 1 was already known for draconian arrangements at its venues, for 
example any material shot at an F1 circuit belongs to F1 – copies of all 
material had to be submitted on a daily basis. However, the Formula 1 
contract with ITV went further in prescribing what could and could not be 
done at any venue. This was in 1996-97 and, whilst I had encountered 
copyright issues when working on behalf of Channel Four with the NFL and 
NBA in the USA, this was the first time I had seen such extensive 
restrictions. Typical conditions determined: 
• What material producers could record at any F1 venue 
• Whether a studio position would be allowed at any venue 
• Where any additional cameras could be placed on site, including a 
tight restriction on RF frequencies86 
• When material could be recorded at the venue 
• When the international feed must be used by a broadcaster  
• Prescriptions on what could be done in and out of commercial breaks 
• How additional material, like interviews with drivers that had left the 
race, may be incorporated within live coverage (the international 
feed) 
• Who producers could have access to at the venue 
• Where production (OB) vehicles could be parked 
• What levels of credentials would be authorised and who could receive 
them 
                                           
86 An RF camera uses radio frequencies to send material back to the Outside Broadcast 
truck. 
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• What supporting F1 Archive would be available and how this could be 
used 
• The ownership of all material shot at the venue 
• When the final programme material can be aired, or rebroadcast on 
other ITV channels  
 
ITV was keen to make Formula 1 coverage as widely accessible as possible 
so the broadcaster could maximise the value of the broadcasting rights87.  
The producers had to balance the stipulations set out by Formula 1 with 
ITV’s commercial targets and audience requirements – the production team 
was stuck in the middle between the rights holders and broadcaster client. 
A senior executive producer with many years experience of Formula 1 
coverage at different broadcasters confirmed the issues remained much the 
same in 2013:  
Formula	  1	  limits	  creative	  control	  massively.	  Bernie	  Ecclestone	  says:	  this	  is	  how	  we	  cover	  the	  
start	  of	  the	  race,	  half	  way	  through	  lap	  2	  we	  will	  do	  7	  or	  8	  replays	  of	  the	  start.	  This	  is	  
incredibly	  frustrating,	  because	  halfway	  through	  lap	  2	  we	  haven’t	  really	  resolved	  where	  this	  
and	  that	  driver	  are	  in	  the	  race	  yet.	  But	  the	  rules	  that	  have	  been	  laid	  down	  by	  Formula	  1	  are	  
that	  halfway	  through	  lap	  2	  you	  must	  have	  these	  replays	  –	  it	  is	  incredibly	  frustrating.	  There	  is	  
now	  much	  more	  of	  a	  set	  pattern	  in	  the	  way	  that	  a	  sport	  is	  covered	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
requirements	  of	  rights	  holders.	  Formula	  1	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  (Senior	  executive	  producer,	  
independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  	  	  
 
                                           
87
 A particular concern for ITV was how to introduce commercial breaks to live race 
coverage. The inclusion of commercial breaks is standard practice around the world so it was 
of less concern to F1 than to UK audiences that had become used to uninterrupted coverage 
on the BBC.  
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Formula 1 was one of the first federations to actively seek a guaranteed 
quality of coverage across all its events - the Premier League later 
expressed a similar target for its own international output (see chapter 4). 
A highly experienced international sport director adds his perspective on the 
balance between offering safety or creativity in live coverage: 
 
When	  you	  are	  directing	  a	  generic	  world	  feed	  to	  over	  100	  countries,	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  
be	  a	  safe	  pair	  of	  hands	  as	  the	  premise	  is	  guaranteed	  uniform	  and	  stable	  coverage	  of	  the	  
event.	  The	  coverage	  needs	  to	  be	  clean,	  so	  any	  client	  can	  jump	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  coverage	  
where	  they	  need	  to.	  You	  might	  need	  more	  creativity	  when	  you	  are	  working	  for	  a	  single	  
channel	  –	  a	  broadcaster	  –	  because	  you	  are	  then	  responsible	  for	  how	  the	  channel	  looks	  and	  
feels,	  but	  you	  don’t	  need	  this	  creativity	  for	  an	  international	  feed.	  (International	  live	  sports	  
director,	  2012) 
 
My experience of Formula 1 tallies with the accounts of several specialist F1 
producers and directors interviewed. What Formula 1 had found was this: 
as F1 broadcasting rights were sold to more broadcasters around the world: 
(a) the different emphasis placed on coverage by each national Grand Prix 
host broadcaster was becoming increasingly incongruous as they tended to 
focus on local stories, teams and drivers and; (b) with increased rights 
sales, more broadcasters wanted to be able to drop in and out of an 
international feed to which they could add their own unilateral material 
(customising presentation for their own audiences). Either way, F1 wanted 
more consistent and uniform coverage from race to race and across the 
entire season of races – the aim was to establish a recognised F1 brand. 
This was not just editorial it was also technical due to different recording 
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standards used around the world. However, the needs of an emerging, 
globalised audience had become more important than the domestic 
interests and idiosyncrasies of coverage from, say, the British, Italian or 
Brazilian Grand Prix. 
 
To achieve greater consistency in race coverage Formula 1 provided its own 
host broadcast (international) feed. This feed starts 5 minutes prior to the 
start of the race lasting through to the post-race press conference. Formula 
1 broadcasting rights agreements required all broadcasters to join this feed 
before the race.  
 
Another reason for such prescriptions was to ensure that the coverage 
provided positive exposure for the key sponsors, whether it is those 
sponsoring the race, those with prominence around the circuit or a balance 
of car sponsors to be shown across a full race weekend.  
 
Between 1996 and 2002 Formula 1 went a step further and provided its 
own coverage from a state-of-the-art production complex at each venue. 
Although this coverage was innovative, it was not a commercial success. 
Consequently, Formula 1 entered a 2 year joint-venture with BSkyB gaining 
access to the Sky platform where it offered a digital service for £12 per 
race. Whilst the service added a number of engaging editorial 
enhancements - including a lap counter, car-tracking graphics, on-screen 
rev counters, G-force indicators and more team radio feeds – commercial 
success remained elusive. However, a positive legacy of this service is how 
many of these editorial enhancements were subsequently adopted in the 
current international feed (Milmo, 2002).  




During interviews some producers, particularly those with more 
international experience, said they considered production standards around 
the globe had gradually improved since about 2000 – in particular, 
standards in Asia and China showed the greatest improvement. These 
producers considered this was a result of exposure to prescriptive coverage 
required by Formula 1, FIFA and the IOC. It was argued that, in a sense, 
these prescriptions offered a benchmark for international standards.  
 
During the same interviews, the most prevalent view expressed was how 
producers considered their own creativity had been curtailed by the same 
increase in prescriptive conditions. These conditions were being added much 
further upstream, usually at the same time as broadcasting rights were 
assigned. In other words, long before producers became involved. A senior 
executive at an independent sports production company expressed concern 
about the future course of this trend:  
Production	  creativity	  will	  be	  much	  more	  focussed	  around	  shoulder	  programming,	  those	  
shows	  pre-­‐kick	  off	  and	  post	  match,	  that’s	  where	  producers	  will	  have	  input,	  once	  you	  go	  
across	  to	  the	  stadium	  or	  race	  track	  coverage	  will	  be	  more	  prescriptive.	  (Senior	  manager,	  
independent	  production,	  2013)	  	  
 
An increase in prescriptive conditions marks a split between international 
coverage, increasingly provided by federations, and more localised 
presentation added by rights holding broadcasters. While Formula 1 was 
one of the earliest examples of a federation exercising control over the final 
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production output, a landmark case illustrating how prescriptions have 
become formalised is found with the UEFA Champions League. 
 
UEFA Champions League  
Coverage of the UEFA Champions League (UCL) involves matches played at 
the same time at different locations across Europe88, so similar issues of 
consistency of coverage and the protection of brand values arise as with 
Formula 1. A head of programmes speaking in 2013 had a simple view of 
the issue: “German TV would use one wipe and Austrian TV another and ITV 
yet another and it wouldn’t look like it is all part of the Champions League 
family.” In my view the issues in play are more complex. 
 
Sugden and Tomlinson (1998:93-97) note UEFA worked closely with TEAM 
Marketing AG, a company set up in 1991 to secure “the greatest monetary 
gain through marketing of television rights and sponsorship of the UEFA 
Champions League.” This approach reflected models created for the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympics and Patrick Nally’s influential InterSoccer template 
discussed in chapter 3 (Nally, 1979).  
 
For UEFA and TEAM Marketing the solution was to create the UEFA 
Champions League Production Manual. When a broadcaster acquires the 
rights to broadcast the UEFA Champions League it must abide by the rules 
set out in the Production Manual. It is telling that, when approaching the 
subject of federation control, many producers were reluctant to say 
anything critical, even when speaking with anonymity. As the focus is on 
                                           
88 The UCL season comprises of 16 Matchdays, including the Final and the UEFA Super Cup. 
The matches, as a rule, begin at 20:45 Central European Time and are played on a Tuesday 
or Wednesday, with the Final played on a Saturday and the Super Cup on a Friday. 
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prescription, the following account refers directly to the UEFA Champions 
League Production Manual and UEFA website. Field notes as participant-
observer are added to short testimony from those participants who were 
willing to speak. Analysis of UEFA’s use of the Production Manual is a new 
contribution to research. 
 
The UEFA Champions League Production Manual (UEFA, 2011) gets a little 
larger each season. The 2011-12 version contains 9 main sections and is 
nearly 150 pages long89. It opens with an overview of the competition, 
including the “triangle of mutual benefit”; the relationship between 
broadcasters, sponsors and football clubs that are “encircled within the 
control” of UEFA and TEAM Marketing. The Manual states:  
UEFA	  controls	  and	  conducts	  the	  competition	  and	  co-­‐ordinates	  the	  three	  partner	  groups.	  
Additionally,	  UEFA	  has	  appointed	  TEAM	  Marketing	  to	  secure	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  UCL	  
Partners	  and	  to	  facilitate	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  concept	  on	  site.	  	  (UEFA,	  2011:12)	  
 
This means UEFA provides sponsorship exposure that is fully embedded in 
the broadcast output and that every Champions League broadcast operation 
is supervised by TEAM Marketing representatives. UEFA’s sponsors for the 
2013-14 season include UniCredit, MasterCard, Ford, PlayStation, Gazprom, 
Heineken, adidas and htc. In addition to various credits in and out of 
commercial breaks during the prescribed coverage, these sponsors often 
buy additional commercial time in key markets around Champions League 
broadcasts; in the UK this would be on ITV or Sky Sports. UEFA expands on 
what it calls a “triangle of mutual benefit”: 
                                           
89 Production bibles are typically produced for drama and factual entertainment shows. By 
contrast to UEFA’s 150 page manual, the bible for HBO’s long running drama series The Wire 
was 79 pages (Martin, 2013) 
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To	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  the	  competition	  everyone	  must	  benefit.	  The	  Clubs	  have	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  play	  on	  the	  biggest	  stage	  and	  be	  financially	  rewarded	  for	  their	  contribution,	  
whilst	  the	  UCL	  Partners,	  who	  provide	  the	  competition	  with	  worldwide	  exposure	  and	  
substantial	  revenue,	  benefit	  from	  association	  with	  an	  outstanding	  competition.	  
UEFA/TEAM	  have	  pioneered	  a	  marketing	  approach,	  which	  ensures	  that	  funds	  raised	  go	  
directly	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  football.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  centralised	  marketing	  programme,	  which	  also	  
produces	  clear	  benefits	  for	  Clubs,	  UCL	  Partners	  and	  spectators.	  The	  UCL	  offers	  Broadcasters	  
football	  of	  the	  highest	  quality	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  broadcast	  up	  to	  125	  UEFA	  Champions	  
League	  matches	  plus	  20	  Play-­‐off	  matches,	  providing	  security	  of	  programming	  to	  a	  known	  
calendar.	  	  (UEFA,	  2011:12)	  
 
TEAM Marketing provides supervision ensuring rules are followed and the 
interests of the partners protected. Conformity is achieved through a 
combination of: 
a) Visits to each Club venue 
b) Meetings at each venue with the host broadcaster  
c) UEFA/TEAM Marketing assigns a coordinating producer to each club 
for as long as it remains in the tournament  
d) The rules and requirements as set out in the Production Manual. 
(These are explained directly to the host broadcast director by the 
TEAM producer) 
e) The host broadcaster is on site for two days for each Matchday (the 
schedule starts with news requirements on Matchday -1).  
f) UEFA has a group of quality control (QC) producers that check the 
final output; this group includes experienced sports directors.  
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The Manual is an impressive document, separate detailed guidelines 
include:  
• Host Broadcast Operations 
• TV Graphics 
• Venue Operations 
• Satellite Distribution 
• Content Services 
• Information Services  
• FAME (Football Administration Management Environment, which 
handles all requests and bookings).  
 
UEFA also insists: “The host broadcaster must use the latest generation of 
digital equipment on all productions.” (UEFA, 2011:19.) Whilst a lot of the 
information in the Manual is highly technical90, there are two sections that 
are editorial; section three Host Broadcast Operations and section seven, 
Content Services.  
 
Section seven, Content Services includes a wide range of approved content 
produced and distributed by UEFA to broadcasters, including individual city 
profiles, numerous Matchday promotional trailers and official graphics 
elements (titles, logos, backgrounds and animations). On Champions 
League Matchdays, UEFA provides Matchnight Highlights, an Instant 
Highlights feed (available quickly after the games have finished) and further 
content for mobile and Internet use. Beyond this offer, UEFA also produces 
                                           
90 For example in requiring Host Broadcasters to provide unbroken recordings from camera 1 
-the main coverage camera on the half way line - and a HDCAM tape copy of all EVS 
material. 
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a weekly 30-minute UEFA Champions League Magazine programme91. There 
is further access to isolated camera compilations (dramatic angles of match 
action), plus in-season archive and previous seasons archive. This offer is 
reminiscent of the approved content provided by Premier League 
Productions for the Premier League full service (see chapter 4). 
 
Host Broadcast Operations, section three, contains what it calls “principles 
and match director guidelines” designed to make Champions League 
coverage as consistent as possible from host broadcaster to host 
broadcaster:  
The	  key	  principle	  for	  match	  directors	  is	  to	  remember	  they	  are	  providing	  coverage	  for	  the	  
multilateral	  feed	  so	  it	  should	  be	  unbiased	  and	  aimed	  at	  satisfying	  the	  viewing	  preferences	  
of	  a	  global	  audience	  and	  not	  just	  a	  specific	  domestic	  market.	  (UEFA,	  2011:27).	  	  
 
This is the same guaranteed uniform and stable coverage sought by 
Formula 1 and the international output of Premier League Productions. 
 
Section three continues to set out host broadcast camera positions and the 
numerous multilateral content production running orders, in other words the 
editorial content of the multilateral international feed to be offered by each 
host broadcaster. Typically Sky Sports or ITV will take the multi-lateral feed 
and insert their own unilateral coverage. The unilateral coverage includes 
any studio discussion and analysis, pitchside presentation and interviews. 
The broadcast output we finally see jumps between the multilateral 
coverage (global) and unilateral injects (local customisation). UEFA’s 
reasoning is:  
                                           
91 From the 2012-13 Season this production was sub-contracted to IMG Sports Media. 
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The	  multilateral	  running	  order	  (MRO)	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  between	  
matches	  and	  to	  inform	  Broadcasters	  what	  coverage	  to	  expect	  during	  non-­‐playing	  periods	  so	  
that	  they	  can	  plan	  their	  unilateral	  productions	  accordingly.	  The	  MRO	  has	  been	  formulated	  
for	  the	  following	  periods:	  Pre-­‐match,	  half	  time,	  post-­‐match,	  extra-­‐time	  and	  penalties.	  
(UEFA,	  2011:44)	  
	  
All key aspects of Champions League match coverage, from camera 
placement, replay philosophy, and programme graphics are specified, 
including minute-by-minute running orders that start at 19.35 (CET) and 
run through to post-match and to off-air at full-time +6:50 minutes. With 
as many as 8 matches per evening, the Champions League is an impressive 
logistical operation with all matches kicking off at the same time. 
Illustrating the extent to which conformity is sought, a typical pre-match 
multilateral running order (MRO) is set out in figure 5.5. 
 

















Team arrivals/ dressing 




19.40.00 20.10.00 30.00 Pre-Multi 
Unilaterals 
When no Unilaterals – multi-
camera coverage of Stadium 
ambience/ multi-camera 




20.10.00 20.14.00 04.00 Warm Up 
feed 
Multi-camera coverage of 
both teams, 15s per player 
 



















Dur. On Screen Description Graphics 
20.15.00 20.25.00 10.00 Pre-
Multilateral 
Beauty shot, then multi-cam 
player warm ups 
 
20.25.00 20.26.00 01.00 Stadium 
beauty shot 
Clean shot  
20.26.00 20.28.00 02.00 Stadium 
beauty shot 
 Match ID 
(2m) 
20.28.00 20.30.00 02.00 Stadium 
Beauty shot 
 Countdow
n to TX 
(2m) 
20.30.00 20.30.40 00.40 Opening 
Sequence 
  
20.30.40 20.31.00 00.20 Stadium 
beauty shot 
 Match ID 
& weather 
20.31.00 20.31.30 00.30 Stadium 
ambience 
Crowd home and away 
shots 
 
20.31.30 20.34.00 02.30 Key player 
warm ups 
Player CUs, super slomo 75s 
each, home then away 
Live stadium sounds 
 

















20.36.00 20.36.30 00.30 Stadium 
beauty shot 
Clean beauty shot  
20.36.30 20.37.30 01.00 Star player 
comparison 
1 x super slomo per team Player ID 
& stats 25 
secs each 




20 s  
20.38.00 20.39.30 01.30 Stadium 
ambience 
Live atmosphere crowd 
shots, home & away 
 
20.39.30 20.40.00 00.30 Stadium 
beauty shot 
 Match ID 
20 secs 











Dur. On Screen Description Graphics 













up 10s & 
tactical 
15s 
20.43.40 20.44.00 00.20 Coin toss  Officials 
IDs 
20s 




up 10s & 
tactical 
15s 




20.44.50 20.45.00 00.10 Main cams 
shots 
  
20.45.00   KICK OFF   
      
 
 
Looking at this running order, an experienced executive producer/director 
points out: 
As	  a	  director,	  with	  five	  minutes	  to	  go	  in	  a	  match,	  I’m	  sometimes	  more	  worried	  about	  
whether	  I’ve	  put	  a	  score	  caption	  up	  at	  the	  right	  time,	  than	  whether	  an	  incident	  in	  the	  
match	  was	  a	  penalty	  or	  not.	  	  (Executive	  producer/live	  sports	  director,	  2013)	  	  	  
 
UEFA’s General Secretary, Gianni Infantino sees issues to do with 
conformity slightly differently in his introduction to the 2011-12 Manual:  
This	  Production	  Manual	  is	  designed	  to	  encourage	  you	  to	  live	  the	  UEFA	  Champions	  League	  
experience	  to	  the	  full	  and	  to	  help	  you	  to	  provide	  the	  best	  possible	  coverage	  for	  your	  
audience.	  (UEFA,	  2011:Introduction)	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In other words, UEFA demands approved coverage. The UEFA Champions 
League broadcast operation - as expressed in the Production Manual and 
through the actions of UEFA and TEAM Marketing at each venue - 
represents an unprecedented level of control that is exerted by a governing 
body over the final broadcast output. Whilst broadcasters can provide more 
local context via their unilateral presentation content and style, the core 
match coverage remains firmly in the hands of UEFA because:  
Developments	  in	  the	  commercial	  and	  media	  world	  have	  gone	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  football’s	  
evolution	  in	  recent	  years.	  Consequently,	  UEFA’s	  marketing,	  commercial	  and	  technological	  
activities	  have	  intensified	  considerably	  (UEFA,	  2009).	  	  
 
Fynn interviewed in 2003, (Boyle and Haynes, 2004:64) argues that UEFA 
“Now recognise through control of sponsorship, advertising and TV rights 
that they have the power”.  This section has demonstrated that this market 
power goes a very long way to define what sports we can see, where we 
can see them and what the final programmes look and sound like. This is 
the reality of transformations in sports broadcasting rights; it is a subject 
that is largely absent from media studies. 
 
Conclusion 
The continuing migration of market power from broadcasters and media 
providers upstream to the leagues and federations that control rights was 
discussed. The changing values and definitions used in sports broadcasting 
rights were also reviewed. 
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How increasing levels of control over output have been introduced was 
illustrated with examples from Formula 1 and the UEFA Champions League. 
These cases were used to explain how a largely unseen influence is 
extended to what we, as viewers, finally see and hear on screen.  
 
The chapter opened with a brief review of the nature of intellectual 
property, including the confusion caused by the idea/expression dichotomy. 
The tendency of copyright to be defined by market-driven principles to 
demarcate who owns what was also explained. The lack of a homogenised 
approach to international copyright – and the subsequent reliance on 
national regulations for enforcement - was noted. An account of the 
changing values and definitions of sports broadcasting rights highlighted 
key factors that determine value, before the different ways that rights are 
broken down (by range, distribution platform, broadcast territory and period 
of license) were reviewed. Past and present revenues for Premier League 
broadcasting rights in the UK and overseas were set out. 
 
With the escalating cost of sports broadcasting rights, a corresponding 
increase in the risks to broadcasters associated with acquiring such rights 
was noted, including the consequences of over valuing or losing important 
rights. A broadcaster’s perspective on broadcasting rights was provided, 
followed by a discussion of the dilemmas that broadcasters face when 
acquiring expensive sports rights. It was noted that, in the UK, by 2014 
only one broadcaster (BSkyB) had so far successfully monetised the 
ownership of expensive Premier League broadcasting rights  
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Finally, the important and largely unseen dimension of the prescriptions 
that are frequently added to broadcasting rights contracts was reviewed. 
The addition of production prescriptions also indicates a critical division 
between federation-approved international coverage and the localised 
presentation (structured around sports events) that is now provided by 
rights holding broadcasters and media suppliers. Whilst providing access to 
large audiences, broadcasters’ influence of actual event coverage is 
becoming more marginal. Despite a scarcity of academic scrutiny this is a 
very important development that illustrates a “quiet accretion of 
restrictions” through the application of IP rights (Drahos and Braithwaite, 
2002:4)   
 
The battle to acquire the most appealing sports broadcasting rights has 
intensified in response to the rising tide of commercialism in UK sports and 
the continued marketisation of broadcasting. In the same way that 
broadcasting rights can be considered to follow one cycle behind 
developments in technology – particularly as new developments are 
expressed every three years - then the regulators in the EU and UK can be 
seen to follow another step behind broadcasting rights. How, among other 
things, regulators tackle market power and market failure in sports 
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6 | Regulation 
 
Regulation is the third pre-production factor that influences what television 
sport we can see, including where and when we can see it. As Evens, 
Iosifidis and Smith (2013) summarise, since the 1990s:  
 
…	  the	  UK	  sports	  broadcasting	  market	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  almost	  constant	  scrutiny	  by	  a	  
whole	  series	  of	  (UK	  and	  EU)	  policymakers	  and	  regulatory	  authorities.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  
attention	  has	  focussed	  on	  two	  key	  areas:	  first,	  legislation	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  coverage	  
of	  major	  national	  sporting	  events	  remains	  available	  to	  all	  television	  viewers	  –	  listed	  events	  
legislation:	  and	  secondly,	  the	  application	  of	  competition	  law	  to	  the	  sports	  broadcasting	  
market	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  the	  market	  power	  of	  the	  dominant	  pay-­‐TV	  broadcaster,	  
BSkyB.	  (Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith,	  2013:203).	  	  
 
Chapter 6 now looks at examples of how different levels of intervention 
impact on sports television, including several associated but less talked 
about dimensions including content regulation, regional and independent 
production quotas and the impact of Transfer of Undertakings Regulations 
(TUPE).  
 
The adopted methodology mixes secondary sources (documentation and 
literature) with primary sources, including field notes as a participant-
observer taken over a 6 year period plus, where relevant, further expert 
contributor testimony. When it comes to regulation my experience of sports 
producers is that they often prefer a slightly standoff approach to many 
issues, particularly Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE), hence they do not 
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always communicate a fully formed view (in the same way a miner may 
know a lot about extracting coal but, perhaps, a bit less about the coal 
mining industry). It is fair to say that broadcasters and executives from 
independent sports production companies tend to have more direct contact 
with regulatory and competition outcomes. 
 
Why has television sport attracted so much attention from UK and EU 
policymakers and regulatory authorities? With UK sports becoming more 
commercially oriented and with the marketisation of broadcasting, 
numerous long-established social and cultural values have been put aside in 
favour of  “the financialisation of everything” (Harvey, 2005:33). 
Consequently, sport and broadcasting are now globally distributed and 
privatised goods. Boyle and Haynes (2004:52) write, a “re-regulation of 
broadcasting is taking place within a more commercial and market-driven 
frame of reference”. This process has been intensified by developments in 
digital technology. Typically, leagues and pay-TV providers often call for a 
free market approach with less regulation, while political economists 
advocate a more rigorous application of competition law together with listed 
event regulation. Whilst sympathising with the political economy position, 
discussions seldom foreground the full range of regulatory measures that 
apply to television sports production - some of which can determine where 
a production is made (regional production quotas) and who can work on it 
(Transfer of Undertakings - TUPE92). Chapter 6 seeks to fill this gap.  
 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:163) raise another interesting point: “football has 
always worn its civic responsibility lightly”. As football rewrites its cultural 
                                           
92 TUPE applies when, for example, production is moved from one company to another. 
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contract with fans “primarily along commercial lines protected under the 
sign of the law” (Boyle and Haynes, 2004:79), the cultural, social and 
historical aspects of many clubs have been commodified and turned into 
elements of global branding strategy. We end up with a commercially driven 
Premier League operating within a wider economic climate in which the 
market remains the central driver93. This produces a league that is very 
different from the more inclusive structure adopted by the Bundesliga in 
2002 and where football is considered a public good and activities, including 
club ownership, are grounded in the local community. In contrast to the 
market-driven Premier League, the Bundesliga took the view that football is 
one of the last activities that really brings people together, so ticket prices 
are set to ensure a wide range of fans can attend. Finding a balance 
between commerce and culture, market principles and wider social 
meaning, is the daunting challenge for regulators. Intervention by media 
regulators and competition authorities appears to be the only limitation 
currently placed on the conduct of leagues and federations.  
 
The sheer pace at which technology (including new workflows and means of 
delivery) and sports broadcasting rights have developed since the early 
1990s, has posed serious problems for regulators and policy-makers. As 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:165) summarise: “regulators strive to keep pace 
with a digital mediascape which threatens to perpetually run ahead of 
regulatory frameworks”. The recent move by federations to take control of 
                                           
93 In the 2013-14 season Hull City fans contested a potential change in the club name from 
Hull City to Hull Tigers and Cardiff City, also under foreign ownership, saw their tradition blue 
club shirts (nickname the Bluebirds) changed to red as it is considered more lucky in Eastern 
markets. 
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their own host broadcast operations and global content distribution could 
leave regulators even further adrift. 
So far this research has considered ways that television sport in the UK has 
adopted more overtly commercial models typically found in the USA, but 
when it comes to broadcasting policy and regulation very different values 
are in play, as Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006:6) explain: 
 
In	  the	  US	  sport	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  commodity	  which	  has	  to	  be	  redesigned	  as	  viewers’	  preferences	  
or	  sponsors’	  requirements	  change.	  In	  Europe,	  by	  contrast,	  sport	  is	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  
cultural	  heritage.	  The	  dominant	  position	  in	  Europe	  is	  that	  sport	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  being	  
merely	  an	  audience-­‐generating	  mechanism	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  preserve	  both	  its	  
identity	  and	  independence.	  (European	  Commission,	  1999)	  
 
Still considering the wider picture, Smith (2009) highlights the growth of 
the regulatory state as part of a general shift from government to 
governance associated with the withdrawal of the state from many activities 
as part of neoliberal thinking. Whilst facilitating conditions conducive to a 
free market is an objective, monopolistic tendencies still need to be curbed. 
Therefore a central concern of regulation is the control of market power. 
Given that broadcasting is an oligopolistic market then strategic behaviour, 
such as first mover strategy often adopted by BSkyB, can offer advantages. 
On the other hand, in a market with only a small number of players a 
dominant position, like that held by BSkyB, also risks infringing the rules. 
Controlling market power in sports broadcasting in the UK and Europe is a 
recurring theme. 
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It was the deregulation of broadcasting policy associated with the landmark 
1990 Broadcasting Act that provided significant momentum for the 
transformation of television sport in the UK, including the arrival of direct 
competition to the established terrestrial networks from satellite 
broadcasters; as discussed in chapter 3, the previously closed world of 
broadcasting was to be exposed to the rigours of the free market. The 1990 
Act also included the first formal quota for independent productions. Doyle 
(2002:161) reminds us that government policy initiative and regulatory 
measures strongly influence the economic performances of media markets 
while Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013) see too much emphasis on 
preserving the investments of pay-TV operators. The influence of EU-level 
media regulation and competition authorities on policymaking and UK 
broadcasters is also noted by Smith (2009). Scrutiny is applied to both the 
demand side (the ways that broadcasting rights are sold upstream by 
leagues and federations) and the supply side, the market in which the final 
programmes are aired. However, it is argued here that the discussion would 
benefit from being widened to include the activities of: 
• Leagues and federations (principally those that issue broadcasting 
rights). 
• Broadcasters and media providers (buyers of broadcasting rights and 
owners of distribution platforms). 
• Broadcasters, production companies and producers that provide the 
finished content. 
 
6.1 The list of protected events 
Speaking on 21 July 2010, the then Sports Minister Hugh Robertson 
(Conservative) supported the principle of protecting major sports events for 
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free-to-air coverage. At the time of writing (May 2014), the two-tiered list 
of protected events continues to apply. 
As noted in chapter 3, as early as the 1930s during the years of monopoly 
an annual calendar of broadcast events had been created, one that 
resonated with the winter and summer seasons of sport in the UK (Scannell 
and Cardiff, 1991). Delivering important sporting events to a national 
audience became a cornerstone of the BBC’s PSB remit (Boyle and Haynes, 
2000:69). Arguing that it was promoting events to a national audience, the 
BBC resisted paying sports broadcasting rights fees. In the 1950s the 
removal of the BBC’s monopoly status, as the Conservative government 
planned to introduce commercial television via the Television Act of 1954, 
raised concerns over bidding wars for broadcasting rights, (see Smith 
(2009) for a good account). The arrival of ITV saw the BBC and Parliament 
claim that “wealthy commercial interests might outbid the BBC and… 
deprive the BBC of events they expected to see on the national service” 
(Sendall, 1982:52). The BBC proposed the government draw up a list of 
national events which could not be broadcast on an exclusive basis by any 
broadcaster, thus averting bidding wars for broadcasting rights. The list of 
protected rights was first set out in the Television Act of 1954 although this 
was, essentially, a gentleman’s agreement (Barnett, 1990).  
 
The spectre of bidding wars was raised again in the 1980s and the list of 
protected events was redrafted as part of the Cable and Broadcasting Act 
1984 (Smith, 2009:9) - by 1985 the protected list of national events had 
become statutory. The general commercialisation of broadcasting under the 
Conservative government continued during the 1980s and 1990s as policy 
restrictions were gradually watered down; the landmark 1990 Broadcasting 
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Act replaced the 1984 Act. Opponents of the 1990 Act claimed that it was 
enabling an unwelcome Americanisation of British broadcasting. With new 
legislation the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA) was replaced by the 
Independent Television Commission (ITC), a light-touch regulator that was, 
in turn, replaced in December 2003 by the super-regulator Ofcom.  
 
The arrival of BSkyB in 1990 and its subsequent acquisition, not only of the 
Premier League broadcasting rights, but also of rights to the Football 
League, England’s home matches and golf’s Ryder Cup established a 
“virtuous circle of more subscribers/more sports rights” (Booth and Doyle, 
1997:280). In turn, this prompted debate about whether sport was a public 
good or a private good; was it right that the nation’s favourite game be 
hidden behind a pay wall? More than 20 years later, an interesting parallel 
can be drawn between the commercial trajectory of the Premier League and 
the Bundesliga, where the German league understood the wider social value 
of football as a public good. The Bundesliga maintains a 50+1 ownership 
rule, ensuring clubs are (a) grounded in the local community (and not 
owned by wealthy foreign investors) and (b) are fully focussed on football 
not financial activities. Access for all levels of society is ensured through 
affordable admission prices offered at Bundesliga grounds. 
 
Returning to the UK, in 1995 it was argued a situation had arisen where 
“three quarters of the nation will be excluded from major sports – which 
would only be available for those wealthy enough to subscribe” (Smithers 
and Cuff, 1996). The 1990 Broadcasting Act’s restriction on the pay-per-
view broadcasting of listed events was extended to include subscription 
broadcasting, a return to the position set out in the 1984 Cable and 
Milne | June 2014 
 
220 
Broadcasting Act. This is an example of how the pace of transformation in 
technology and in broadcasting rights had started to outstrip the regulators’ 
ability to react. 
 
By 1997 the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) introduced 
the idea that a sport on the list of protected events must have a special 
national resonance, an event that unites the nation and is a shared point on 
the national calendar. As noted in chapter 2, not all sports actually wanted 
protected status and sought, instead, to negotiate the most lucrative 
commercial deals available, usually with BSkyB as with the English Cricket 
Board (ECB). To some sports authorities revenue from rights was more 
important than being seen by larger numbers of viewers on terrestrial 
television. BSkyB has frequently called upon leagues and federations for 
support following challenges from regulators and competition authorities. 
 
As raised in chapter 3, there is no list of protected events in the US. The US 
Major Leagues have managed to maintain a strong presence on the 4 
commercial free-to-air networks and have not migrated wholesale to pay-TV 
as the Premier League has done in the UK. In another major difference, the 
US Sport Broadcasting Act of 1961 exempted the collective selling of 
sponsored telecasting, or cartel behaviour, from anti-trust legislation as 
authorities accepted the need for a governance structure in sport, including 
horizontal arrangements aimed at enhancing competitive balance within 
each league (Fort, 2006:429). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 went on 
to remove most price regulation and the main frame of reference is the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. But the conduct of the leagues themselves includes 
an important difference insofar as they have adopted rules that, ultimately, 
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maintain the value of their broadcasting rights. The three broad regulatory 
principles adopted by the leagues include, (a) a fair (equal) share of 
television rights to all member clubs94, (b) salary caps for club rosters 
(including named franchise players) and (c) a reverse-order-of finish draft 
system for players entering the league (Desbordes, 2006). Evens, Iosifidis 
and Smith (2013) argue that the US case:  
…	  illustrates	  that	  increased	  exposure	  and	  higher	  audience	  ratings	  via	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  television	  
can	  serve	  the	  interest	  of	  teams,	  leagues,	  broadcasters,	  advertisers,	  sponsors	  and	  viewers	  
alike.	  (Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith,	  2013:228)	  
 
Whilst professional sports have always been more malleable in the US - 
particularly when accommodating the demands of television – it does not 
follow that the country has foregone all sporting cultural heritage. Finding a 
balance, between commercial concerns and wider social and cultural 
benefits, is a key issue in the UK and Europe. 
 
Concern that the market for the most appealing sports broadcasting rights 
was becoming dominated by commercial players – the Kirch Group in 
Germany, Canal Plus in France and BSkyB in the UK – led the EU to adopt 
the UK’s approach of providing a protected list of sports events via 
legislation. Evens, Smith and Iosifidis (2013) explain how the European 
Parliament (EP) used a review of the Television Without Frontiers Directive 
(TVWF) as a convenient means to press for EU wide legislation. In 
November 1996, the EP approved an amendment to the TVWF Directive to 
ensure that coverage of sporting events of general interest are available on 
free-to-air TV (EC, 1997). In February 1997 proposals for an EU system of 
                                           
94 As noted in chapter 5, the PL has a 50:25:25 formula. 
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listed events based on the principle of mutual recognition – no broadcaster 
would now be allowed to circumvent the rules governing protected events in 
any other EU state. Major event legislation was formally adopted as part of 
the renewed 1997 TVWF Directive and subsequently incorporated into the 
2007 Audiovisual Media Service Directive (Evens, Iosifidis and Smith, 
2013:77). The Davis Committee (2009) was set up to review the UK’s 
protected list of events and recommended a return to a single list of 
protected events. Further decisions were deferred until (at least) 2013 
leaving the current list of category A and category B events, as published by 
the DCMS, intact. Category A includes full live event coverage whilst 
category B provides for secondary coverage (primarily same day highlights 
shown on the terrestrial networks):  
 
Figure 6.1, Protected List of Events (Groups A and B)  
Category A Events – Full live coverage protected 
The Olympic Games 
FIFA World Cup Finals 
European Championships Finals 
FA Cup Final 
Scottish FA Cup Final 
The Grand National 
The Derby 
Wimbledon Lawn Tennis Finals 
Rugby League Challenge Cup Final 









Category B Events – Secondary coverage protected 
England Home Test Cricket Matches 
Non-Finals Play at Wimbledon 
All other matches at the Rugby World Cup Finals 
6 Nations Rugby Tournament matches involving home countries 
The Commonwealth Games 
IAAF World Athletics Championships 
The Cricket World Cup – finals, semifinals and matches featuring home 
nation’s teams 
The Ryder Cup 
The Open Golf Championship 
 
Without the list of protected events it is hard to see how the publicly funded 
BBC would have a meaningful foothold on top tier sports broadcasting rights 
and, even so, two of the most popular football competitions, the Premier 
League and the UEFA Champions League, are not included on either list. 
Given their exclusion from the lists, perhaps it is no surprise that the 
activities of Premier League and UEFA should prove of particular interest to 
regulators and competition authorities in the UK and Europe?  
 
6.2 The Premier League     
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the Premier League’s exclusive 
rights deals of 1992 and 1996 to the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC), 
where the OFT claimed that the collective selling of all Premier League clubs 
television rights by the Premier League was illegal (Boyle and Haynes, 
2004). As discussed in chapter 2, the business of team sports is no ordinary 
business. For example, Neale (1964:14) asserts that: “It is clear that 
professional sports are a natural monopoly, marked by definite peculiarities 
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both in the structure and in the functioning of their markets”. Leagues are 
necessary to professional sport; a single team cannot supply the entire 
market because it would have no other team to play. However, a single 
league can supply the entire market in conditions of a natural monopoly 
(Dobson and Goddard, 2007:5). It is also the case that competition 
between different sports is more likely than competition between rival 
leagues within the same sport; the Premier League is a rare example of a 
new league successfully replacing the dominant incumbent league (Fort, 
2006:150). In professional sport, many basic economic rules are inverted - 
Neale (1964) highlights the single-entity action by leagues leading to 
profitable economic outcomes, naming it “the peculiar economics of team 
sports”. Finally, leagues are necessary to provide competition and 
uncertainty of outcome, in addition to scheduling matches, providing 
officials and other joint venture conduct. There is an argument to be made 
that the confusion between the need for sporting competition and sporting 
monopoly - accepted in the US - has never been fully resolved in the UK 
and Europe. In part this is due to the cultural value placed on sport in the 
UK and Europe. To some extent this reaction is reminiscent of the 
reluctance to embrace professionalism (over amateurism) in the UK in the 
1960s. The transformation of professional sport suggests a revision of what 
we, in the UK and Europe, expect from elite professional sport would be 
useful. It is worth repeating that it is within the gift of leagues and 
federations to turn their focus away from purely commercial outcomes, as 
demonstrated by the Bundesliga. 
 
In July 1999, the Restrictive Practices Court ruled that the Premier League’s 
deals with BSkyB did not impose unreasonable restrictions on the clubs, nor 
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was the agreement contrary to the public interest (Gratton and Solberg, 
2007:159). In defending its position BSkyB argued that it was legitimate for 
a single broadcaster to retain exclusive broadcasting rights for a limited 
time, as long as rights were regularly renegotiated and sold in a fair and 
open manner (Boyle and Haynes, 2004: Haynes, 2005). From 2001, we see 
Premier League rights being sold every 3 years whereas, previously, they 
had been sold in 5 year (1992-97) and 4 year (1997-2001) periods (see 
chapter 5).  
 
In 2000, the Premier League started to unbundle the various broadcasting 
rights it was offering for auction. 3 packages were subsequently created (a) 
to reduce the risk of further intervention from the competition authorities 
and (b) to increase Premier League revenues. For the 2001-04 period, 
BSkyB secured 106 games and NTL withdrew its bid due to financial 
problems. ITV secured the rights to highlights, leaving the BBC with no 
Premier League football at all (no Premier League match has, so far, been 
broadcast live on free-to-air television in the UK). 
 
In December 2002, the Competition Directorate of the European 
Commission launched its own investigation into the selling of Premier 
League broadcasting rights (Haynes, 2005:75). According to Smith (2009) 
the Commission set out to negate the potential anti-competitive effects 
from the collective selling of Premier League broadcasting rights. Boyle and 
Haynes (2004) add: 
The	  key	  to	  the	  whole	  negotiation	  and	  bidding	  process	  was	  the	  EC	  investigation	  and	  its	  
‘guiding	  hand’	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  deal.	  While	  not	  prescriptive,	  the	  EC	  edict	  that	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collective	  selling	  could	  only	  exist	  where	  the	  consumer	  ultimately	  benefitted	  from	  wider	  
choice	  and	  no	  broadcaster	  could	  exclusively	  sew	  up	  all	  the	  rights	  clearly	  influenced	  the	  
initial	  tender	  document	  issued	  by	  the	  Premier	  League	  in	  June	  2003.	  (Boyle	  and	  Haynes,	  
2004:47)	  
 
Initially, the rights for the period 2004-07 consisted of a gold package of 38 
matches starting at 16.00 on Sunday afternoon, a silver package of 38 
matches on Monday evenings, midweek and Sundays at 14.00, and a 
bronze package of 92 matches on Saturdays at 13.00 and 17.15 – a total of 
138 matches, up from the previous total of 106. However after the initial 
bidding process had begun, the Premier League separated the bronze 
package into 2 licenses, creating, in all, 4 packages of live rights. Boyle and 
Haynes (2004) point out a traditional highlights package was available, plus 
a new package of rights that allowed a broadcaster or a club channel to 
screen as live re-runs from midnight on match day. Additionally, short-form 
clip rights to all 380 Premier League matches were available for distribution 
on mobile phones from 5 minutes after the end of the games. It appeared 
that the attention of regulators and competition authorities was having 
some impact. Or was it? In August 2003, BSkyB successfully bid for all 4 
live match packages giving them more games for less money when 
compared to the deal for 2001-04 (Boyle and Haynes, 2004:49). It is 
doubtful that strengthening BSkyB’s position was the preferred outcome of 
this intervention. 
 
Under further pressure from the Competition Commission, the Premier 
League agreed that BSkyB should sublicense 8 matches per season to 
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another broadcaster in an auction process. Haynes (2005:75) reports that 
that BSkyB executives saw the leakage of 8 games as undermining the 
rights they had just purchased. However, a reserve price for the rights was 
agreed and, as no broadcaster met this price, the 8 sublicensed matches 
reverted to BSkyB.  
 
But there had been concessions; the period for rights was reduced to 3 
years (Haynes, 2005:76) and the Premier League was required to ensure 
there was a second broadcaster that held live rights for the period 2007-10 
(Gratton and Solberg, 2007:6). In 2005, it was agreed that live rights would 
be sold in 6 balanced packages (of 23 matches) with no one bidder being 
able to buy all 6 packages. The door was finally opened to a new 
broadcaster. BSkyB secured 4 packages and 92 matches, whilst newcomer 
Setanta acquired 2 packages, totalling 46 matches. Whilst the European 
Commission had successfully ended BSkyB’s monopoly of live rights to 
Premier League football it is questionable whether “the consumer benefitted 
from wider choice” – yes, there was more choice available but viewers that 
wanted to see all Premier League matches now had to buy 2 subscriptions 
at greater cost, including coverage from an inexperienced Premier League 
broadcaster. Whilst the outcome appeared to suit the Premier League, and 
with no live rights for any free-to-air broadcasters, it could be argued that it 
was not in the best interests of consumers. Increased competition for rights 
did result in an escalation in the prices paid to the Premier League.  
 
In the next rights issue (2010-13) Setanta was not able to match its 
previous bid price (Sweney, 2009). However, the company was able to 
secure a single package of rights for a reduced outlay, due to the restriction 
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placed on the Premier League to ensure that rights were split between 2 
broadcasters. The loss of a package (from 2 packages including 46 games, 
down to one with 23 games) raised questions about Setanta’s strategic 
position in the UK pay-TV market. Failing to attract sufficient new 
subscribers, the company struggled to pay the fees due to the Premier 
League and, in summer 2009, fell into administration (Smith, 2009:17). The 
rights were quickly re-auctioned and awarded to ESPN (Robinson, 2009).  
 
In 2012, as a participant-observer working for IMG (the producer of Premier 
League Productions), I heard predictions about a new bidder for Premier 
League rights from industry insiders, with Al Jazeera expected to fulfil this 
role. However, it was BT Sport that emerged and, by providing some 
serious financial competition to BSkyB, helped to propel domestic revenue 
for the period 2013-16 to an all time high in excess of £3 billion for the 7 
packages of live matches offered (Press Association, 2012). The winner, 
once again, was the Premier League. Former BSkyB Head of programming 
David Elstein added his view that BSkyB: 
…	  is	  also	  an	  extremely	  tough	  competitor,	  and	  treats	  regulators	  with	  as	  little	  regard	  as	  it	  
treats	  commercial	  rivals.	  More	  than	  20	  years	  ago,	  its	  mantra	  was:	  we	  will	  strangle	  cable	  
before	  cable	  strangles	  us.	  It	  has	  taken	  on	  the	  likes	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading,	  the	  
Competition	  Commission	  and	  the	  broadcasting	  regulator,	  Ofcom,	  as	  each	  of	  them	  has	  tried	  
to	  level	  up	  the	  playing	  field	  in	  television.	  (Elstein,	  2010)	  	  
 
Have the regulators succeeded in levelling the playing field? In 2014 
BSkyB’s hold on Premier League football remains robust. As in previous 
cases, viewers wishing to see all available Premier League matches are 
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required to pay for 2 subscriptions for 2013-16, one for Sky Sports and 
another for BT Sport (in early 2014, existing BT broadband customers 
receive BT Sport for free). Had even one package of live rights ended up 
being available on a free-to-air broadcaster then it would be easier to see 
the point of this intervention - a split between 2 pay-TV services delivers 
less benefit than providing wider access via free-to-air broadcast. In my 
view, this underlines the difficulties of regulators and competition 
authorities in keeping up with the activities of the Premier League, BSkyB 
and BT Sport. Whilst the application of legislation via the list of protected 
events offers tangible results, the results when applying competition law in 
respect of the Premier League appears harder to justify.  
 
6.3 The UEFA Champions League 
The premier European club competition was re-launched in 1992 as the 
UEFA Champions League (UCL), with the new format replacing the 
European Champion’s Cup. Unlike the Premier League, coverage of the 
UEFA Champions League took much longer to migrate to pay-TV in the UK 
than it did in many other countries across Europe where it had already 
found a home. So, whilst BSkyB was able to show exclusive live Premier 
League matches from 1992-93, it was not until 2003 that the UCL first 
appeared on BSkyB. BSkyB paid approximately £240 million while ITV paid 
£160 million giving the free-to-air broadcaster first picks of Tuesday night 
fixtures (van Wijk, 2013). 
 
The split-broadcasting arrangement, somewhat like the Premier League but, 
crucially, including a free-to-air outlet, was due to intervention from the 
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European Competition Commission as it sought to investigate the selling of 
football rights in a range of media markets across Europe. Whilst the 
Commission accepted the declaration of the specific characteristics of sport 
adopted by the European Council at Nice in 199995 the EU, according to 
Boyle and Haynes (2004), increasingly viewed sport as a business.  
 
The EC investigation into the anti-competitive joint selling of Champions 
League rights resulted in no single national broadcaster being able to 
acquire sole live rights to the competition from 2003-04 (Haynes, 2005:66). 
With 14 categories of rights being marketed centrally by UEFA and TEAM 
Marketing, new rights were created which meant that more broadcasters 
might be able to secure rights. This allowed BSkyB to acquire the majority 
of rights in the UK, reducing ITV’s eventual broadcast output to a single 
Matchnight per round of games.  
 
According to Boyle and Haynes (2004), at this time a number of rights 
reverted back to individual clubs and there was a greater emphasis on 
mobile and Internet rights, with UEFA seeking to grow revenue alongside an 
expanding European broadband market. In 2014, it is unclear to what 
extent this market has materialised, as television coverage remains by far 
the most popular medium through which to view Champions League 
content. In terms of additional competition to acquire Champions League 
rights from 2015-18, then BT chief executive Gavin Patterson made good on 
his promise that BT Sport would bid for these rights (van Wijk, 2013).  In 
November 2013, BT was granted exclusive rights to 350 Champions League 
                                           
95 http://ec.europa.eu/sport/documents/doc244_en.pdf, accessed 21.10.2013. Including 
point 15, which recognises that the sale of television rights is one of the greatest sources of 
income for certain sports.  
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matches a season for 3 years at a cost of £897 million for 4 years from 
2015. Although Goodley and Monaghan (2013) report BT chief, Gavin 
Patterson claiming to “give sport back to the fans”, and acknowledging that 
BT had injected “a welcome element of competition” into the market, it 
remains to be seen how this rights acquisition sits (a) with the requirement 
that rights should not be held by a single broadcaster and (b) how BT plans 
to make some matches available free-to-air. BT’s channel positions on the 
free-to-air digital terrestrial television service Freeview is likely to be 
relevant although, in 2014, these signals are scrambled.  
 
Given the rights sale to BT Sport the benefits of EU wide intervention in the 
auctioning of Champions League broadcasting rights could be contested. 
However of potentially even greater significance is UEFA’s own introduction 
of the Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP), first approved in 2010. 
According to UEFA’s website these rules are set out to: 
 
• Introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances. 
• Decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary 
effect. 
• Encourage clubs to compete within their revenues. 
• Encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and 
infrastructure. 
• Protect the long-term viability of European club football. 
• Ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis. 
 
The FFP regulations came into full effect for the 2013-14 season. Whilst FFP 
is not the completely business-oriented closed system used in US leagues, it 
Milne | June 2014 
 
232 
is the strongest suggestion yet that regulations similar in intention to those 
adopted by US leagues, including salary caps and other agreed measures96 
designed to promote competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome 
(critical to maintaining the value of broadcasting rights) are being 
considered for application in a European context. In May 2014 UEFA 
sanctioned Premier League club Manchester City under the Financial Fair 
play Rules imposing a fine of £50 million and restrictions on their 
Champions League squad for the 2014-15 season (Gibson, 2014). UEFA 
sanctioned 9 clubs that breached FFP rules. 
 
The argument here does not seek to devalue the wider benefits from listed 
event regulation and the application of competition law, but, in addition to 
these measures, the leagues and federations should be encouraged to take 
more responsibility for balancing their books and for managing their affairs 
more constructively, including broadcasting activities and wider social 
outcomes. This path is likely to be more beneficial to more people in the 
longer term. Both the German Bundesliga and UEFA have demonstrated 
ways to engage with their civic responsibility; the Premier League might 
also consider this approach. 
 
6.4 Ofcom, UK market regulation 
As a result of the Communications Act 2003 regulatory powers in the UK 
passed from the ITC to the newly formed Ofcom. Ofcom’s duties include: 
                                           
96 These include an equal share of broadcasting revenue, the reverse order-of-finish player 
draft system and naming of franchise players. 
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• Managing, regulating and assignment of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and licensing portions of the spectrum for television 
broadcasting. 
• Specifying the Broadcast Code, including mandatory rules including 
the protection of children, harm and offense, crime, religion, 
impartiality and accuracy, elections, fairness, privacy, sponsorship 
and commercial references. 
• Rules on the amount and distribution of advertising. 
• Undertaking public consultations. 
• Dealing with viewer complaints. 
 
Ofcom has also developed Terms of Trade/Codes of Practice that apply to 
rights deals between independent producers and 
commissioners/broadcasters. These terms97 were introduced in the 
Communications Act 2003.  
 
Returning to questions of market power and the supply of programmes in 
the downstream market, such investigations are not limited to the EU 
Competition Commission. Between 2007 and 2010, Ofcom completed a 
revue of the pay TV market in the UK (Ofcom, 2010). The revue followed 
complaints from BT, Virgin Media, Top-Up TV and Setanta that BSkyB 
exerted a vicious circle of control that crushes competition (Smith, 
2009:20). In particular it was the ability of BSkyB to determine carriage 
charges - both for rival channels on its own platform (and for EPG access) 
and for carrying its own brands, such as Sky Sports - that was considered 
                                           
97 The terms relate to how rights should be sold and priced, with independents retaining a 
share of IP rights on created content. In sports production secondary rights are retained by 
the sports governing bodies. 
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problematic. The outcome required BSkyB to lower the wholesale prices it 
charges the rival companies for Sky Sports 1 and Sky Sports 2. Ofcom 
appears exasperated by the experience as expressed in the Pay TV 
Statement (para:1.25): 
Our	  review	  of	  these	  negotiations	  reveals	  lengthy	  and	  ultimately	  fruitless	  discussions	  over	  a	  
number	  of	  years	  between	  Sky	  and	  other	  pay-­‐TV	  operators	  over	  possible	  wholesale	  of	  Sky’s	  
premium	  channels.	  This	  impasse	  has	  remained	  despite,	  as	  Sky	  agrees,	  there	  being	  an	  
immediate	  financial	  benefit	  to	  Sky	  from	  wholesale	  supply.	  We	  believe	  this	  is	  because	  Sky	  is	  
acting	  on	  two	  strategic	  incentives	  –	  to	  protect	  its	  retail	  business	  on	  its	  own	  satellite	  
platform,	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  stronger	  competition	  for	  content	  rights.	  (Ofcom,	  2010:7)	  
 
Former BSkyB executive David Elstein adds his view:  
…	  BSkyB	  has	  become	  notorious	  for	  taking	  on	  regulators,	  winning	  some	  battles,	  prolonging	  
others,	  and	  generally	  giving	  the	  competition	  authorities	  pause	  before	  embarking	  on	  any	  
restraining	  course.	  	  (Elstein,	  2010)	  
 
What does this constant skirmishing mean? Is regulation pointless? Have 
broadcasters like BSkyB and organisations like the Premier League and 
UEFA become too powerful? The argument is that the more powerful the 
league or broadcaster is then the more necessary potential intervention 
becomes, particularly where there is monopoly provision. Smith (2009:22) 
concludes that the role played by the EU has enhanced the capacity of the 
UK government to pursue its desired outcomes. My own view is, whilst 
regulatory principles are to be applauded in their intention, the actual 
outcomes, at least in the cases cited above, leave a lot to be desired.  
 
Milne | June 2014 
 
235 
In the case of Ofcom’s Pay TV revue, in August 2012 the Competition 
Appeals Tribunal (CAT) said that Ofcom’s entire case against BSkyB was 
unfounded (Hewlett, 2012)98.  But, while Ofcom was less successful in 
limiting BSkyB’s activities, in 2012 BT announced its arrival as a very well 
funded rival to BSkyB in the competitive market to acquire appealing sports 
rights. In 2014 Ofcom announced a new revue into whether BSkyB should 
still have to wholesale its key sports channels given changes in the market 
(Mance, 2014). 
 
Whilst this is a challenging area, in my view some of the attention 
regulators and competition authorities have focused on sports broadcasting 
often appears (a) to be too late (regulating on technology and broadcasting 
rights that have had a chance to become well established as practice is 
usually problematic) and (b) often seems to misunderstand some of the 
“peculiar economics of professional sports” (Neale, 1964). The situation is 
symptomatic of powerful and extremely well funded leagues and pay-TV 
providers using technology and rights to serve their own commercial 
interests first and foremost. However, it seems reasonable to ask if more 
lasting solutions might be found by considering the experience of the US 
leagues and in self-motivated league and federation action, including 
improved governance and increased civic responsibility as was the case with 
the re-launch of the German Bundesliga in 2002. As the Premier League 
continues to expand its own content production arm, including a 24/7 
Premier League global channel, and federations provide international host 
                                           
98 BSkyB (2013:13) confirms that BT was granted a right to appeal the CAT decision on 
26.04.2014. 
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broadcasting services for their own events it is unclear how and where 
regulators will be able to intervene in the future. 
 
6.5 Regulating content production  
Discussion of regulation and intervention tends to be focused on upstream 
activities and seldom considers the direct contact with broadcasters and 
producers that regularly occurs downstream on the content supply side. For 
example, each Ofcom license requires all broadcasters (and therefore all 
producers, whether in-house or independent) to comply with the 
Broadcasting Code on content standards (Ofcom, 2013). This interaction is 
worth noting. 
 
For sports broadcasting the content standards categories that apply have 
become more extensive with the corresponding expansion of sports output 
over the past 20 years. These include: the protection of children, harm and 
offense, crime, religion, impartiality and accuracy, elections, fairness, 
privacy, sponsorship and commercial references. Of these, probably only 
elections and, hopefully, crime are less relevant, although an increasing 
number of betting scandals suggest vigilance is required.  
 
However, among many active sports producers the Broadcasting Code is 
simply not well known; the level of operational knowledge is, in my direct 
experience over the last decade, very low. As a senior executive producer 
for a leading independent confirms:  
Young	  producers	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  regulations	  like	  fairness	  and	  privacy.	  We	  did	  our	  stints	  as	  
assistant	  producers	  and	  didn’t	  become	  full	  producers	  until	  we	  were	  ready	  to	  do	  so.	  Too	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many	  young	  sports	  producers	  are	  promoted	  quickly	  and	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  their	  
responsibilities.	  (Senior	  executive,	  Independent	  production,	  2013)	  	  
 
As making sure producers do know their responsibility seems a reasonable 
expectation this raises a question about why these responsibilities are not 
always well known. A senior producer explains a difference unique to 
television sport: the apparent hegemony found in sports production culture. 
This is a kind of self-policing of accepted practice that represents a form of 
covert compliance in itself:  
 
Most	  people	  [sports	  producers]	  grew	  up	  watching	  sport	  so,	  when	  they	  become	  producers,	  
they	  tend	  to	  replicate	  what	  they	  saw	  and	  what	  they	  think	  is	  appropriate.	  It’s	  a	  closed	  world.	  
You	  can’t	  step	  out	  of	  the	  box.	  (Senior	  sports	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  
2012)	  
 
Tunstall (1993:2) argued that television sport was a closed world. Over 20 
years it appears that not much has changed. In my view, television sport 
relies on producers behaving predictably within unspoken but consensual 
parameters. Consequently, when it comes to the Broadcasting Code there is, 
in my direct experience, very little in the way of training for independent 
sports producers. Guidance, when it is available, tends to come from the 
commissioning channel, whether it is the robust position taken by BSkyB in 
following Ofcom rules, through to an extremely relaxed position like that of 
Trace Sports. In other words, the frame of reference can be rather wide. 
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Typical examples that attract the attention of compliance officers include 
the increasing commercialisation of top sports stars, particularly around 
sponsorship and branded clothing, so undue prominence can be a 
problematic area. Whilst Formula 1 presents so many sponsors logos that 
none may stand out Sir Alex Ferguson can, in October 2013, gain blanket 
coverage across numerous broadcasts promoting his new book. Even 
apparently innocent mistakes, like a misplaced shot of a player tying up a 
branded football boot prior to training (shown, say, in a short feature) can 
fall foul of the rules and will need to be re-edited at the producer’s expense.  
 
For sports events that heavily feature betting, for example Channel Four’s 
horse-racing, a balance is required in the prominence given to, say, 
Littlewoods betting options over services from other providers.  
 
Harm and offence is not limited to more obvious shots of players mouthing 
obscenities on screen (or of foul language or racist abuse being chanted in 
the ground), In late October 2013, BT Sport fell foul, for a second time in 
just 24 hours, of crude and offensive gestures that were made by in-vision 
guests during two different football shows (Sale, 2013).  
 
Between January 2011 and July 2012 I produced 140 x 26 minute 
documentaries for IMG on behalf of Trace Sports. In these films I dealt with 
issues of privacy – from revealing where a person lived, to showing the 
license plate on their car - in the great majority of the films. Privacy 
cropped up the most, with undue prominence and other commercial issues 
(such as sponsorship) cropping up in many. In a period where constant 
access to Internet and YouTube content is taken for granted, younger 
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sports producers appear to be less aware of the Broadcasting Code. And 
this lack of understanding can even extend to broadcasters. A revealing 
example is found with Trace Sports as it constantly pushed IMG for access 
to top football players. Suggesting ways to improve access, a senior Trace 
Sports executive attended a private party given by Didier Drogba (at the 
time playing for Chelsea FC). Speaking in 2012, the executive confirmed 
that she had covertly recorded material from Drogba’s event (using her 
mobile phone), posted it on YouTube, badged as Trace Sport content, and 
had a very large number of hits. The Trace executive did not accept this 
conduct infringed Ofcom privacy laws even though the material was covertly 
recorded and broadcast without permission. 
 
Whilst it is easy to argue that values, such as the Broadcasting Code, need 
to be supported and upheld across the downstream supply side, it is 
apparent that emerging digital platforms, user-driven content and 
federation based productions will increasingly challenge such values and 
how they are implemented. That a major media provider like BT Sport can 
fall outside these guidelines is another reason for concern. 
 
6.6 Regional and independent production quotas 
The largest impact of regulation on sports broadcasting in the UK is found in 
regional production quotas. Senior independent sports production 
executives have described this impact as “massive”. Regional quotas are 
frequently paired with independent production quotas, allowing 
broadcasters that outsource content to complete two quota requirements 
with a single commission. 
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Historically, the independent production sector has delivered high levels of 
content for PSBs. The creation of Channel Four as a publisher-broadcasters 
and the formal introduction, through the 1990 Broadcasting Act, of a 
statutory 25% independent quota for the BBC were important drivers in 
developing the UK’s independent production economy (HMSO, 1990).  
Again, the thinking behind such quotas is rational, well intended and hard to 
argue with. However, the reality on the production supply side is very often 
at odds with the objectives. As an executive producer at an independent 
that regularly supplies material to the BBC said in 2013: “The BBC has to do 
a certain amount of regional and independent production hours, so it 
decides to place its snooker production outside.” In this case outside is an 
independent and regional production company based in Scotland. The 
executive producer continues: 
 
The	  rules	  state	  that	  75%	  of	  the	  production	  must	  be	  generated	  from	  that	  region.	  
Unfortunately,	  there	  are	  not	  the	  outside	  broadcast	  companies	  in	  Scotland,	  let	  alone	  the	  
experienced	  snooker	  producers,	  directors,	  assistant	  producers,	  cameramen	  and	  others	  to	  
get	  anywhere	  near	  this	  figure.	  It	  is	  a	  complete	  farce.	  (Executive	  producer,	  independent	  
production,	  2013)	  	  
 
The company in question has a single representative based in Glasgow with 
the senior staff based in London spending a great deal of time wondering 
who and how this production can meet the qualifying regulations.   
 
From my own experience as a participant-observer in the independent 
sector I am aware of several other examples. Channel Four’s Football Italia 
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was chosen to fulfill the broadcasters regional production quota. As a result, 
the production moved from London to Yorkshire (Sheffield, then Leeds), 
cities that do not offer direct flights to Italy where the programme was shot. 
In this case, a proportion of the staff was regionally based, but more came 
from the north west of England than from Yorkshire. The production was 
supervised and funded from London. Some sports productions do sit more 
comfortably within regional production quotas, particularly where an event 
may be based in that region, for example some BBC darts coverage.  
 
The trend towards increasing specialisation in sports productions, combined 
with limited contracts (limited in budget and in duration) threatens to 
undermine the intentions of such regulation; it can become a box ticking 
operation by broadcasters. Speaking to a range of contributors, including 
several senior executives, it is apparent that, in a number of cases, a 
degree of obfuscation is involved in meeting all the conditions required 
under these quotas. Therefore, the extent to which the quotas help regional 
development might be questioned. 
 
6.7 Transfer of Undertakings Regulations (TUPE)  
While broadcasters and media providers respond to upstream tender 
processes that allocate sports broadcasting rights, an important part of the 
downstream supply side production economy involves subsequent tender 
documents called Requests for Production (RFP) or Invitation to Tender 
(ITT). These tenders are issued by rights holding broadcasters, media 
providers and federations and are concerned with a range of outputs, from 
a single sports production for a federation right through to a broadcaster’s 
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entire sports output, as was the case for ITV Sport in 2009 and for a large 
proportion of BT Sports production in 2012. The respondents are mostly 
independent sports production companies, for example IMG Sports Media, 
Sunset + Vine, North One TV (formerly Chrysalis) and Century TV, as they 
compete to win these contracts and build their businesses using a cost plus 
percentage fee model that, typically, delivers small and sometimes even 
negligible profit margins. 
 
The UK has implemented the EC’s Acquired Rights Directive 1981 amended 
in 1998 and replaced in 2006 with new regulations (Keter and Jarrett, 
2011), on Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
2006 or TUPE. The regulations are designed to protect employees whose 
business is being transferred to another business – employee’s terms and 
conditions of contract should not be worsened before or after the transfer. 
TUPE legislation is often complex and has come to be applied to 
downstream production tender processes in television sport. 
 
In 2009, I was a participant-observer responding on behalf of IMG when 
Niall Sloane, the newly appointed director of sport at ITV, sought 
competitive tenders to take over production of all ITV Sports’ output. 
However, the application of TUPE meant the incumbent production team 
based at ITV was protected. This meant that any bidding company had to 
deliver a cost-efficient production plan at the same time as hiring all of the 
ITV Sport staff, many of which had lengthy service and subsequent 
redundancy entitlements. In other words, had an independent production 
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company won a 3 year contract to produce ITV Sport output, it would also 
inherit a substantial financial liability including redundancy settlements99. 
 
Whilst the logic of TUPE is apparent in the case of the ITV tender (where a 
whole department may, potentially, have been relocated) this logic is much 
less obvious in cases where a rights holder decides to tender for alternative 
production services – when they are seeking a change direction. In 2012 
such a case involved Al Jazeera Sport. Again as a participant-observer, I 
was aware the company had had content produced by ITV, but it now 
wished to consider alternative producers, so Al Jazeera put its portfolio of 
production out to tender. With an annual budget of around £7 million this 
production interested several independent sports production companies. 
However, legal advisors confirmed that TUPE applied. If the contract were 
to be awarded to a company other than ITV, then the current production 
staff (hired by ITV but working for Al Jazeera) would need to be transferred 
across at the exclusive risk of the new production company and not at the 
risk of the rights holder, Al Jazeera. Firstly, it is hard to see how production 
output could be changed substantially if TUPE required the outgoing staff to 
be placed on the new production. Secondly, the incentive for an 
independent sports production company, already working on slim margins, 
is further reduced if TUPE is applied. Again, this is an example where, in 
theory, the objectives of regulations are fundamentally well intended but, in 
practice, they fail to make much sense in the circumstances. In the past 5 
years, TUPE has increasingly been applied to sport production tenders. In 
another example, when, in 2011 Channel Four acquired the rights to all top 
                                           
99 ITV made their own production department bid for the contract and, presumably having 
delivered cost savings, was awarded the contract. 
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class UK horse racing the production services were put out to tender. 
However, the winning company had to TUPE-in members of the outgoing 
production team in order to secure the contract100.  
 
Looking at such examples, the evidence suggests there is often a gap 
between the objectives of downstream supply side regulation and the actual 
outcomes. In terms of regulation and intervention as applied downstream to 
the content supply side, then regional production quotas and TUPE can be 
seen to have had a massive impact on the activities of independent sports 
production companies and are important but often neglected factors that 
are shaping the content supply market. 
 
Conclusion 
Regulation is the third pre-production factor that influences what sport we 
can see, where we can see it and can influence who makes the final 
programmes. Cultural, social and historic values surrounding sport have, to 
some extent, been maintained in Europe but this is under constant threat 
from the ever-increasing commercial and market-driven activities of leagues 
and federations, including the Premier League and UEFA. The crucial role of 
the list of protected list of events was explored, including the adoption of 
similar protection across the EU. With neither included on this list, 
interventions against the Premier League and UEFA were reviewed and 
questions about the usefulness of some outcomes were raised, particularly 
the impact on the final consumer. In the case of the Premier League, it was 
EC intervention that brought BSkyB’s monopoly hold on broadcasting rights 
                                           
100 In these examples I either had first-hand experience of the discussions or have spoken 
directly with several senior executives that were involved. 
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to an end. However the same intervention caused further inflation in 
broadcasting fees, benefitting the Premier League. 
 
Although there is no protected list of events in the US, the Major Leagues 
have maintained a strong presence on the 4 free-to-air commercial 
networks and have not migrated to pay-TV. The leagues have also adopted 
voluntary rules that help maintain the value of their broadcasting rights, 
including (a) an equal share of television rights to all member clubs, (b) 
salary caps for club rosters and (c) a reverse-order-of-finish draft system 
for players entering the professional leagues. Evens, Iosifidis and Smith 
(2013) conclude that the increased exposure and higher audience ratings 
delivered by free-to-air television can serve the interests of teams, leagues, 
broadcasters, advertisers and viewers alike. 
 
Consistent with providing a supply side perspective some ways that 
regulation directly impacts on production practices was discussed including, 
in the UK, the role of Ofcom in regulating (a) the market and (b) 
maintaining production standards. Threats to the values as set out in the 
Broadcasting Code were discussed. These included an apparent hegemony 
among sports producers that led to a kind of self-policing of standards, plus 
challenges from digital media platforms where content is largely 
unregulated.  
 
This chapter also discussed two regulatory aspects not normally discussed 
in the literature: the impact on independent production companies of 
regional production quotas and the impact of TUPE regulations insofar as 
this can determine who will work on a production when a commission is 
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transferred from one production company to another. The chapter 
concluded by observing the gaps between the theory of regulation and the 
practical outcomes found downstream on the production supply side, this 
was despite the positive intentions that underline regulations.   
 
It was also suggested there was a need for new ways of thinking about 
regulation in the upstream markets, including looking at (a) the solutions 
adopted by the US leagues and (b) more constructive self-management by 
leagues and federations to provide a more constructive path forward. 
 
Having addressed the second research question - how do largely unseen 
upstream pre-production processes  (technology, broadcasting rights and 
regulation) interact and increasingly influence what television sport looks 
and sounds like, where it can be seen and who can see it? – part two of the 
research is concluded.  
 
In part three, the focus turns to a micro-level analysis of the work of 
broadcasters and media providers, plus the day-to-day work of independent 
sports production companies as the downstream impact of developments in 
technology, broadcasting rights and regulation is discussed. 
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Part three | Challenges and trends  
 
As part two considered transformations in technology, broadcasting rights 
and regulation, and how these factors have shaped the development of 
television sport in the UK, it was argued that many more critical decisions 
about what sport we can see, where we can see it and what it looks and 
sounds like have migrated upstream away from broadcasters and sports 
producers. Part two also illustrated subsequent changes to the downstream 
content supply side, including examples of new workflows (Premier League 
Productions) and the noteworthy extension of control exercised by 
federations over the final broadcast output (Formula 1 and UEFA Champions 
League).  
 
Part three now addresses the third research question: how do upstream 
pre-production processes impact on (a) broadcasters and media providers 
(including who now provides sports media) and (b) independent sports 
television production, from company-level activities to the shop floor and 
the day-to-day work of sports producers and directors? Part three adds a 
micro-level view to the continuing supply side oriented perspective as it 
seeks to fill a gap in the literature dealing with contemporary television 
sport production.   
 
As demand continues to outstrip supply, increased competition to acquire 
sports broadcasting rights has delivered good economic news for the elite 
leagues and federations (Fort, 2006:53). But what are the challenges now 
faced by broadcasters and media providers? Under review in chapter 7 is 
how the commercial performance of broadcasters and media providers has 
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become increasingly linked to the acquisition and retention of critical sports 
broadcasting rights. Also considered is how the downstream market in 
content provision is being reshaped as a result. Faced with diminishing 
control and increasing prescriptions - since 2005 the IOC, FIFA and UEFA 
have all taken control of host broadcast operations for their events, 
including the provision of non-controversial international coverage – where 
does this leave broadcasters? For major sports events, how significant is the 
apparent split between approved federation-based coverage and the 
localised presentation offered by broadcasters? As the volume and scope of 
sports television has expanded can a reciprocal contraction in critical 
comment be identified? Chapter 8 argues that power continues to migrate 
upstream to the leagues and federations; it usually does so in ways that are 
seldom discussed, like increasingly prescriptive coverage. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a micro level view as trends in independent sports 
production are reviewed. The trend towards ownership of small independent 
sports production companies by private equity firms or by other investors 
provides an economic paradigm shift that is used to explain the emergence 
and rapid extension of new roles on the production side, including legal, 
business and production management positions. This raises new questions 
including: to what extent has the operational side of production become 
separated from the editorial and creative side? How is this trend recasting 
the work of sports producers and directors? 
 
Chapter 9 provides a conclusion for the research, including discussion of the 
paradox of contemporary sports television production.  
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Consistent with offering evidence from the supply-side, chapter 7 combines 
primary research - extensive field notes made over 6 years as a participant-
observer are supported by short subject-specific contributor interviews - 
with secondary research from contemporary sources, including business 
reports, online newspaper and trade articles. As the sports television 
market continues to move rapidly the general challenges and trends are 
noted rather than extensive case studies provided (which could quickly be 
out of date). Shifting to the micro level chapter 8 is constructed around 
primary research including longer form semi-formal interviews held with a 
select group of key executives, senior producers, directors, heads of 
production and production managers working in independent sports 
production between 2011 and early 2014. 
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7 | Broadcasters and media providers 
 
The challenges facing broadcasters in 2014 are now considered, including: 
the increasingly complex relationship between rights ownership and the 
commercial performance of broadcasters and media providers, the 
emergence of host broadcast operations run directly by the organising 
federations, indicative trends including the increasingly important role of 
presentation for broadcasters, how more content is provided via additional 
platforms and how increased scope has delivered less criticism. 
 
7.1 Commercial performance and market polarisation 
Whilst increased competition to acquire sport broadcasting rights benefits 
leagues and federations, broadcasters and media providers face a number 
of challenges, with economics providing a particularly high barrier to entry. 
Sports broadcasting is an oligopolistic market structure dominated by large 
networks (Doyle, 2002); one supplier’s actions can have a significant impact 
on its competitors (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Two elements are of 
critical important to all broadcasters: audiences and content. Cottle (2003) 
provides a useful summary of how the market structure encourages certain 
types of behaviour: 
This	  involves	  an	  inherent	  tendency	  towards	  media	  concentration	  through	  buying	  up	  (or	  out	  
pricing	  and	  ruining)	  competitors,	  processes	  of	  vertical	  integration	  (extending	  control	  over	  
the	  entire	  production	  and	  distribution	  processes),	  and	  horizontal	  integration	  (combining	  
related	  or	  complementary	  businesses)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reducing	  costs,	  increasing	  market	  share	  
and	  corporate	  control.	  A	  number	  of	  other	  consequences	  flow	  from	  this	  same	  logic	  of	  
economics.	  (Cottle,	  2003:9)	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For Boyle and Haynes (2004) the consequences of opening British 
broadcasting to market forces included the introduction of full commercial 
competition in 1992. BSkyB established itself as the dominant player in the 
UK sports television market as the company amassed a portfolio of the 
most appealing live sports rights and grew its subscription base. As noted in 
chapter 6, it was only the intervention of EC competition authorities that 
ended BSkyB’s monopoly hold on live Premier League rights. As the 
dominant force, BSkyB also had a major say in determining new distribution 
methods; it strictly controls access to its platform, including its EPG and the 
critical audience data collected.  
 
With the UK’s terrestrial broadcasters unable to compete economically with 
BSkyB no further threat was posed by the arrival of Setanta, or when 
Setanta failed in 2009 and ESPN acquired Setanta’s former rights. However, 
in 2012 the arrival of BT in the UK sports rights market, followed by its 2-
channel launch in summer 2013, has seen the competition to acquire key 
sports rights intensify further, creating consequences for both corporations. 
 
BT was motivated to enter the market due to concern the company could 
lose critical core fixed-line telecoms business, particularly broadband, to 
BSkyB. Hewlett (2013) speculates BT had £700 million annual revenue at 
risk. In this case attractive sports content was used to bolster BT’s existing 
services - BT Broadband customers were offered the new BT Sport package 
free of charge.  
 
BT’s initial investment of £400 million per year on elite football and rugby 
union rights was followed in November 2013 by another £300 million per 
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year deal agreed for the purchase of European football rights (UEFA 
Champions League and Europa Cup from 2015). At £897 million for three 
years, BT’s winning bid is more than double the amount paid jointly by 
BSkyB and ITV for the previous 3 year period. Enders Analysis (2013) 
calculate that, whilst BT can absorb this cost due to the large size of the 
company, the direct revenue returns through subscription charges and 
advertising on BT Sport are expected to fall far below the annual rights 
payment. Whilst BT’s initial cost-versus-income equation can be questioned, 
Garside (2014), reviewing figures for the final quarter of 2013, reports that 
BT’s push into football and fibre broadband has helped deliver a forecast-
beating 2% rise in revenues across the BT Group, with BT Sport attracting 
half a million extra customers (to 2.5 million in total). This suggests the 
ways the most expensive sports broadcasting rights are being valued is 
becoming more complex as is increasingly linked to the overall corporate 
performance of the largest media providers. Owning attractive sports rights 
is another way of safeguarding their other businesses.  
 
Looking ahead, BT is expected to bid for 3 years of Premier League rights 
from 2016. As a participant-observer, in early 2014 I was aware of industry 
speculation surrounding a potential joint bid from BT and Al Jazeera to 
acquire Premier League rights, but BT has more prosaic issues to deal with. 
These include the potential reaction of the company’s institutional 
shareholders to any substantially increased bid (and the increased risks this 
would involve) plus, on an operational level, whether BT is willing to 
become a full pay-TV provider - including the need to raise its subscription 
fees, address distribution capacity and provide improved customer services. 
Brignall (2013), reviewing Ofcom data, notes that the level of complaints 
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from BT TV customers in August 2013 about the quality of service provided 
more than doubled and were running at 11 and 28 times the rate of 
complaints against Virgin Media and BSkyB respectively – half of the 
complaints were about the newly launched BT Sport channels. Williams 
(2013) reports the complaints centred on difficulties in receiving the 
channels. Prior to the launch BT’s TV service was already the industry’s 
worst performing in terms of complaints to Ofcom, attracting 6.5 times the 
average (Williams, 2013). Through my involvement in production services 
tenders, I note both ESPN and BT Sport were in a hurry to launch their 
channels. In my view, the practical difficulties that need to be overcome 
when delivering a quality broadcast service spanning several channels are 
easy to underestimate. 
 
The next Premier League rights auction is scheduled for May 2015 with Dr 
Toby Syfert of Enders Analysis (Williams, 2014) suggesting the Premier 
League could seek to bring the process forward by six months to exploit the 
fierce competition between BSkyB and BT; this would be a commercially 
opportunist move by the Premier League. Irrespective of the schedule, 
Hewitt (2013) predicts inflation from BSkyB’s current £750 million per year 
to a staggering £1.2 billion per year would be required for BT to secure 
these rights, with a three-year package price exceeding £3.5 billion. In this 
scenario BT’s annual outlay for rights would exceed BSkyB’s £1.45 billion 
(2013 figures) but with a smaller portfolio of sports available to entice 
viewers. To recoup this outlay, Hewitt predicts BT would need to charge 
subscribers £40 per month in comparison to £22 charged by BSkyB.   
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The connection between sports rights ownership and corporate performance 
was also underlined by BSkyB’s figures for the six months to the end of 
December 2013. With 38 Premier League matches assigned to BT Sport, all 
UEFA Champions League and Europa League matches migrating in 2015 
and FA Cup matches to be split between BT and the BBC from 2014-15, 
BSkyB reported an 18% fall in pre-tax profits (BSkyB 2013; Sweney, 
2014b). The company’s adjusted operating profits (the figures most closely 
watched by analysts) fell by 8% year-on-year. BSkyB’s share price also fell 
2.6%. Addressing the forthcoming Premier League rights bid BSkyB’s chief 
executive Jeremy Darroch is quoted as saying: 
Of	  course	  the	  Premier	  League	  is	  an	  important	  set	  of	  rights,	  we	  get	  that,	  we	  will	  go	  in	  with	  a	  
clear	  view	  of	  what	  we	  seek	  to	  achieve.	  Whenever	  [the	  auction]	  arrives	  we	  will	  be	  ready	  and	  
in	  good	  shape	  for	  the	  process.	  With	  any	  set	  of	  rights	  there	  is	  a	  price	  beyond	  which	  we	  don’t	  
think	  it	  provides	  value.	  That	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  [UEFA]	  Champions	  League.	  It	  accounted	  
for	  just	  3%	  of	  viewing	  and	  there	  were	  better	  ways	  [to	  invest].	  (Sweney,	  2014b)	  
 
The coverage of top-flight football has been essential to BSkyB. Gratton and 
Solberg (2007:143) suggest that BSkyB risks losing 50% of its subscribers 
without Premier League coverage. Throughout the 1990s, having spent over 
50% of the value of its sports programming expenditure on football 
(Szymanski, 2006:155), how BSkyB could seek to add further innovation 
after losing rights to the Champions League to BT Sport from 2015 presents 
a major challenge. Losing further rights may lead to diversification in an 
effort to retain subscriptions.  
 
Milne | June 2014 
 
255 
The remarkable amounts of money involved in acquiring sports 
broadcasting rights is also linked to increasing amounts of risk and a very 
real danger of encountering winners’ curse, of paying too much and the 
underlying business model failing (Fort, 2006:64) – as Darroch said, BSkyB 
recognise there is a price beyond which value is lost. Despite such risks the 
market is still driving forward, Rankin (2013) notes that the sports rights 
market grew 14% in 2013 and Deloitte, anticipating the market in rights to 
hit £16 billion in 2014, sees no end in the rush to acquire premium content 
with revenue growth driven by new broadcast deals for Premier League 
football, Germany’s Bundesliga and MLB Baseball in the US. Increases in 
sports right payments are forecast to outpace global pay-TV revenues, 
suggesting that the stakes (and risk) continue to rise. In market conditions 
like these, if BSkyB and BT reach the limits of what they are willing to pay, 
there would be an opportunity for even larger corporations such as Google, 
Apple or Microsoft to acquire the most appealing sports broadcasting rights 
and change the content distribution model again (Evens, Iosifidis and 
Smith, 2013).  
 
The large portfolio of international rights acquired by Al Jazeera (often 
trading as beIn Sports) has also been noticed. As an international live 
sports director, interviewed in 2013, points out: “Al Jazeera, Google and 
Microsoft could not only buy sports rights, they also have their own 
technological gateway via their own devices”.  As the largest multinational 
players operate across borders then broadcasting rights could be purchased 
for key territories, or for all distribution, both UK and international, or even 
for the purposes of warehousing them. 
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Polarisation in sports content provision  
Despite the efforts of media regulators and competition authorities from the 
UK and the EU, the evidence suggests that only the biggest and best-
funded pay-TV broadcasters and Telcos – in the case of the UK, currently 
BSkyB and BT Sport – or the biggest transnational corporations are able to 
acquire live sports rights, such as the Premier League and the UEFA 
Champions League, neither of which are included on the protected list of 
events. 
 
As the battle between BSkyB and BT Sport continues, the market is 
effectively split, leaving the contest for major events (where access is 
ensured via the list of protected events), highlights packages and what 
might loosely be determined as second tier sports providing realistic targets 
for the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5. However, for the UK’s free-to-
air terrestrial broadcasters the ability to deliver large audiences and offer a 
shared viewing experience retains considerable value. 
 
As the BBC competes against well-funded rivals, Barbara Slater, the BBC’s 
director of sport, accepts there is a “new reality” in the market for live 
sports rights (Gibson, 2012). Despite the successful presentation of the 
London Olympics, 2012 was a challenging year for the BBC. It lost its horse 
racing rights to Channel 4, and, after 10 years coverage, MotoGP rights 
were lost to BT Sport. It also re-positioned its Formula 1 coverage as a 
junior partner to Sky Sports. In terms of organisation, when the sports 
department relocated from London to Salford it shed 43% of its staff. And, 
as part of the BBC’s overall Delivering Quality First initiative, the sports 
rights budget was cut by 20% (Gibson, 2012).   
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Slater recognises the disadvantage the BBC carries by having a finite 
income that, in real terms, is reducing over time. The corporation is also 
challenged, in so far as it cannot monetise expensive broadcasting rights via 
subscription charges or by attaching sponsorship or advertising to content 
in the ways its competitors can (Gratton and Solberg, 2007). In view of the 
BBC Charter renewal (due in 2017) then the BBC may need to target which 
rights it can realistically secure, for example coverage of the Wimbledon 
Lawn Tennis Championships was prioritised over retaining full Formula 1 
coverage.  In its defence, Gibson (2014b) argues that London 2012 was 
hugely important in defining the BBC’s role as a home for communal 
viewing in the digital age. The ability to reach large audiences is the BBC’s 
defining characteristic, particularly the presentation of global events. 
 
Recently ITV has also seen its portfolio of sports broadcasting rights 
reduced, losing FA Cup coverage and, from 2015, the UEFA Champions 
League and Europa League. World Cup Finals, for football in 2014 and rugby 
union in 2015 are the remaining highlights. In 2013 Channel Four acquired 
broadcasting rights to major horse racing events in the UK. Produced by 
IMG Sports Media across 90 racing days, 73 are reported to have suffered a 
drop in viewers over the previous year (Cook, 2014). However, Channel 
Four received a favourable response to its coverage of the 2012 
Paralympics; this represented a considerable commitment to an event that, 
previously, had not received a great deal of primetime coverage. Viewed in 
conjunction with the BBC’s Olympic coverage, plus world cup finals in 
football and rugby illustrates the benefits of greater prominence for major 
event coverage on terrestrial television. Absent from the list of broadcasters 
with major events is Channel Five. Whilst there will be intermittent 
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skirmishes that may yield a sports rights win, or a coverage/highlights 
share with Sky Sports or BT Sport, there is little evidence to suggest the 
continued migration of live sports coverage towards pay-TV in the UK will 
slow down. As a senior executive from the BBC but now at a major 
independent sports producer summarises: 
In	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  BBC	  had	  everything.	  There	  were	  tears	  in	  the	  corridors	  when	  rights	  
were	  lost.	  Now	  the	  [BBC]	  sports	  department	  is	  much	  smaller,	  the	  BBC	  has	  lost	  a	  load	  of	  
rights.	  A	  lot	  of	  their	  main	  stuff	  is	  now	  made	  by	  independent	  producers.	  Sky	  has	  changed	  the	  
overall	  view	  of	  what	  is	  acceptable,	  Channel	  4	  continues	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  and	  ITV	  even	  
has	  its	  own	  sports	  channel	  in	  ITV	  4.	  The	  biggest	  difference	  is	  that	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  more	  
people	  drinking	  at	  the	  fountain,	  whereas	  it	  just	  used	  to	  be	  one	  person.	  	  (Senior	  executive,	  
independent	  sports	  production,	  2013) 
 
Asked to look ahead, a senior manager who has worked at both the BBC 
and Sky Sports adds: 
I	  think	  the	  World	  Cup	  Finals	  and	  Olympics	  will	  continue	  on	  traditional	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  television	  
for	  a	  long	  time…	  Will	  the	  World	  Cup	  Finals	  or	  Olympics	  be	  on	  Sky	  Sports	  soon?	  No.	  In	  20	  
years,	  possibly,	  but	  not	  even	  in	  the	  medium	  term	  let	  alone	  the	  short	  term	  as	  the	  major	  
events	  are	  all	  protected.	  But	  this	  will	  change.	  (Senior	  manager,	  ex-­‐BBC	  and	  BSkyB,	  2013)	  
 
The BBC’s director of sport, Barbara Slater, defends the role of free-to-air 
broadcasters in this quote: 
We	  have	  got	  a	  very	  peculiar	  intensity	  of	  competition	  between	  Sky	  and	  BT,	  leading	  to	  
extraordinary	  hikes	  in	  price	  for	  certain	  properties.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  free-­‐to-­‐air.	  I	  think	  
you	  take	  your	  sport	  off	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  television	  at	  your	  peril…	  It’s	  about	  your	  new	  audiences	  
and	  your	  future	  audiences.	  To	  create	  heroes,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  seen.	  (Gibson,	  2014b)	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The cornerstone of the BBC’s PSB remit - delivering important sporting 
events to a national audience (Boyle and Haynes, 2000:69) - is echoed in 
Slater’s comments. Slater claims that while BBC Sport accounts for 2% of 
sport output in the UK it attracts 40% of the viewership (Gibson, 2014b). 
What the 40% of viewership watch is not specified but is likely to include 
major events that benefit from the shop window effect the BBC still offers. 
However, as the BBC faces further scrutiny of the value it provides for £3.5 
billion leading into the charter renewal this is a critical period. Gibson 
(2012) notes that cuts to BBC sports presentation draws concern from 
powerful sports organisations, including the IOC and The Royal and 
Ancient101, so what sports choose to remain committed to the BBC despite 
its access to larger audiences is another matter. 
 
But this is not the only challenge. The influence of a small group of 
specialist advisers and, particularly, the advance of federation-based 
coverage of major events are significant developments.  
 
A small world: special advisers  
A consequence of the current intensification in competition for the most 
appealing sport rights is the apparent reliance on a small group of, mostly 
male, advisers. Selling its broadcasting rights, the Premier League has 
received advice from specialist firms including DLA Piper and Reel 
Enterprises (part of the Wasserman Group since 2011). The current BT 
Sport chief Marc Watson previously worked at Reel as a seller of sports 
rights. Watson is now a buyer of rights for BT Sport (Sweney, 2012). As a 
participant-observation over recent years I have noticed how leading 
                                           
101 Organiser of the Open Golf Championship.  
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company executives, like Watson, are attributed with specialist operational 
knowledge of the sports broadcasting rights business. The list includes a 
number of former BSkyB executives: Sam Chisholm (who negotiated the 
original Premier League deal for the newly merged BSkyB), Dave Hill (who 
became CEO of the Fox Sports Media Group after leaving Sky Sports102) 
through to recent BSkyB CEO Tony Ball. Having left BSkyB, Ball, hired as a 
non-executive director, then advised BT on its sports rights acquisitions 
including the Premier League. Additionally, there are legally trained rights 
negotiators including Simon Johnson, formerly of ITV Sport who 
subsequently joined the Premier League. Whilst the increased activity in 
specialist consultants is broadly in line with corporate activity, the 
movement from one side of the table to the other – primarily from 
television sport to senior positions at the leagues and federations - provides 
evidence of how boundaries are becoming more fluid. 
 
For example, two people I have worked with include former controller of 
BBC Sport (and former Channel Four sports commissioning editor) Mike 
Miller, who after leaving the BBC, spent 10 years (until 2012) as chief 
executive of the International Rugby Board (IRB). Miller is attributed with 
negotiating rugby union’s inclusion in the 2016 Olympics103. Similarly, the 
Football Association (FA) turned to a former controller of BBC and ITV 
Sport, Brian Barwick, as its chief executive between 2005 and 2008. In 
January 2013, Barwick became chairman of the Rugby Football League, 
again suggesting that sports federations value senior managers with direct 
                                           
102 Hill moved from supervising Sky Sport’s Premier League coverage to taking charge of 
Fox’s NFL coverage as executive producer. 
103 In 2013 Miller became the first chief executive of the World Olympians Association. 
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broadcasting experience. As broadcasting is often a primary source of 
revenue this makes sense. 
 
However, an entirely new phase in sports television production is associated 
with television executives moving to federations. Bernie Ross had been an 
executive producer with IMG Sports Media working on the early stages of 
the Premier League’s international output, plus major event international 
coverage for FIFA and UEFA. In 2006 Ross joined UEFA as head of TV 
production, to plan and implement the host broadcast of UEFA EURO 2008. 
This was the first time UEFA had taken the television production of the 
tournament in house to produce the international feed. This was a 
significant step.  
 
Also of note is John Rowlinson, previously a senior executive at BBC Sport. 
In 2002 Rowlinson moved from the BBC to the All England Lawn Tennis 
Club (AELTC) at Wimbledon before becoming its director of television. In 
2009 Rowlinson was hired by the London Organising Committee (LOCOG) of 
the 2012 Olympics as head of broadcast for the International Broadcast 
Centre (IBC). The IBC was the home of Olympic Broadcast Services (OBS) 
during the Games and was the base for around 15,000 media workers 
linked to rights holding broadcasters (Sweney, 2009b).  
 
In the small world of television sport an even smaller group of power 
players has developed where a few male, mostly former television 
executives have come to wield a considerable amount of influence. One of 
the most significant steps is for federations to take charge of the television 
Milne | June 2014 
 
262 
coverage for their own events, rather than depending on local national 
broadcasters to provide this service. 
 
7.2 Federation run host broadcast operations  
Since around 2005 FIFA, the IOC and UEFA have set up their own host 
broadcast operations for major sports events, replacing the role previously 
held by the host nation’s national broadcaster. The line between what is 
best for the sponsors and advertisers wooed by the federation’s promises of 
sympathetic coverage and the final television output also provided by the 
federation is neither straight nor straightforward. This significant 
development is considered.  
 
At all major global sports events, the International Broadcast Centre (IBC) 
is a bespoke technical and broadcast hub used for broadcast operations and 
rights holding broadcasters (RHBs). Coverage of each individual event is 
routed to the IBC’s central media servers where content can then be 
accessed by rights holding broadcasters before being uplinked to their 
respective territories for broadcast. The International Broadcast Centre 
model can be viewed as an extension of the Premier League Productions 
workflows and UEFA Champions League Production Manual conditions 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Funding for the planning, construction, engineering and equipping of the 
IBC is provided by the LOCOG and/or Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) but 
can also be privately funded, either way the costs are not carried by the 
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IOC or FIFA. Gibson (2009) places the cost of the 2012 London Olympics 
International Broadcast Centre at £355 million.  
 
OBS, IOC and OTAB 
Olympic Broadcasting Services (OBS) is based in Madrid. Created by the 
IOC in 2001, the company specialises in covering multi-sport events 
according to its website: “to serve as the host broadcaster organisation for 
all Olympic Games, Olympic Winter Games and Youth Olympic Games” 
(OBS, 2013). The online explanation continues: 
 
The	  Host	  Broadcaster	   is	  responsible	  for	  delivering	  the	  pictures	  and	  sounds	  of	  the	  Olympic	  
Games	   to	   billions	   of	   viewers	   around	   the	   world.	   It	   produces	   and	   transmits	   unbiased	   live	  
radio	   and	   television	   coverage	   of	   every	   sport	   from	   every	   venue.	   This	   feed	   is	   called	   the	  
International	  Signal	  or	  the	  World	  Feed.	  	  
In	   this	   role,	   OBS	   is	   responsible	   for	   developing	   a	   consistent	   approach	   across	   Olympic	  
operations	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   optimising	   resources	   to	   continually	   improve	   the	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  Host	  Broadcast	  operation.	  
OBS	  does	  so	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  IOC	  contractual	  obligations	  are	  fulfilled	  and	  the	  Games'	  
Rights	  Holding	  Broadcasters	  (RHBs)	  are	  satisfied	  with	  the	  overall	  television	  production	  of	  
the	  Olympic	  Games.”	  (OBS,	  2013)	  
 
Local broadcasters are no longer responsible for providing coverage, 
although they may, as sub-contractors, still contribute to the overall OBS 
operation. It can be argued that the main beneficiaries are not the rights 
holding broadcasters, but the IOC’s highly developed programme of 
preferred global sponsors - TOP. Consequently, the extent to which OBS 
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coverage can be considered unbiased is open to question. In terms of 
providing coverage that is sympathetic to sponsors and advertisers, then 
the role of Olympic Broadcasting Services introduces another level of 
control on behalf of the IOC by removing an intermediary, the local 
broadcaster. A senior producer who worked on several Olympics looking 
after international output for the IOC explains the role of digital technology 
in allowing Olympic Broadcasting Services to take control of operations: 
 
Between	  2000-­‐2004	  we	  had	  access	  to	  all	  IOC	  content,	  we	  made	  the	  programmes,	  including	  
highlights,	  and	  sent	  them	  out	  to	  the	  RHBs	  [rights	  holding	  broadcasters]…	  By	  2008	  OBS	  
[Olympic	  Broadcasting	  Services]	  via	  their	  central	  server	  at	  the	  Beijing	  IBC	  had	  total	  control.	  
Everybody	  now	  worked	  under	  the	  OBS	  umbrella.	  Everything	  is	  done	  according	  to	  the	  
Manuals	  you	  are	  given;	  it’s	  all	  pre-­‐conceived	  so	  you	  have	  very	  little	  leeway	  in	  what	  you	  can	  
possibly	  produce.	  I	  would	  place	  the	  watershed	  for	  this	  change	  at	  around	  2005.	  (Senior	  
sports	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  
 
To better understand this critical shift we need a benchmark. Prior to 2005 
the IOC contracted IMG Sports Media to provide international production 
services for rights holding broadcasters. Between 2000-04, IOC library 
managers at IMG would receive feeds of all event coverage routed from the 
venues, Sydney and then Athens. A senior sports producer involved in 
production picks up the story: 
The	  feeds	  would	  come	  in;	  they	  would	  be	  recorded	  onto	  digital	  tape	  where	  they	  would	  be	  
logged	  so	  that	  producers	  could	  find	  what	  they	  wanted	  from	  the	  library.	  From	  2008,	  and	  
Beijing,	  the	  operation	  had	  gone	  entirely	  digital.	  There	  was	  a	  big	  server	  in	  Beijing,	  everything	  
was	  fed	  into	  that	  and	  all	  rights	  holders	  could	  come	  and	  pick	  up	  what	  they	  wanted.	  Tape	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storage	  was	  no	  longer	  relevant.	  (Senior	  sports	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  
2013)	  	  	  
 
It was a similar story with FIFA and Host Broadcast Services (HBS) as an 
executive producer with significant major event experience recalls: 
The	  first	  time	  I	  encountered	  central	  media	  servers	  at	  a	  major	  event	  was	  the	  2006	  World	  
Cup	  Finals	  in	  Germany.	  Rights	  holding	  broadcasters	  had	  a	  meeting	  each	  day	  where	  Host	  
Broadcast	  Services	  (HBS)	  would	  say	  what	  was	  available	  in	  the	  central	  pot.	  The	  technology	  
has	  been	  around	  for	  a	  while	  –	  it	  was	  around	  in	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  in	  2002	  -­‐	  Host	  
Broadcast	  Services	  will	  be	  in	  charge	  again	  in	  Brazil	  2014.	  (Executive	  producer,	  independent	  
sports	  production,	  2013)	  
 
By the middle of the decade federations had taken charge of host broadcast 
operations and, using central servers and digital workflows, produced an 
international feed used by all rights holding broadcasters. 
 
For the IOC there were two important outcomes: (1) the IOC, via Olympic 
Broadcasting Services, now had much more control of its own material, 
including how the coverage looked, who could access it and a detailed log of 
what material was used; and (2) the IOC no longer needed to contract a 
company like IMG Sports Media to carry out its international production 
operations, although IMG was retained to run the Olympic Television 
Archive Bureau (OTAB). OTAB manages the commercial processes of 
licensing Olympic footage and all IOC symbols. As the OTAB website says: 
Ultimately	  we	  are	  involved	  with	  your	  project	  from	  the	  conception	  of	  your	  ideas	  to	  the	  final	  
cutting	  stage,	  so	  we	  can	  service	  all	  your	  requirements	  from	  sourcing	  of	  Olympic	  content,	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the	  licensing	  and	  rights	  clearance	  stages	  to	  the	  final	  approvals	  of	  the	  production.	  (OTAB,	  
2013)	  
 
The OTAB explanation is indicative of increasing supervision for the use of 
all IOC material. Returning to Olympic event coverage, Olympic 
Broadcasting Services subcontracts production of each Olympic event 
(sport) to individual specialist producers, or to national broadcasters that 
may have expertise in specific event coverage. So, for the London Olympics 
the BBC becomes one contractor (albeit a large contractor) among others 
that were hired by Olympic Broadcasting Services to cover the entire range 
of events and to produce a sympathetic feed with consistent production 
values. The removal of national host broadcasters from coverage of Olympic 
events leaves them free to focus on the presentation, or localisation, of the 
Games for their own national audiences. 
 
To illustrate the extent of control exerted by Olympic Broadcasting Services 
as a participant-observer I was aware of an example from 2008. A senior 
producer, a fluent Mandarin speaker, and an executive producer who were 
in Beijing working on the Games corroborate this account. In 2008 the best 
canoe slalom director had twenty years experience of covering the sport 
and was based at Slovenian television. The director, Stane Skodlar, and his 
team were brought in by Olympic Broadcasting Services to cover the white 
water canoe slalom event at the Beijing Games. However, Skodlar was 
presented with an OBS manual explaining exactly how to direct the slalom 
coverage. With no room given to interpret these instructions the director’s 
expertise was redundant, although his name was still attached to coverage 
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that, in his words, “could have been directed by anyone”. Conversely, and 
again through experience as a participant-observer, in 2013 I was aware of 
a senior producer attributed with coverage of the dressage event at London 
2012. When IMG hired this director to help with a proposed dressage event 
in Qatar it turned out that his knowledge of outside broadcasts and directing 
the event was limited – he had simply followed the instructions provided by 
Olympic Broadcasting Services in their manual for dressage coverage.  
 
Whilst the television departments at the IOC, FIFA and UEFA are now far 
more instrumental in defining exactly how productions should look and 
sound – as expressed in their detailed production manuals – at least some 
senior television executives believe that federations cannot do everything 
themselves:  
Federations	  do	  now	  get	  control	  over	  their	  events,	  but	  they	  still	  need	  to	  hire	  people	  to	  do	  
the	  production	  work	  for	  them.	  The	  federations	  will	  determine	  how	  it	  is	  seen,	  where	  it	  is	  
seen	  and	  how	  much	  they	  charge.	  But	  they	  still	  need	  cameramen	  and	  directors	  [to	  cover	  
events].	  (Senior	  executive,	  independent	  production,	  2013)	  	  
 
In other words, the federations require producers hired on short-term 
contracts (preferably assured by companies like IMG or a recognised 
national broadcaster). But, with the need to comply with the specifications 
set out in the manuals and so deliver approved coverage, the function is 
increasingly one of painting by numbers. It should also be noted that 
federations increasingly police the quality of final coverage provided to 
ensure it complies with the requirements set out in the production manuals. 
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A senior manager with extensive experience working for broadcasters at 
major events concludes: 
Some	  Olympic	  events,	  like	  the	  marathon,	  will	  always	  look	  different	  because	  the	  setting	  
changes	  every	  four	  years.	  But	  for	  many	  other	  events,	  yes,	  they	  are	  all	  becoming	  more	  
prescriptive.	  (Senior	  manager,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  
	  
 An experienced live sports director adds: 
The	  Olympics	  gives	  a	  very	  clear	  instruction	  about	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  allowed…	  It’s	  all	  linked	  
to	  commercial	  obligations	  as	  sport	  becomes	  more	  commercialised.	  Federations	  and	  
organisations	  need	  to	  protect	  those	  relationships	  and	  that’s	  one	  way	  of	  doing	  it.	  (Live	  
international	  sports	  director,	  2012)	  
 
Increasing prescription and conformity is the price of the IOC seeking totally 
dependable television coverage. 
 
Another aspect of the dependability of international television coverage is 
more prosaic, but also a factor. This involves providing clear cue points 
throughout the broadcast timeline, so that rights holding broadcasters, 
working in different time zones around the world, can opt in and out of the 
international feed when they want to. This is a very similar procedure to the 
UEFA Champions League Production Manual multilateral running orders 
discussed in chapter 5. Directing live sport to a defined and pre-determined 
timetable whilst adapting to unpredictable outcomes within these 
parameters leaves little or no leeway for interpretation. No surprises are 
required. 
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According to all the expert contributors interviewed, the outcome is an 
Olympic television product that is subject to increasing control by Olympic 
Broadcasting Services on behalf of the IOC. This television product receives 
an injection of local colour and tone every fours years but, essentially, the 
aim is to achieve consistency, avoid controversy and any surprise material 
such as ambush marketing that would offend or otherwise compromise 
sponsors and advertisers spending significant sums to be associated with 
the Olympic movement. With no advertising allowed inside Olympic venues 
– unlike perimeter advertising in football – the IOC, according to a senior 
producer with experience of 3 Olympics (related in 2013) “are desperate to 
avoid ambush marketing in and around the stadia”.   
 
Given the production prescriptions and preferred workflows now set out by 
Olympic Broadcasting Services, it appears to make less and less difference 
who actually directs event coverage, whether it is individuals, independent 
production companies or national broadcasters with specific expertise. Since 
the mid-2000s the use of new digital technology has provided the IOC and 
Olympic Broadcasting Services with a quantum leap forward in their ability 
to control much more of their own output.  
 
The rise of the global sports event was discussed in chapter 3, but looking 
at the Olympic movement since Sydney 2000, Magdalinski et al (2005), 
argue that the Games now represent the incorporation of sport into 
multinational advertising and marketing strategies.  They state:  
This	  partnership	  between	  sponsors	  and	  the	  movement	  has	  solidified	  the	  rapid	  process	  of	  
commodifying	  the	  Olympics	  as	  a	  ‘product’	  and	  has	  established	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  the	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future	  success	  of	  the	  Olympic	  movement	  and	  leveraged	  its	  ability	  to	  attract	  capital	  funding	  
from	  external	  supporters.	  (Magdalinski	  et	  al,	  2005:	  46)	  
 
Recalling Gruneau and Cantelon (1988:347), the Olympics has been 
transformed into an increasingly market-oriented project where there is “a 
more fully developed expression of incorporation of sporting practice into 
the ever-expanding marketplace of international capitalism.” In practice, 
this can be reduced to (a) taking control of television output to provide 
dependable and sympathetic output suitable for consumption worldwide and 
(b) the ability to exclude any and all material that might in any way 
compromise the IOC or TOP members. The IOC is now the gatekeeper and 
its own regulator.  
 
HBS, FIFA and UEFA 
UEFA took significant steps to extend its control of coverage of the 
Champions League and Europa League via the production manuals it issues 
as a key part of broadcasting rights agreements (see chapter 5). In 
comparison to multi-sport events like the Olympics, top football 
tournaments feature a single sport with a limited number of games – Brazil 
2014 featured 64 matches – so, in many respects, they present slightly less 
challenging logistical circumstances. Television output from international 
football tournaments, including the FIFA World Cup Finals and the UEFA 
EURO Championships is now supervised by each federation’s television 
department working with Host Broadcast Services (HBS) in ways similar to 
Olympic Broadcasting Services on behalf of the IOC. 
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Host Broadcast Services (HBS) was founded in 2000 and is fully owned by 
Infront Sports and Media, a sports rights and marketing company based in 
Zug, Switzerland. The Infront company profile claims it is “helping to 
transform the industry” (Infront, 2013:1) by “targeting sport at the core of 
an ever growing and widening matrix of the entertainment industry” 
(Infront, 2013:3). The inclusion of sport as another element of the 
entertainment industry is not in question (Whitson, 1998; Boyle and 
Haynes, 2000). Host Broadcast Services (HBS) was established to produce 
the television and radio output for the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cups. On 
the HBS website the company profile page states:   
 
HBS	  is	  responsible	  for	  producing	  the	  multilateral	  coverage	  and	  providing	  unilateral	  
production,	  transmission,	  commentary	  facilities	  and	  associated	  services	  for	  world	  
broadcasters	  at	  the	  FIFA	  World	  Cup™.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  HBS	  designs,	  builds,	  installs	  and	  
manages	  an	  International	  Broadcast	  Centre	  (IBC)	  and	  the	  multilateral	  and	  unilateral	  
broadcast	  facilities	  at	  every	  venue	  in	  the	  host	  country.	  (HBS,	  2013)	  
 
Host Broadcast Services influence has increased since the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup Finals in Germany. The objective is to take control of every aspect of 
production, “from pitch to the active viewer” (Infront, 2013:15). Host 
Broadcast Services seeks to control everything to do with the international 
feed and its distribution globally via satellite. To paraphrase: work begins 
with an audit at the venue to establish local resources and delivery needs. 
Host Broadcast Services is responsible for planning, building, managing and 
dismantling the International Broadcast Centre as well as providing the 
multilateral and unilateral on-site broadcast facilities at all venues (HBS, 
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2013). In addition to the international feed the unilateral requirements of 
rights holding broadcasters including unilateral production, transmission, 
commentary and on-site production services (such as editing and archive 
provision) are provided by Host Broadcast Services. HBS also provides what 
it intriguingly calls “knowledge management’” as well as “legacy archiving”. 
This is simply information and media archiving activities undertaken when 
the organising federation does not already provide these services.  
 
In comparison to the Olympics, a World Cup Finals tournament generates 
around 120 hours of football, so the volume of media should be easier to 
manage (although by the time various match feeds, isolated camera angles 
and EVS feeds are added this volume increases dramatically). An innovation 
pioneered by Host Broadcast Services is embedding an individual producer 
with each World Cup Finals team. The HBS producer works exclusively with 
the assigned team to access news stories and provide profiles, features, 
interviews and updates that will be made available to all rights holding 
broadcasters via the central media server for use in their own presentation 
as required.  
 
Hidden from immediate view is how Host Broadcast Services and Infront 
now operate together to control many critical aspects of event staging and 
television presentation. Reviewing HBS and Infront websites, plus Infront 
(2013) their activities embrace: 
• Event positioning, brand development and promotion. 
• Individual company sponsorship strategies. 
• Event management, venue dressing and signage, including LED 
venue advertising solutions.  
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• Hospitality, catering, accreditation and ticketing services. 
• Media rights sales. 
• Coordinating broadcast coverage and digital asset management, 
including longer-term archive management and clip sales. 
• Creating digital communications platforms for media, brands and 
products. 
 
Recalling Patrick Nally’s influential Intersoccer template (Nally, 1979), since 
the mid 2000s FIFA and UEFA, working closely with Host Broadcast 
Services, have taken decisive control of all aspects of major international 
football tournament coverage. As has been the case in other examples, 
from the Olympics to Premier League Productions, it is a combination of 
factors that have enabled this move, including: (a) powerful media servers, 
(b) the ability to move large amounts of media between locations, (c) the 
capacity for numerous rights holding broadcasters to access the same 
source material simultaneously and (d) produce and distribute different 
outputs, and (e) the ability of federations to provide approved coverage of 
their own events for international consumption via localised presentation 
provided by rights holding broadcasters. An important part of approved 
coverage is guaranteed protection and enhancements for key sponsors and 
advertisers.  
 
Considering the rapid development of the host broadcast operations by 
Olympic Broadcasting Services and Host Broadcast Services, in addition to 
new content distribution models – like the Premier League’s full channel 
service available in more than 200 territories, plus excursions into bespoke 
broadcast channels by the NBA and NFL (with both organisations retaining 
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established production arms in NBA Entertainment and NFL Films) - there 
can be little doubt that the downstream television operations provided by 
the leagues and federations has entered an important new phase. In 2014 
the precise relationship between these new federation-run television 
operations and competition authorities and media regulators remains 
unclear.  
 
Reviewing developments in conjunction with a perceived lack of 
accountability on behalf of the IOC and FIFA, and fed by allegations 
summarised by Jenkins (2014), leads to questions about purpose:  
These	  organisations’	  staff	  travel	  the	  world	  like	  heads	  of	  state.	  They	  require	  more	  lavish	  
facilities	  and	  kowtowing.	  They	  must	  stay	  free	  at	  hotels,	  be	  greeted	  by	  presidents	  and	  prime	  
ministers,	  have	  armies	  and	  navies	  on	  hand	  to	  guard	  their	  ceremonies,	  and	  have	  domestic	  
markets	  rigged	  for	  their	  sponsors’	  products.	  Roads	  must	  be	  closed	  for	  their	  limos	  and	  traffic	  
lights	  phased	  to	  green.	  The	  politics	  of	  host	  nations	  are	  of	  no	  concern	  to	  them.	  No	  one	  calls	  
these	  bodies	  to	  account,	  because	  they	  claim	  a	  higher	  licence	  from	  the	  great	  god	  of	  sport.	  
(Jenkins,	  2014)	  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Falcous (2005) identified a triangular alignment 
of corporate, media and sport interests and how this accelerated phase has 
resulted in sport being linked with more instrumentally rational approaches 
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7.3 More scope, less criticism; even more media and 
coverage versus presentation  
Considering the challenges facing broadcasters engaged in fierce 
competition to acquire sports broadcasting rights at the same time that 
federations have taken control of producing their own international feeds, 
three trends are worth reviewing: (1) whilst the volume and scope of output 
has increased dramatically, criticism (of leagues and federations) remains 
minimal, (b) yet more content is provided as broadcasters engage with 
viewers via the red button, online and second screen applications and (c) 
the extent of the split between the coverage and presentation in television 
sport. 
 
More scope, less criticism 
Even a brief review of channel schedules suggests that all broadcasters are 
engaged in eking out as much value as they can from their sports 
broadcasting rights. Sky Sports, for example, has its own strategy 
department dedicated to maximising value under an overall “vision to be 
the world’s best sports business”104. Looking across sports television output 
in early 2014 it is apparent that a much wider scope of output has emerged, 
this now includes:  
a) Live sports coverage. 
b) As-live sports coverage (coverage routed through EVS with several 
minutes delay built in, for example NFL coverage on Sky Sports). 
c) New made for television sports (Fight Night, UFC, Premier League 
Darts). 
                                           
104 Taken from a recruitment advertisement for strategy manager, Sky Sports: 
http://www.grapevinejobs.com/executive_mediajobs/42641,Strategy_Manager_Sky_Sports.
html, accessed 04.12.2013 
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d) Magazine presentation (live, as live and highlights usually presented 
via a studio, for example Match of The Day offers a 3rd edition for the 
2013-14 season).  
e) Stand-alone highlights (usually sport-specific, like Ashes Test 
cricket). 
f) Weekly review and preview programmes. 
g) Discussion formats (some formats featuring a panel of journalists, 
others with players, ex-players and coaches). 
h) Sport-celebrity vehicles (Sky One’s In a League of Their Own and 
Jumpers for Goalposts plus the BBC’s They Think It’s All Over). 
i) Traditional sports quizzes (BBC’s A Question of Sport).  
j) Sport-celebrity feature programmes (access-based lifestyle films. 
Trace Sports Stars offers a whole channel of lifestyle-oriented 
content). 
k) Sports documentaries (from Sky’s A Year in Yellow, to one-off films 
on ITV 4 and a documentary strand on BT Sport). 
l) Fanzine formats (Soccer AM and Fantasy Football). 
m) Archive-based formats (Premier League Years, Football Gold, 
Football’s Greatest, Sports Greatest, Premier League 100 Club). 
n) Personality interviews (often ad hoc and offered around a product 
launch). 
o) Chat shows (host plus guests, previously BBC’s On the Line). 
 
Sky Sports News has a dedicated channel with its own signature event, the 
closing stages of the football transfer window. Within football coverage 
general discussion is not limited to the Premier League and its fixtures, but 
is focussed more specifically on mini-leagues within the league – for 
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example, the race for the title, the battle for European places, bragging 
rights in local derbies and the fight for survival (the avoidance of relegation) 
at the bottom of the league. This has been noticed in research: 
But	  even	  in	  an	  unequal	  league,	  like	  the	  Premiership,	  our	  results	  imply	  that	  the	  modern	  
creation	  of	  ‘leagues	  within	  leagues’	  permits	  many	  games	  to	  generate	  extra	  interest	  because	  
they	  ‘matter’	  for	  some	  issue	  or	  another.	  (Forrest,	  Simmons	  and	  Buraimo,	  2006:99)	  
 
With 154 matches broadcast per season (116 on Sky Sports and 38 on BT 
Sport, 2013-16) creating reasons to watch is not surprising. However, 
generating more scope can involve adopting overtly entertainment-based 
production values, the BBC’s Sports Personality of the Year provides an 
example. In the early 1990s, when the BBC still retained the majority of 
sports rights, the popular annual review programme was titled Sports 
Review of the Year. Today, the programme has been rebranded and on 
15.12.2013 it celebrated its sixtieth anniversary. The new format is a 
glittering sports-celebrity-awards show, complete with an entertainment 
style floor and lighting rig. The sports action clips are sourced from a 
variety of broadcasters.  
 
The crossover between sport and entertainment has also generated a range 
of celebrity-sports-entertainment formats. These are often prominently 
positioned in schedules and include:  
• The Jump (Channel 4), a celebrity contest based around several 
winter sports aired in January 2014 ahead of the Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympics (BBC). 
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• Splash (ITV) a celebrity diving challenge featuring 2012 Olympic 
bronze medalist Tom Daley also broadcast in January 2014. 
• Dancing on Ice (ITV) featuring Winter Olympic gold medal winners 
Torvill and Dean, broadcast in early 2014. 
• Olympic Superstars (BBC) a specially staged television tournament 
post-2012 Olympics105 aired as a Christmas special. 
• The Match (Sky) a celebrities versus retired professional footballers 
challenge match – 3 series with additional support programming. 
• The All Star Cup (Sky One), a celebrity version of golf’s Ryder Cup. 
• Famous and Fearless (Channel 4), 8 celebrities in a multi extreme 
sport challenge broadcast in early 2011.  
 
In summer 2014 the BBC launched Tumble, a new celebrity gymnastics 
format featuring 2012 Olympic silver medallist (and BBC Strictly Come 
Dancing champion) Lewis Smith and Nadia Comaneci, the first gymnast to 
score a perfect 10 in competition. In purely economic terms there is some 
appeal to creating formats that do not incur the considerable rights fees 
attached to elite professional sports events. If successful these new formats 
can be reformatted for international sales generating further income. 
Usually made by entertainment producers, these formats are not considered 
as replacements for regular weekly sports coverage but act more like 
special offers used to attract viewers to the channels, somewhat like special 
events including Olympics (Fikentscher, 2006:85). 
Whilst the scope of sports television output has increased substantially 
critical comment is harder to find. The few programmes that might hold 
FIFA or the IOC to account are distanced from sport output and broadcast 
                                           
105 Channel Five had re-launched the IMG owned Superstars format in 2008. 
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under current affairs strands like BBC Panorama106. More typical of the 
current climate is an example from January 2013, when ESPN issued a 
statement implying that one of its commentators, Jon Champion, had 
wrongly labelled a Liverpool player, Louis Suarez, as a cheat for using his 
hand in a live FA Cup match. Champion said: “That, I’m afraid is the work 
of a cheat” (Gibson, 2013). ESPN, which was in the third of a four-year deal 
to show FA Cup matches, distanced itself by adding:  
We	  take	  our	  responsibility	  to	  deliver	  the	  highest	  standards	  of	  coverage	  to	  our	  viewers.	  
ESPN’s	  editorial	  policy	  is	  for	  commentators	  to	  be	  unbiased	  and	  honest,	  to	  call	  things	  as	  they	  
see	  them.	  Inevitably	  this	  can	  involve	  treading	  a	  fine	  line	  on	  occasion,	  especially	  in	  the	  heat	  
of	  the	  moment.	  (Gibson,	  2013)	  	  	  
 
Evidently such lines are even finer when important sports broadcasting 
rights are due to be renewed. Limited discussion of some issues – like 
foreign ownership of football teams, player wages, Financial Fair Play rules 
or even constantly changing kick off times – can be found on radio 
particularly via listener phone-ins. However, comments still may not draw 
much of a challenge: on 22.12.2013, the Premier League’s chief executive, 
Richard Scudamore contributed to Gary Richardson’s BBC Five radio show. 
Asked to outline Premier League activities in 2014 Scudamore said the first 
priority would be to “protect the Premier League’s intellectual property 
rights worldwide”. Scudamore did receive some scrutiny in May 2014 when 
emails he wrote containing sexist comments were released. However, 
despite dominating the agenda elsewhere, Sale (2014) reports the story 
was practically ignored by Sky and News International newspapers. As 
                                           
106 The journalist Andrew Jennings has campaigned against corruption at FIFA for several 
years, including programmes for Panorama, see Jennings (2006) and a critique of the IOC in 
Simson and Jennings (1992) 
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television’s protection of the culture of sport serves to maintain the 
hegemonic position in enjoys with sport, so Boyle and Haynes (2000:107) 
see an obvious reason to avoid criticism: television knows “that it must not 
kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”. For Perelman (2012) the situation 
appears to be worse: 
We	  are	  not	  just	  witnessing	  an	  increased	  mediatisation	  of	  sport,	  but	  mediatisation	  deployed	  
–	  decreed	  –	  by	  sport	  itself,	  in	  whose	  influence	  the	  media	  is	  steeped	  through	  and	  through.	  
(Perelman,	  2012:89)	  
 
From a Marxist stance, Perelman sees sport as having expanded across the 
planet leading to its successful and nearly complete globalisation – as “an 
irresistible power it has no equal” (Perelman, 2012:109). With all critical 
positions excluded from mainstream discussion: “sport as an institution 
today is the vanguard of non-criticism” (2012:110).   
 
Even more media 
Another contemporary trend sees broadcasters emphasising alternate 
means of viewing their sports content. In some ways this is part of a 
pattern where ever more volume and scope of content is offered. Various 
forms of content linked to innovative means of viewing can also used by 
broadcasters as a point of differentiation in their marketing manifestos. This 
content also represents further commodification of sport as a media 
product, (Boyle and Haynes, 2004). 
 Enhanced or interactive viewing essentially falls into 3 areas:  
1) Additional coverage that supplements the primary channel output, 
usually broadcast behind the red-button accessible via a TV remote 
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control. Content ranges from adding a cockpit camera in Formula 1 to 
alternative match choices for football such as Champions League on 
Sky Sports. 
2) Associated content streamed on the Internet, usually via a linked 
website, and ranging from clips to lengthy streams of events, for 
example coverage of more specialised Olympic events, like Judo. 
3) Second screen or social media; a range of dialogues taking place 
parallel to the main coverage. Twitter, for example, is used by 




Particularly since London 2012, the BBC has offered what director of sport 
Barbara Slater describes as the “deeper experience” for viewers (Gibson, 
2014b). Slater argues that viewers want the communal, shared moments of 
seeing big event coverage live on television, but they also want an option to 
customise their experience and “go deeper” via online access. For the Sochi 
2014 Games two interactive streams were available behind the red button 
and six more streams on the BBC video player available on all viewing 
devices. The BBC sees this added value as a major point of difference it 
provides to viewers. 
 
For BSkyB enhancements such as on-demand, Sky Go, and its EPG 
interface have been drivers in creating customer loyalty and form a 
significant part of the company’s promotional activities – “expect more” to 
quote a 2014 campaign phrase. As discussed, BT Sport, via its fibre 
broadband services, is making a case for converged media. Doyle 
(2002:20) argued that, ultimately, there will be no difference between 
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broadcasting and telecommunications. However, the extent to which these 
services have taken off is open to question. 
 
The idea of immersive viewing was introduced first by Sky Sports, as an 
experienced live director explains: 
In	  terms	  of	  immersive	  and	  social	  viewing,	  Sky	  Interactive	  did	  this	  10	  years	  ago,	  by	  offering	  a	  
choice	  of	  different	  camera	  angles	  via	  the	  [television]	  remote	  control.	  Viewers	  could	  access	  
statistics	  and	  Hawkeye	  too,	  so	  that’s	  all	  been	  around	  as	  an	  enhancement	  for	  a	  while.	  The	  
new	  thing	  is	  “talking	  about	  sport”	  are	  viewers	  interested	  in	  what	  other	  viewers	  are	  saying?	  
More	  people	  are	  checking	  this	  out	  before	  expressing	  an	  opinion.	  (Live	  sports	  director,	  Sky	  
Sports,	  2012)	  	  
 
The option to use match choice via the red button is well established and a 
consequence of greater capacity in the digital spectrum. As part of sports 
presentation, the inclusion of Twitter and Facebook, for example, on top of 
SMS and email has risen substantially over the past 5 years. But just how 
important or relevant this may be is open to debate; a respected executive 
producer with broadcaster and independent sports experience offers this 
view: 
90%	  of	  all	  viewing	  is	  still	  via	  television.	  Digital	  and	  mobile	  [consumption]	  is	  still	  only	  1	  in	  10	  
people	  –	  I	  think	  this	  will	  continue	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  World	  Cup	  Finals	  and	  Olympics	  will	  be	  on	  
traditional	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  television.	  Twitter,	  connected	  TV	  and	  so	  on,	  it’s	  really	  important	  in	  
pitches,	  but	  come	  the	  interview	  it	  never	  gets	  mentioned,	  broadcasters	  want	  to	  know	  what	  
we	  will	  see	  on	  the	  main	  screen.	  Broadcasters	  pay	  lip	  service,	  but	  I	  think	  they	  know	  in	  their	  
heart	  of	  hearts	  what	  drives	  this	  business.	  (Executive	  producer,	  broadcaster	  and	  
independent	  production,	  2013)	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To what extent the current preoccupation among broadcasters with 
alternative means of delivering content and generating viewer discussion is 
a passing fashion, or is part of a genuine shift towards convergence and 
more customised viewing habits remains to be seen as there is simply not 
enough evidence to draw any meaningful conclusions at this time. In 
addition to the difficulties in raising revenue from these new platforms an 
experienced senior producer expresses a widely held view among producers 
interviewed and one that reflects the dramatic increase of scope in sports 
content more generally: 
I’m	  not	  convinced	  you	  can	  slice	  up	  events	  much	  more.	  The	  Olympics	  is	  different	  as	  it	  has	  so	  
much	  [action	  that]	  you	  might	  want	  to	  see	  it	  all…	  Formula	  1	  cockpit	  cam,	  no	  one	  is	  really	  
bothered,	  or	  different	  angles	  of	  football	  coverage	  you	  can	  chose	  from	  your	  own	  seat,	  but	  
covering	  football	  differently,	  that	  might	  be	  interesting.	  (Senior	  sports	  producer,	  
independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  	  
 
As the organising federation defines match coverage from major football 
tournaments, any significant changes appear to be unlikely. But, how many 
more ways sports content can be recycled and re-broadcast is a relevant 
question; it is also one that federations have been considering. According to 
an executive producer at a large independent sports production company 
speaking in 2013: “it is certainly not clear that federations have, so far, 
fully grasped the dynamics of this new landscape.” That leagues and 
federations are unclear about how they want to engage with newer aspects 
of digital media tends to fuel confusion. As an observer-participant, I have 
experienced how leagues and federations can be very clear about many of 
their production activities (via production manuals), but away from primary 
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coverage and website support they are much less sure about how to 
proceed – e.g. online, on social media. Following a tender for production 
services in late 2012107 the IOC decided to experiment with their own 
dedicated You Tube channels during 2013. The IOC decision came from its 
marketing department suggesting such activities are part of promotional 
strategy rather than fully integrated with their broadcasting plans. 
 
Returning to broadcasters, with output largely defined (a) by the rights a 
broadcaster holds, (b) federations providing coverage of major events and 
(c) due to an increased volume of sports coverage originating in other 
countries but broadcast in the UK – for example Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s 
Bundesliga and Italy’s Serie a – broadcasters face a further challenge in 
differentiating their product as they move from providing original coverage 
to offering wrap around presentation of events.  
 
Coverage versus presentation  
The presentation of television sport, as distinguished from its coverage, is a 
development worth noting. There has been a substantial increase in sports 
covered by one party – a league, federation or a local broadcaster – that is 
broadcast (essentially re-broadcast) by another.  
 
The Olympics offers an example. As noted, Olympic Broadcasting Services, 
rather than the national broadcaster from the host country now provides 
coverage of the Olympics. For the BBC this means it has been able to focus 
more effort and resources on the presentation of the event.  
 
                                           
107 Explanation provided as a participant-observer working at IMG Sports Media in 2012. 
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In addition to commentating on the coverage provided, the additional 
shoulder programming - including all presenting and reporting around the 
event - is an increasingly important aspect of broadcast output as it seeks 
to both localise and brand the generic international coverage provided by 
the federations. The precise division between coverage and presentation 
can sometimes be difficult to see as broadcasters like the BBC usually have 
some access (in their rights agreements) to additional unilateral feeds 
within the arena (in other words to cameras under the BBC’s direct control 
that may be used to track specific UK interest, like a featured athlete) and 
they will certainly have cameras for their own presentation positions and for 
post-race interviews. 
 
Although the change in emphasis from coverage to presentation may 
suggest limitations, or even a degree of passivity, wide variances in 
presentation style are easily found. For example, the BBC adopted a fairly 
catholic view of the Olympics, reporting widely on a whole range of events 
and competitors; it seeks to provide a reasonable overall picture. This 
contrasts sharply to NBC’s presentation in the US. In my experience of 
viewing Olympic coverage in the UK and the US, the focus in the US is 
almost exclusively on US athletes. US presentation style often amplifies 
human drama and emotion (a story might report on a competitor who has 
recently lost a parent and dedicates their performance to this memory). 
These feature stories are highly produced, and, with coverage mostly time 
delayed to fit US network prime-time schedules, an altogether more 
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personal narrative is presented, mainly to the exclusion of stories that have 
little or no US interest. It is a narrower angle of view108.  
 
The BBC underlined its commitment to presentation by securing prominent 
studio positions at London 2012 and, before that, in Cape Town for the 
2010 World Cup Finals. In a main point of difference with the BBC’s London 
2012 semi-open studio vantage point, and use of exterior links in the 
Olympic Park, Channel Four chose a fully enclosed studio that did not 
provide the same immediate connection to the venue seen on the BBC. For 
Sochi 2014, it was noticeable that the BBC opted for an even more agile 
and informal presentation style with presenters linking from a variety of 
completely open locations – it was a more immersive style compared to a 
formal and closed studio presentation. A brief look at football (particularly 
UEFA Champions League) and rugby union coverage (on Sky Sports and BT 
Sport) reveals a trend for using pitch-side positions for at least part of the 
main programme presentation.  
 
More generally, the primary presenters – the faces of an event like the 
Olympics - are carefully chosen, with teams of reporters and experts added 
to the onscreen line-ups. Although not responsible for coverage per se, the 
BBC had production teams of 295 at the 2010 World Cup Finals (Gibson, 
2010) and a team of 765 for London 2012 (Gibson, 2012b). Presenting 
London 2012 to its UK audience, the BBC spent approximately £66 million 
(Sherwin, 2014). 
 
                                           
108 Access to Internet reports meant many viewers already knew the results of London 2012 
events, leading to criticism of NBC’s approach. 
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The critical importance of determining presentation style is underlined by 
the intervention of Channel Four’s chief creative officer when the final 
composition of the on-screen presentation team for coverage of the 2012 
Paralympics was changed after the press launch – as relayed, in 2013, in an 
interview with a senior producer who was at the launch and involved in 
subsequent discussion. 
 
Away from major events, more and more sports are bought in by 
broadcasters and presented via a studio, usually featuring a host and 
relevant guests – again, localising non-UK originated coverage for viewers. 
With 4 dedicated Sky Sports channels devouring 672 hours of content a 
week – and joined by a 5th channel in August 2014 - the necessity of 
bringing in additional content is apparent. Interviewing sports producers in 
2012 and 2013 provided a snapshot of how many popular sports are now 
presented rather than covered. For example, European Tour Golf is covered 
by European Tour Productions, a joint-venture company owned by the Tour 
and IMG Sports Media. The same team produces Ryder Cup coverage when 
the event is held in the UK. For tennis, the ATP World Tour (the governing 
body of men’s professional tennis circuit) has its own broadcast operation 
that provides an international feed to over 110 rights holding broadcasters, 
including BSkyB. Popular European football is covered by local broadcasters, 
including La Liga on Sky Sports, with the Bundesliga and Serie a carried by 
BT Sport. And NFL coverage comes from BSkyB’s sister company Fox Sports 
and the other rights holding US broadcasters that provide game coverage.  
Presentation style was also a major selling point in the BT Sport launch, 
with promotional trailers featuring BT’s large studio (previously the 
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international broadcasting compound for the 2012 London Olympics109) – 
virtually all of the launch trailers featured action specially shot in this 
distinctive space. Glendenning (2013) quotes BT Sport’s director Simon 
Green: “Without getting personal, the presentation of football hasn’t come 
on a huge amount in the last 15 years. We [BT Sport] think we’ll bring 
something different.”	   At the end of its first season of Premier League 
football any differences appear to be rather nuanced.  In addition to the 
central hub design of the studio with its prominent monitor banks, the only 
innovation was the use of a small live box sometimes inserted in the corner 
of replays so nothing is missed during the time the replay is on screen.  
 
Considering these brief examples, whilst more effort and resources are put 
into presenting sport, it is evident the main point of difference between 
broadcasters is the portfolio of sports rights that each holds. However, as 
major event coverage is increasingly provided by federations, with leagues 
issuing ever more detailed prescriptions for coverage and the need to fill a 
high volume of broadcast hours on multiple channels with additional sports 
content, then the individual presentation style each broadcaster chooses to 
adopt is important, not least because it remains one of the very few areas 
for which they still retain substantial control and, as such, has become a 
key part of their channel brand. 
 
Conclusion  
Chapter 7 reviewed a range of challenges faced by broadcasters following 
the upstream transformations discussed in part two. These included: (a) the 
                                           
109 Also used by IMG Sports Media and Sunset+Vine for Channel Four’s presentation of the 
2012 Paralympic presentations.  
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close relationship between sports broadcasting rights ownership and the 
commercial performance of large media firms, (b) the emergence of 
federation-based host broadcast operations providing coverage for major 
events, (c) how increased demand for sports content has delivered very 
little critical comment and (d) a widening division between coverage and 
presentation, how broadcasters focus on localising and re-branding the 
international coverage they receive from federations via individual 
presentation and branding styles. The chapter reflects the continuing flow of 
power upstream to the leagues and federations.  
 
Examples from BT Sport and BSkyB were used to examine how the 
commercial performance of broadcasters is linked to ownership of popular 
sports broadcasting rights. In an oligopolistic market structure, changes in 
sports broadcasting rights ownership can directly impact on the economic 
performance of competing companies; the growing significance of corporate 
performance also suggests the way in which sports broadcasting rights are 
valued is becoming increasingly complex. With the migration of many sports 
rights to BSkyB and BT Sport, a split in the market providing sports content 
was reviewed, including the possibility on encountering winners curse and 
bidding too much in a market where rising prices for broadcasting rights 
shows little inclination of slowing down.  
 
Further challenges for broadcasters arise as a result of (a) the influence of a 
small group of mostly male special advisers many of whom have moved 
from executive positions in television sport to work directly for the leagues 
and federations and (b) the emergence of federation run host broadcast 
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operations; Olympic Broadcasting Services and Host Broadcast Services in 
particular.  
 
Enjoying commonalities with Premier League Production workflows (chapter 
4) and the Production Manuals and shared international feed philosophy 
adopted by UEFA (chapter 5), the IOC, FIFA and UEFA seek to take control 
of every aspect of production to provide a dependable and sympathetic 
international feed to all rights holding broadcasters. In doing so, the line 
between what is best for advertisers/sponsors and broadcasters becomes 
more blurred. Research by Gruneau and Cantelon (1988) and Magdalinski 
et al (2005) notes how the Olympics have become “a more fully developed 
expression of incorporation of sporting practice into the ever-expanding 
marketplace of international capitalism” (Gruneau and Cantelon, 1988:347). 
This research argues that federation-based production is a very important 
new phase in television sports production. 
 
Considering the significantly increased demand for sports content, including 
more volume and scope, and the introduction of formats that embrace more 
entertainment-oriented production values, there remains very little in the 
way of criticism in sports television output reflecting a reluctance to “bite 
the hand that feeds” (Boyle and Haynes, 2000:107).  
 
The provision of more media remains a central theme as broadcasters try to 
engage viewers via the red button, online, mobile platforms and second 
screen activities (such as peer group dialogues). Whether this is a 
marketing exercise by each channel (providing added value), or indicative 
of a shift towards more customised viewing is unclear as there is insufficient 
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evidence to reach a conclusion. It was noted that federation activity in this 
area is comparatively underdeveloped. 
 
As broadcasters respond to league and federation-based production activity 
that delivers approved coverage to all rights holding broadcasters, plus an 
increase in coverage originated by other broadcasters and bought in to fill 
schedules, then the importance of presentation in sports television has 
increased significantly. Whilst the BBC faces intense commercial competition 
to acquire rights, for protected events like the Olympics and World Cup 
Finals, the corporation has, with the rise of federation-based host broadcast 
operations, been released from providing comprehensive coverage of 
events. This has allowed the BBC to concentrate its efforts and resources on 
the presentation of major events, in other words the shoulder programming 
that wraps around international coverage and that serves to localise it. 
Presentation is also a means to differentiate broadcast output and to build a 
brand identity. The BBC has retained a plausible position as the broadcaster 
that can deliver a shared viewing experience for large numbers of British 
viewers. Presentation is one of the remaining areas where broadcasters still 
retain substantial control.  
 
Continuing the supply side perspective in answering the third research 
question – what is the impact of pre-production process downstream - but 
moving now to a micro-level view of activities, contemporary trends in 
independent sports production and the day-to-day work of sports producers 
and directors are considered in chapter 8.  
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8 | Independent sports television production 
 
Subject to considerable upheaval as upstream pre-production processes 
have tricked down to the supply side, the television sports production 
workplace can be a confusing environment. On face value it might be 
reasonable to assume the transformations reviewed so far could have been 
the foundation for a creative heyday for sports producers and directors. In 
some important respects a very different scenario is playing out, one that is 
shaped by inhibitions and restrictions. Chapter 8 examines trends in 
independent production, from investment in production companies through 
to the rise of the production manager. 
 
Evidence has been collated from longer form semi-formal interviews with 
leading participants from the independent sports production sector. Day-to-
day field notes and examples taken directly from my experience as 
participant-observer are also referenced. Academic research describing the 
contemporary day-to-day work of sports production companies, producers 
and directors is scarce. Among a limited and dated output (Barnett (1990), 
Whannel (1992), Boyle and Haynes (2000,2004) and Haynes (2005)) 
observations by Tunstall (1993) remain useful. Developing an idea put 
forward by Burns (1977) Tunstall argues that producers operate in “closed 
and private worlds” (Tunstall, 1993:2). This is accentuated by working 
within prescribed genres that serve “to shut sports producers off from the 
rest of the world of television” (1993:67), for sport the distinguishing 
features include high volume of output, unscripted content and technical 
complexity amongst others. It is argued here that important new sub-
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genres within sport further delineate production skills, for example the 
emphasis placed on live coverage, and this creates more pressure to 
specialise. Tunstall also questioned whether the prominence placed on 
technology and logistics in television sports diminishes its journalistic value 
(Tunstall, 1993:72). This updated position sees prescriptive control as one 
of the major issues faced by independent sports producers and directors.  
 
8.1 The UK independent sports production sector 
The first UK independent sports production companies emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s; the launch of Channel Four in 1982 was significant so, 
too, was the 1990 Broadcasting Act, as it introduced a general independent 
production quota of 25% across all non-news commissioned programming 
(HMSO, 1990; Mediatique, 2005). In sports production, the growth in 
sponsored and bartered distribution content (where programmes are 
typically provided to a broadcaster for free in return for advertising space) 
and collaborations directly with federations, for example the joint venture 
between The European Tour (of golf) and TWI (now IMG Sport Media) to 
form ETP Productions in 1991 also added impetus. However, the UK 
independent sports production sector has never been large. As an observer-
participant over the past 2 decades I have seen some companies cease 
trading and the remaining firms shift orientation from focussing on creative 
output to realising their value as a business, with a corresponding tendency 
to offer more specialised output. Commenting on the nature of markets, 
Doyle (2002) writes: 
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The	  structure	  of	  a	  market	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  number	  of	  rival	  sellers	  that	  exist	  but	  on	  
a	  variety	  of	  other	  factors,	  including	  differences	  in	  their	  product,	  the	  number	  of	  buyers	  that	  
are	  present,	  and	  barriers	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  competitors.	  (Doyle,	  2002:8)	  
 
In 2014, the UK independent sports production sector remains small and 




Cheerleader Productions was one of the first independent sports production 
companies in the UK. I worked at Cheerleader from the late 1980s, as a 
participant-observer I recall the company was funded by an annual fee it 
received from Channel Four (around £400,000 per year; relayed to me at 
the time by the managing director), for which a team of 6 producers and 
assistant producers were on call, effectively acting as the Channel Four 
sports department. Managing director Derek Brandon also informed me 
Cheerleader policy was to adopt an overtly US styled approach to 
production values, arguing that televised sport in the UK was under 
produced compared to US sports productions. Methods and technologies 
were freely imported as Cheerleader packaged US sport for UK broadcast 
including the NFL; Japanese Sumo wrestling was added in 1988 again for 
Channel Four. I was producer of Sumo and I can confirm that, in the late 
1980s, the process of producing programmes generally took precedence 
over business affairs, although questions surrounding rights and other 
issues, including specified access at events, were beginning to impact on 
production work. 
                                           
110 Endemol Sport operated for 3 years from January 2009. 
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An ex-ITV and BBC executive, Mike Murphy, ran Television Sport and 
Leisure (TSL); the company bought and sold sports rights in what was a 
fledgling market. During an interview in 2011, a senior production manager 
that worked for TSL confirmed that Murphy began to offer production 
consultancy, again a new area for independent producers, including selling 
the overseas broadcasting rights to the 1991 Rugby World Cup.  
 
Founded over 40 years ago111 Trans World International (TWI) had been 
established as a part of IMG to add television production services for clients 
the McCormack organisation already represented, including golf and tennis 
federations. My interviews with sports producers working for TWI in the 
early 1990s confirm the company began to specialise in outside broadcast 
coverage from challenging locations. Equipment was designed to be packed 
easily and transported between venues, including island hopping for West 
Indies cricket and league football from China. Whilst TWI pioneered flyaway 
production techniques, it also produced the long running magazine, 
TransWorld Sport that, in early 2014, is still in weekly production. Speaking 
in 2013, one producer who graduated from TransWorld Sport to Chinese 
football recalls there was “still a tendency for broadcasters and federations 
to view different cultures through sport”.  This was certainly the case with 
early Channel Four productions from Sumo to Kabaddi. The producer also 
added a note about prominence: 
[Before	  multi-­‐channel	  sport]	  what	  it	  does	  mean	  is	  people	  remember	  better	  and	  were	  more	  
attached	  to	  sport	  when	  there	  was	  less	  of	  it	  [on	  television].	  (Series	  producer,	  independent	  
sports	  production,	  2013)	  
                                           
111 According to IMG’s website, http://www.imgproductions.com/our-work/sports-
production, accessed 24.02.2014. TWI now trades as IMG Sports Media Limited. 
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Using sport as a lens to view culture was relatively short lived approach as 
the downstream market in sport content provision began to change in the 
early 1990s. The same producer suggests that, pre-dating the expansion of 
BSkyB in the UK, the Pan Asian satellite channel, Star, was the first 
dedicated sports channel to require significantly more sports content to fill 
its schedules. In the US ESPN and TBS also required more content. In 
changing market conditions TWI was well placed to react. From the outset, 
and due in part to the background of several of its senior executives, TWI 
was often viewed as a sort of annexe to BBC Sport – in early 2014, 3 out of 
4 of the company’s most experienced executives had prominent BBC 
backgrounds. Some senior IMG producers speaking to me in interviews 
between 2011 and 2013 confided they see the company as the “Marks and 
Spencer of sports television”, because it provides competitively priced 
programmes, including large volumes of content, rather than stand out 
creativity and innovation. That IMG also represents federations and rights 
holders and has sales offices in numerous countries is also significant. A 
former ITV head of production, interviewed in 2013, confirmed a widely held 
industry view that IMG provides a benchmark for costs: “You always get a 
production quote [price] from IMG as this will give you a guide to the lower 
end of expected costs on any project”. 
 
The UK’s independent sports production companies were small but each, in 
some way, was pioneering. Sunset+Vine was formed in 1983 to produce 
sponsored/advertiser-funded programmes and offer bartered syndication 
deals, like Gillette World Sport that ran for 25 years between 1984 and 
2009. Interviews with programme producers confirm that distributed 
magazine programmes like Gillette World Sport, TransWorld Sport and FIFA 
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Futbol Mundial saw their access to elite content dramatically restricted with 
the extension of sports broadcasting rights and copyright control – “We just 
can’t do top level sport anymore; the rights are prohibitive and exclusive” 
(Series producer, independent sports production, 2013). 
 
Cheerleader Productions split in 1989, with Derek Brandon joining event 
entrepreneur and former athlete Alan Pascoe to form Grand Slam 
Productions, where more advertiser-funded content was targeted. Again in 
my role as a participant-observer, I witnessed the original Cheerleader 
bring in an executive producer from the BBC, Charles Balchin, as the 
company continued to produce NFL and Sumo coverage into the early 
1990s before the Daily Mail General Trust (DMGT) purchased it.  
 
Also in the early 1990s Chrysalis fully entered the independent sports 
production sector. Chrysalis Sport Managing director Neil Duncanson 
informed me that he took advantage of an opportunistic moment when 
making a documentary on Paul Gascoigne – the England player who had 
famously cried during an Italia 1990 match and had been transferred from 
Tottenham to Serie a club Lazio. To show any Italian football highlights in 
the Gascoigne film Chrysalis had to acquire the broadcasting rights to Serie 
a from RAI, the Italian broadcaster and rights holder. The acquired rights 
were offered to Michael Grade, then at Channel Four, who purchased them 
in 1992 just as BSkyB had acquired exclusive rights to live Premier League 
football. Significantly the Gazzetta weekly highlights programme was 
complemented by live coverage on Sunday afternoons, as Football Italia 
became the only live league football that could be seen on terrestrial 
television in the UK. By looking for gaps where they could operate in the 
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content production market, independent sports production companies had 
already taken the first step towards specialisation. 
 
Issues 
A major problem for independent sport production companies is that they 
very rarely hold any broadcasting rights. Also, they do not have direct 
access to audiences. Instead, and unlike general programme provision, 
independent sports production companies offer services for costs plus a 
percentage fee to broadcasters or rights holders. Typically broadcasters will 
pay all production costs but, because they only hold primary rights, there is 
no benefit from selling this coverage to other broadcasters (as secondary 
rights are normally retained by the issuing league or federation, see chapter 
5 for an explanation of primary and secondary rights and Doyle, 2002:80-
90). In these circumstances sports production companies find themselves 
constantly competing to win production tenders - Request For Production 
(RFP) and Invitation To Tender (ITT) - issued by broadcasters, federations 
or third-party rights holders; they are in competition with other 
independent sports production companies and, sometimes, with broadcast 
sports departments including ITV Sport. Independent production companies 
seldom carry major capital investment in property, hardware and 
technology, with IMG Sports Media providing an exception with its studios, 
post-production and distribution divisions located near Heathrow Airport in 
London. The worth of an independent sports production company is usually 
based on its production order book, the ability of key staff to attract new 
business and its potential for growth, with these factors weighed against 
staff salaries, rents and other operating costs. As a participant-observer I 
recall managers/owners complaining - at various times when favourable 
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interest rates on deposits were available - they could achieve better returns 
by putting their money in the bank than investing in independent sports 
production – a good return was considered to be 3-5%.  
 
During the past decade there has been a trend where private equity firms 
have taken ownership and shareholding control of independent sports 
production companies. For example, Tinopolis/Vitruvian Partners control 
Sunset+Vine and All3Media/Permira own North One.  In December 2013, 
Forstmann Little sold IMG Worldwide to William Morris Endeavour and Silver 
Lake for US$2.3 billion, having purchased IMG in 2004 for US$750 million 
(Sweney, 2013). In May 2014 Discovery and Liberty Global paid £500 
million to take over All3Media, including North One (Sweney, 2014). For 
investors including an agency (William Morris) and a broadcaster 
(Discovery) sport production is often one arm in a bigger group of 
independent producers including genres that hold valuable secondary rights 
to content – as Doyle 2002:82 notes, it is the retention of secondary rights 
by producers that has attracted venture capital to independent production. 
However this does not apply to independent sports production companies, 
as a broadcaster or media provider will hold primary rights whilst the 
leagues and federations retained secondary rights. At Chrysalis, I heard the 
owner, Chris Wright, state on several occasions it was “useful to have a 
high profile independent sports producer on the books” because boardroom 
executives often enjoyed talking about Formula 1 and Serie a football.  
 
Based on my experience as a participant-observer working at Cheerleader, 
Chrysalis Sport, Endemol Sport and IMG Sports Media, and corroborated by 
field notes and interviews held with senior executives from these 
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companies, the contemporary situation can be paraphrased like this: Today, 
private equity firms typically work on a 3-5 year business plan that aims to 
maximise the value of the company before selling it on for a substantial 
profit. This generates pressure to raise revenues and reduce costs, 
particularly staff costs. However, given the cyclical nature of sports 
broadcasting rights and the fluidity in the downstream programme 
commissions market, plus ever-reducing profit margins (particularly 
pressure on costs plus fee service contracts that specify a production fee 
based on a percentage of the overall costs – since the late 1990s these fees 
have been gradually eroded, typically from 15%, to 10% and now, for 
larger contracts, where the fee can be limited to 5%112), longer term growth 
planning becomes more challenging. When the requirements of regional 
production quotas, including establishing regional offices, and Transfer of 
Undertakings (TUPE) regulations – when staff can receive protection if 
projects migrate from one company to another (see chapter 6) - are all 
added, then substantial financial returns become harder to deliver.  
 
Another problem is one of scale. The smaller size of independent sports 
production companies, at least compared to broadcasters and other media 
providers, means typical economies of scale and economies of scope 
enjoyed by broadcasters and large transnational media providers are mostly 
missing and this can introduce a degree of instability, particularly with 
expansions and contractions in the workforce. Of all the UK independent 
sports production companies perhaps only IMG Sports Media, as it seeks to 
vertically integrate production, studios, post-production, satellite services 
                                           
112 The BT Sport production contract RFP in summer 2012 included a large number of 
exclusions, like studios and outside broadcasts, for which no production fee could be 
charged. BT also proposed a series of fines should key action be missed in live coverage. 
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and distribution, plus access to federations via its agency, rights and 
archive management services, comes close to this template. Speaking to 
the managing director in 2013, even a company of this size remains 
vulnerable to losing its biggest contracts as productions are retendered. 
Efforts to retain existing contracts and to win new contracts are continuous 
and costly. Projecting profits, controlling cash flows and managing the 
company head count have become essential day-to-day activities. At IMG 
Sports Media in 2013 there was a monthly editorial board meeting for 
senior production staff. Having attended several of these meetings myself 
the primary focus was not on editorial matters but on company performance 
and potential results, a monthly financial health check that is indicative of 
the current climate. The transformation of independent sports production to 
a vehicle for private equity investment is part of neoliberalisation, what 
Harvey (2005:33) describes as “the financialisation of everything”. 
 
Without direct access to audiences, it can be argued that independent 
sports production companies exist around the fringes of the broadcasting 
economy, allowing broadcasters, leagues/federations and sponsors to hire 
specialist services for costs plus a fee over a longer or shorter term as 
required. As federations provide host broadcast operations for their own 
events, then there is a trend for independent companies to act like agencies 
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8.2  Live television sports production, creativity or 
prescription? 
Since 1992 live broadcasting has come to dominate the UK’s television 
sports landscape, including the work of independent sports production 
companies. Live sports production has attained a similar level of 
prominence to that enjoyed in the US, as one experienced producer 
explains:  
US	  television	  sport	  invented	  replays,	  graphics	  and	  the	  use	  of	  statistics	  among	  other	  things.	  
These	  techniques	  have	  been	  exported	  all	  round	  the	  world	  now.	  Sky	  Sports	  has	  adopted	  
very	  US-­‐styled	  techniques.	  Some	  sports	  have	  taken	  ideas	  from	  the	  US	  and	  used	  them	  to	  
their	  own	  advantage	  but,	  overall,	  we’ve	  come	  a	  very	  long	  way	  from	  the	  way	  we	  used	  to	  do	  
things	  in	  the	  UK.	  (Senior	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2012)	  
 
How far we’ve come from the way we used to do things in the UK is an 
interesting point as it signifies the scale of transformation in television 
sport. One senior manager at an independent sports production company, 
considered a pivotal point to be ITV’s 1978 snatch of the day (when ITV 
acquired football league rights from the BBC):  
You	  could	  feel	  it	  [the	  arrival	  of	  more	  money]	  in	  the	  air.	  Now,	  the	  income	  per	  head	  
generated	  by	  football	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  NFL	  when	  market	  size	  is	  taken	  into	  account.	  
(Senior	  manager,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  
 
This underlines the view, held in the late 1980s and early 1990s by football 
club owners and the newly formed Sky Sports, that television sport in the 
UK, particularly football, was under produced. The rapid introduction of up 
scaled live production methods and how this took precedence over more 
traditional presentation, like highlights and magazine formats (see chapter 
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4), represents a very significant change in UK television sports production 
culture; this gear-change favoured producers and directors that were most 
comfortable with the technical, logistical and editorial requirements of live 
broadcasting.  
 
Producers and directors that worked on live flagship sports output became 
the most highly rewarded in sports production. This replicates the status 
enjoyed by live producers in the US (as I can confirm as a participant-
observer working in the US for 5 years in the 1990s). With large segments 
of unscripted presentation and studio-based discussion, plus the uncertainty 
of outcome surrounding matches and events, the demands on producers 
and directors working in a live environment were significantly different from 
those working with highlights and magazine formats. Live sports coverage is 
an environment where the ability to think quickly in reaction to events and 
to manage output, virtually always under pressure, is highly prized. Live 
production was not so much a new sub-genre but had become the genre 
that defined television sports production.  
 
However, the introduction of more technology in live sports production 
tends to obscure some important underlying issues. Priorities for live sports 
directors are often split; a leading international live sports director describes 
the need for situational awareness and the tension between (a) telling the 
story of the event, (b) controlling the available technology and (c) providing 
a coherent output: 
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I	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  what’s	  happening	  in	  the	  match/event	  and	  to	  tell	  that	  story.	  But	  I	  also	  
need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  television	  environment,	  the	  camera	  placement	  and	  other	  points	  of	  
view	  and	  how	  I	  am	  putting	  this	  together	  on	  air.	  (Live	  international	  sports	  director,	  2012)	  
 
Live sport production can be an intense working environment. Interviewing 
a number of live sports directors, they noted that further tension may arise 
depending on who the director is working for; is the director required to 
provide a safe pair of hands when delivering federation-based international 
coverage, or is something more creative required by a broadcaster for its 
local audiences? With the dramatic technological changes in coverage that 
were being rolled out, directing was also becoming more complicated; a live 
sports director explains:  
 
Cricket	  was	  covered	  with	  about	  8	  cameras	  and	  4	  tape	  machines,	  now	  we	  use	  25	  cameras	  
and	  8	  channels	  of	  EVS	  –	  the	  equipment	  has	  become	  much	  more	  capable.	  Since	  the	  1990s	  
we’ve	  moved	  from	  48	  to	  168	  inputs	  into	  the	  switcher	  [mixing	  desk],	  1	  graphics	  source	  has	  
become	  3	  graphics	  sources.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  kit	  is	  small,	  but	  the	  capacity	  is	  so	  much	  greater.	  
Tape	  has	  gone	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  servers	  is	  simply	  revolutionary…	  with	  an	  all-­‐digital	  
environment	  the	  scale	  of	  outside	  broadcasts	  has	  increased	  hugely.	  (Live	  international	  
sports	  director,	  2012)	  
 
The introduction of digital technology gave live sports directors significantly 
more cameras, a variety of graphic tools and considerably more instant 
replays. These additional inputs had to be managed at the same time as 
capturing and reflecting the ebb and flow of the story from the field of play. 
Another interesting point from the interviews concerned creativity and how 
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creative coverage does not appear to be determined by the number of 
cameras but by the overall way resources can be combined, as a very 
experienced live sports director testifies: 
 
It	  isn’t	  so	  much	  the	  number	  of	  cameras	  used	  -­‐	  whether	  it	  is	  8	  or	  38	  -­‐	  a	  decent	  director	  can	  
use	  7	  cameras	  and	  still	  deliver	  good	  coverage.	  The	  bigger	  step	  changes	  are	  replay	  systems	  
and	  graphics.	  	  EVS	  allows	  you	  to	  isolate	  nearly	  every	  single	  camera	  and	  chose	  from	  20	  
different	  replays.	  A	  single	  penalty	  incident	  can	  generate	  7	  or	  8	  different	  angles	  you	  can	  
discuss	  later	  in	  the	  pub.	  Graphics	  have	  been	  transformed	  from	  Letraset113	  on	  black	  and	  
white	  magnetic	  strips	  that	  were	  keyed	  in,	  to	  what	  we	  have	  now:	  fully	  animated	  team	  sheets	  
and	  other	  match	  details	  [statistics].	  Don’t	  forget	  it	  wasn’t	  long	  ago	  that	  score	  clocks	  didn’t	  
exist	  now	  they	  are	  taken	  for	  granted.	  (Live	  sports	  director,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  
2013)	  
 
Whilst most live sports directors tend to be technically rather than 
editorially oriented, it is important that technology itself is not the key 
factor but rather the ways in which this technology is used. Live directors 
may debate the merits of different technologies and how they have shaped 
output but they were not the only people to see how this was transforming 
coverage, leagues and federations – as discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 7 – 
saw opportunities to harness new technologies and workflows so they could 
take production under their direct control. What is interesting is how new 
digital technology with the dramatic increases in capacity described by 
directors could certainly be used creatively. However, the same technology 
                                           
113 Letraset is a graphics transfer system where captions were built manually onto black 
cardboard. 
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also provided the circumstances where federations were able to demand a 
more prescriptive approach to coverage of television sport. 
 
With the potential offered by a fully digital workflow, this era might have 
delivered more creativity and innovation but, whilst there have been many 
enhancements to coverage, issues to do with prescriptive control and 
standardised output are recurring themes. Nearly every sport can provide 
some example of improvements in event coverage, from highly mobile 
flying camera rigs down to miniaturised cameras improving access, plus a 
wide range of revealing replay and analysis tools. However, there is another 
crucial non-technical factor that dictates each and every working context, 
including what can and cannot be done: the customer the production 
company, producer and director is working for. And this influence may be 
even more significant than the technology used, Haynes (2005:10) goes as 
far as to say that intellectual property rights have been used to “actually 
inhibit innovation and creativity”. The gloss of new technology applied to 
television sports tends to obscure such issues. 
 
8.3 Commissioning content 
As the volume of televised sport content has grown so, too, has the 
importance of who commission this content and why. The implications of 
commissioning are now reviewed. 
 
Whilst Tunstall (1993:67) considered that producers were cut off from the 
rest of the world of television, he noticed a further difference with sports 
producers: 
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…	  these	  producers’	  world	  is	  less	  private	  than	  that	  of	  other	  producers	  in	  one	  important	  
respect.	  These	  producers	  are	  closer	  to	  their	  audiences	  than	  are	  the	  producers	  in	  any	  other	  
genre.	  (Tunstall,	  1993:76)	  
 
Tunstall continued to argue that sports producers were unusual in believing 
that feedback from friends and acquaintances can be helpful. This appears 
to be based on a strong emotional commitment to sport shared by both 
producers and viewers (Tunstall, 1993:76). It also raises a question that 
may be more relevant in 2014 – who is the sports producer’s customer?  
 
Historically, as Tunstall found, many producers, as sports fans themselves, 
have considered their customer was the audience – I have experienced this 
argument directly as a participant-observer. Doyle (2002:8) reminds us 
that “media content has no value unless it is distributed to an audience” 
and, again (Doyle, 2002:80), that producers are linked to the audience via 
intermediary stages in a vertical supply chain, therefore it is not the 
audience per se but the broadcaster, federation or, in the case of 
advertising-funded programming, a sponsor114 that is the customer for 
television programming. This is important because, as discussed throughout 
this research, each customer has quite different demands and priorities. 
Unlike broadcasters, that have some influence via the substantial fees they 
pay for rights, independent sports production companies are dependent on 
these commissions for their survival and can easily be caught between the 
different requirements of rights holders and broadcasters. How this impacts 
on companies and individuals is now reviewed. 
                                           
114 Sponsor-funded sports programming is unlikely to involve live broadcasting. As many of 
the points made about federation-based production are relevant to sponsor or ad-funded 
programming this is not discussed separately. 




Since the late 1980s broadcasters have been a critical source of business 
for independent sports production companies. When a broadcaster wins 
sports broadcasting rights a further competitive tender may follow. As 
noted, independent sports production companies are invited to respond to a 
Request for Production (RFP) or an Invitation to Tender (ITT). When BT 
Sport launched in 2012, the media provider did not have a substantial 
production department that could meet its production requirements, 
therefore it tendered its Premier League football production. As a publisher-
broadcaster, Channel Four carries out tenders for all of its major 
productions. The BBC has regional and independent production quotas it 
must achieve, whilst Sky Sports occasionally tenders specialised 
productions, like fishing. Winning these tenders is a critical activity for 
independent sports production companies. Whilst many of these processes 
are protected by non-disclosure agreements and financial confidentiality I 
have, as a participant-observer, been involved with numerous production 
service tenders since the late 1980s and have added specific field notes 
from examples during the past 5 years. 
 
From 2009, an increased influence from procurement specialists and 
internal legal and contractual professionals working for broadcasters was 
reflected in the tender documents issued, particularly in examples from ITV 
and BT Sport. Increasingly tenders are set out in such a way that the 
responses can be scored by the issuing procurement managers with the 
answers to key questions, the range of services provided and the value 
measured and then compared. This process is designed to deliver a more 
rational means of allocating a production contract. Interviews with senior 
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executives at independent sports production companies between 2011 and 
2013 suggest they take a prosaic view in so far as “every box must be 
ticked” and “all questions answered” in each tender response, even if this 
means submitting a large final document115. It can be argued that the use 
of scoring to assess the creative aspects of a response is indicative of how 
creativity has been subjugated in respect to an overall desire for compliance 
and financial value. However, when it comes to providing evidence then a 
trend towards specialisation is easier to identify, both at the level of 
independent sports productions companies and among producers and 
directors.  
 
For example, having produced Formula 1 for ITV as a participant-observer I 
can confirm that Chrysalis Sport expanded its motorsport expertise to 
include production of the World Rally Championships and Isle of Man TT. In 
late 2013, the company (now North One) used this experience to secure a 
five-year contract to produce MotoGP motorcycle racing for BT Sport 
(Considine, 2013). Whilst this may be commercial opportunism, 
broadcasters do appear to be more comfortable where there is a clear track 
record of production in a specific sport, in this case motor sport. Looking at 
other examples, Sunset+Vine have been successful in their presentation 
production – their work around the shoulder of event coverage – including 
Channel Four cricket, BBC horse racing, Sky Sports rugby union and BT 
Sport (football and rugby union). By contrast, with a track record of working 
directly with leagues and federations, IMG Sports Media executives, 
interviewed between 2011 and 2013, recognise whilst the company is 
associated with a more conservative outlook it enjoys a reputation for 
                                           
115 I have seen submissions that exceed 300pp not including additional budget forecasts. 
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reliability when delivering content. However, the trend is towards providing 
expertise in any given televised sport production with overt pressure to do 
so. In 2012 when IMG Sports Media responded to a tender from Channel 
Four to produce the channel’s horse racing coverage, a senior executive 
confirmed the priority:   
 
The	  first	  thing	  you	  have	  to	  do	  is	  to	  go	  for	  the	  expert	  in	  horse	  racing.	  Similarly,	  to	  win	  the	  
BBC	  snooker	  contract	  you	  have	  to	  present	  people	  who	  are	  known	  for	  these	  sports.	  
Independents	  have	  to	  pitch	  with	  expert	  [producers]	  otherwise	  you	  won’t	  get	  in.	  It’s	  like	  a	  
hamster	  running	  on	  a	  wheel,	  it	  never	  changes.	  (Senior	  manager,	  independent	  sports	  
production,	  2013)	  
 
This raises the question of whether replication has become more important 
than originality; asked how new ideas could be introduced in such 
circumstances the answer was: 
 
The	  funnel	  is	  getting	  narrower.	  I	  once	  totted	  up	  how	  many	  different	  sports	  I	  had	  worked	  
on;	  it	  came	  to	  42.	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  will	  happen	  to	  anyone	  in	  the	  future.	  Federations	  are	  
becoming	  more	  prescriptive	  in	  their	  production	  requirements	  and	  producers	  are	  becoming	  
more	  specialised	  [in	  their	  output].	  (Senior	  manager,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  
	  
The necessity to provide production experts coincides with a perceived 
narrowing of the funnel for creativity. But these developments also illustrate 
the increasing division between coverage and presentation in sports 
television. A factor driving this trend is how federations have taken control 
of host broadcast operations (see chapter 7). Whilst this provides a further 
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opportunity for independent sports production companies to offer their 
services for hire, what are the implications? 
 
Federations 
A respected international live sports director explained the primary 
differences when producing live content directly for a federation and that 
delivered to a broadcaster:  
 
For	  a	  federation	  I’m	  creating	  a	  generic	  world	  feed.	  The	  premise	  is	  guaranteed	  uniform	  and	  
stable	  coverage	  of	  the	  event	  for	  all	  international	  clients.	  For	  the	  ATP	  [Men’s	  professional	  
tennis]	  this	  would	  be	  [for]	  138	  countries.	  The	  world	  feed	  follows	  a	  set	  format,	  so	  a	  safe	  pair	  
of	  hands	  is	  most	  important	  as	  this	  allows	  clients	  [international	  rights	  holding	  broadcasters]	  
to	  jump	  in	  and	  out	  of	  our	  coverage	  cleanly	  when	  they	  want	  to.	  It’s	  proper	  coverage,	  but	  
safely	  done.	  Working	  for	  a	  broadcaster,	  or	  a	  specific	  channel,	  would	  need	  more	  creativity,	  
as	  you	  are	  more	  responsible	  for	  how	  that	  channel	  looks	  and	  feels.	  (Live	  international	  sports	  
director,	  2012)	  
 
There are two dynamics operating; between providing standardised 
international coverage that multiple broadcasters can cut in and out of and 
more specific coverage designed for a single broadcaster or channel. A 
further tension exists around the preference to work for a federation or a 
broadcaster. Speaking to a number of independent sports producers there 
was only one who preferred working for a federation; the general sentiment 
is that federations including Formula 1, UEFA, FIFA and the IOC are 
increasingly prescriptive in their production requirements. It is argued that 
this represents a very significant shift from previous working practices of 
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creating a production (usually for a single broadcaster that offered some 
leeway in interpreting events) to a contract-driven delivery process 
involving highly prescribed content designed for multiple international 
users. This is a new kind of content that is nearly always for federations and 
it contains different levels of compliance within the prescribed workflows 
and deliverables. Offering a wide-angle view of the situation, a company 
director at a leading independent sports production company observes:  
 
Creation	  [in	  future]	  will	  be	  around	  shoulder	  programming;	  pre	  and	  post	  kick	  off,	  that’s	  
where	  it	  will	  come	  from.	  Once	  you	  go	  to	  the	  stadia	  and	  the	  referee	  blows	  the	  whistle,	  or	  
the	  green	  light	  goes	  in	  F-­‐1,	  whatever,	  it	  [the	  coverage]	  will	  be	  more	  prescriptive.	  There	  is	  
more	  and	  more	  prescription	  [from	  Federations]	  and	  less	  and	  less	  input	  from	  producers.	  Yes,	  
that’s	  the	  case.	  (Senior	  executive	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  	  
	  
These prescriptions were discussed in chapter 5 (UEFA Champions League) 
and chapter 7 (federation-run host broadcast operations) including the ways 
coverage of events are now set out by the federation via their production 
manuals, with broadcasters taking responsibility for their domestic 
presentation of the event, in other words the shoulder programming around 
the event.  
 
Delivering increasingly prescribed content presents it own challenges but, 
ultimately, it is a more mechanical process (and one that is more easily 
described in contractual terms as the services provided) than is the case 
when interpreting events or providing more creative programming. The 
clarity provided by such prescriptions may suit some sports producers and 
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directors, but by no means all, particularly those used to having more input. 
A very experienced senior producer summarises: 
 
Production	  for	  the	  Olympics	  is	  by	  the	  book.	  There	  are	  excellent	  producers	  and	  directors	  
sitting	  around	  with	  nothing	  to	  do	  other	  than	  follow	  the	  Production	  Manual	  that	  is	  provided	  
[by	  Olympic	  Broadcasting	  Services]…	  The	  Olympics	  want	  to	  give	  a	  product	  they	  can	  depend	  
on	  –	  for	  example	  with	  clear	  cue	  points	  [for	  opt	  outs	  and	  opt	  ins]	  and	  good	  quality.	  This	  is	  
how	  it	  is	  sold	  to	  rights	  holding	  broadcasters.	   
 
The	  television	  departments	  at	  UEFA	  and	  FIFA	  are	  also	  far	  more	  instrumental	  in	  how	  it	  
works.	  At	  the	  last	  EUROs	  [2012]	  it	  was	  rubbish	  [for	  coverage]	  to	  go	  to	  a	  top	  shot	  
immediately	  after	  a	  goal,	  even	  before	  a	  replay	  on	  camera	  2.	  It	  was	  straight	  out	  of	  the	  
manual	  ‘cos	  everyone	  did	  it.	  You	  need	  to	  have	  2	  or	  3	  regular	  replays	  before	  a	  top	  shot	  
makes	  any	  sense.	  (Senior	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2012)	  
	  
Similar complaints were levied against the prescriptions required in Formula 
1 coverage. Some coverage requirements (the sequencing of cameras and 
replays in particular) do not make sense to directors who have produced 
their own coverage in the past. Looking at typical prescriptions provided by 
other federations, a highly regarded sports director adds further 
perspective: 
The	  Olympics	  give	  you	  very	  clear	  instructions	  about	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  allowed.	  Overt	  
pressure	  from	  sponsorship	  has	  always	  been	  there.	  It’s	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  event	  
–	  the	  magnitude	  tapers	  down	  with	  the	  organisation	  running	  the	  event,	  say	  from	  the	  
Olympics	  to	  the	  Asian	  Games.	  But	  even	  small	  events	  now	  give	  guidelines	  on	  what	  they	  want	  
and	  don’t	  want	  to	  see.	  It’s	  all	  linked	  to	  their	  commercial	  obligations	  as	  sport	  becomes	  more	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commercialised.	  Federations	  and	  organisations	  need	  to	  protect	  those	  relationships	  and	  
that’s	  one	  way	  of	  doing	  it.	  (Live	  sports	  director,	  freelance,	  2012)  
 
Such instructions increasingly seek to provide television coverage that is 
wholly sympathetic to the needs of the federations’ own marketing and 
sales strategies, including their relationships with sponsors and advertisers 
– in some important ways television sports coverage has become another 
marketing tool for elite sports federations. In chapter 3, NBA commissioner 
David Stern was quoted:  
 
That’s	  the	  beauty	  of	  television.	  Other	  brands	  have	  to	  buy	  their	  way	  on	  through	  advertising.	  
Our	  core	  product	  is	  a	  two-­‐hour	  commercial	  [the	  NBA	  game]	  that	  someone	  pays	  us	  to	  run.	  
(Jay,	  2004:229)	  
 
Sport as a brand, as a product and with games and events running as if a 
commercial, is part of the growing global marketisation of sport. Following 
work by Whitson (1998), Falcous (2005) argues this type of development:   
 
…	  represents	  a	  new	  stage	  in	  the	  commodification	  of	  sport,	  such	  that	  it	  may	  be	  gradually	  
detached	  from	  meanings	  based	  on	  attachments	  and	  loyalties.	  In	  the	  place	  of,	  and	  
supplemental	  to,	  geographical	  loyalties	  come	  the	  discourse	  of	  personal	  and	  consumer	  
choice.	  	  (Falcous,	  2005:59)	  
 
It is argued that sports producers and directors must now play by the rules, 
or they don’t play at all. As the rules are frequently set by rights holders 
and apply to broadcasters, independent production companies and 
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individual producers and directors this is a critical point. It is one of the 
most fundamental changes in television sports production since 2005. 
 
As the rules of the game continue to change, producers were asked what 
the main difference in working for a federation or for a broadcaster was. A 
live sports director provided this summary: 
 
The	  difference	  is	  like	  living	  in	  a	  democracy	  and	  living	  in	  North	  Korea.	  If	  you	  are	  covering	  an	  
event	  for	  a	  broadcaster	  you	  do	  so	  from	  an	  outside	  perspective.	  But	  working	  for	  a	  
federation,	  who	  owns	  their	  own	  rights,	  the	  event	  must	  be	  covered	  in	  a	  positive	  light	  
regardless	  of	  how	  it	  may	  seem.	  Working	  for	  a	  broadcaster	  gives	  you	  that	  independence	  to	  
call	  a	  spade	  a	  spade.	  But	  working	  for	  a	  federation	  you	  have	  to	  tread	  very	  carefully	  and	  
always	  portray	  things	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  (Live	  international	  sports	  director,	  2012)	  
	  
Working for federations, producers and directors must always present 
events “in a positive light regardless of how it might seem” and, by doing 
so, they deliver approved international feeds (that are sympathetic to 
sponsors requirements) subsequently aired by rights holding broadcasters. 
But, are broadcasters able to act any more independently? In February 
2014, it was alleged that BT Sport dismissed ex-referee Mark Halsey as a 
pundit following pressure from the Premier League (Sale, 2014b). Looking 
at developments more generally any serious notion of broadcaster 
independence appears to be an idea that is in rapid retreat due to the eye-
watering amounts of money paid for exclusive broadcasting rights and the 
subsequent need to comply with collateral commercial relationships. In any 
case, it is argued that the differences between working for a federation or 
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for a broadcaster have become less pronounced and that, without any 
significant changes in prospect, many remaining differences will continue to 
diminish over time. Given the description (by a senior manager at an 
independent sports producer speaking in 2013) that “the funnel continues 
to narrow” another trend within television sports production is evident, the 
pressure on individual sports producers and directors to specialise. 
 
8.4 The trend towards specialisation in sports production  
In November 1997 I worked for Chrysalis Sport where I wrote an internal 
management document titled People, practice and profit. At that time the 
company had 42 people working on 7 major sports productions involving all 
major UK broadcasters. The document explained typical progression 
through production roles. As independent production is already a form of 
specialisation, and as companies also have less scale and scope, it is worth 
providing a brief update as part of a discussion on how specialisation has 
accelerated. This update is based on new field notes as a participant 
observer taken at several independent sports production companies; short 
form interviews with senior managers are also incorporated. It is also worth 
recalling Tunstall as he argued the role of television producer does not 
constitute a profession - there are no recognised qualifications, nor is entry 
to the sector controlled (Tunstall, 1993:203). The requirements for the role 
are subjective and dependent on the working context, a context that has 
been transformed in recent years.  
 
Up to the late 1980s and early 1990s, progression at traditional 
broadcasters like the BBC and ITV was described anecdotally as filling dead 
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men’s shoes, opportunities for promotion mostly occurred when someone 
left or retired. Junior staff would join as librarians or as trainee production 
assistants (later known as assistant producers). Staff would be encouraged 
in one of two directions, towards an editorial role (producer) or towards 
directing, with a further distinction made between outside broadcast 
direction and studio (presentation) direction. At the BBC and ITV the engine 
room of sports coverage, particularly for major events, was the corps of 
assistant producers who turned around all incoming VT feeds for use on air. 
With limited opportunities for promotion, breaking out of the assistant 
producer ranks was challenging. However, as an ex-BBC executive producer 
speaking in 2013 confirmed: “The BBC had everything [in terms of rights] 
so there were opportunities to work on a wide range of sports, from the 
Olympics to World Cup Finals.” 
 
The arrival of independent sports production companies, followed by BSB 
(Champion), Sky and then BSkyB created more fluidity in what had been a 
very static job market. As noted, it also placed a greater premium on 
producers and directors with live broadcasting experience.   
 
Entry level at an independent sports production company was as a runner 
or a researcher. Junior assistant producer was the next step, someone that 
could carry out action editing: provide basic scripting, location 
contacts/fixing and short feature storytelling. Senior assistant producers 
would shoot and edit complete features and be able, under supervision, to 
construct shorter format programme episodes. A junior producer would do 
much the same, but with slightly less supervision, whilst a producer would 
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take charge of a complete programme working under a series 
editor/producer or an executive producer. 
 
A series producer would take charge of multiple programmes in a strand, 
manage the team and ensure all paperwork and archiving is completed. A 
series editor differs in so far as they would provide an overview for studio-
based productions featuring guests and discussion. Heading the team is the 
executive producer, someone that selects staff for each project and works 
on a number of series simultaneously, providing more advanced programme 
development and detailed project planning, including preparing responses 
to competitive tenders from broadcasters or federations. 
 
For live sports television, gaining relevant experience can be challenging, 
even more so for freelance contractors. Some vision mixers have 
progressed to become directors, but another route would involve an 
assistant producer running replays, the multiplexer (a machine used to 
route VT signals to the studio), or switching a number of live isolated 
cameras into a single feed. Access to opportunities improved if you were 
assigned to a single sport and could build up a reputation as someone that 
could be trusted. Beyond that there may be limited occasions to provide 
second unit direction, or a small OB providing a live inject to a larger 
programme. A step up would be for lower specification coverage from an as 
live minor event. 
 
Training in television sport is primarily on the job, with opportunities often 
limited to the scope of the broadcaster, media provider or independent 
sports production company. Typically people work at a job for some time 
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before receiving a formal promotion. On the other hand promotions are 
often made internally.  
 
Recent changes to workflows (see chapter 4), combined with substantially 
increased demand for sports content, means there have been more 
opportunities to enter sports television with many starting at assistant 
producer level. Promotion to producer can be faster but is often made 
within a limited terrain, for example working on a particular series or on a 
specific sport. For example, a junior assistant producer may find 
opportunities for progression within, say, Premier League Productions but, 
having progressed, might find it hard to transfer these skills to another 
sport. As Tunstall (1993:74) found, it is generally difficult for sports 
producers to export their skillset to other genres outside sport – in my 
experience this remains the case.  
 
When television industry practices, including implementing short term 
contracts for production staff (including project-specific contracts), are 
aligned to a tendency towards annual programming commissions (even 
when rights are held for longer periods by broadcasters, annual production 
contracts are still often preferred) then the appearance of tram lines that 
can dictate career development is hardly a surprise. Increased demand for 
content is frequently offset by the constant pressure to reduce costs, 
including overheads and production fees, so with tighter production 
conditions this, again, reinforces the tendency to opt for more defined roles 
and appointing people with a reputation for delivering; for replication rather 
than innovation. 
Milne | June 2014 
 
320 
For some sports there are circumstantial reasons for specialisation, as the 
senior managers and producers interviewed in 2012 and 2013 confirmed. 
For example, a senior director with direct experience points out that 
directing Formula 1 coverage requires control of 50 or more cameras across 
a race circuit, there are additional in-car camera feeds, a vast array of 
replay options plus streams of performance-related data to process and 
present. An executive producer with broadcaster experience adds multi-
sport coverage, as is the case with athletics, presents location and timing 
issues as events happen concurrently across the venue (the ability to juggle 
EVS clips to give the impression of a constant flow of action and to offer 
some sort of narrative form is a specialised skill). A specialist golf executive 
producer interviewed in 2012 confirmed that a similar technique is used 
where the broadcast action is usually a constantly updated flow of short 
clips from EVS. Sports including golf and world rally also require cameras to 
be rapidly relocated from one position to another to capture the action – 
this is another type of specialised directing that places a greater emphasis 
on logistics to provide effective coverage. For sports like football, rugby, 
cricket and tennis, producers and directors stressed the need to capture the 
rhythm and pace of each match, with replays and statistics added to assist 
commentary. Another senior producer pointed out that American sports, 
with their frequent breaks, offer further challenges that are met by 
deploying EVS and introducing a delay of up to 3 minutes from the incoming 
live feed to the outgoing broadcast presentation. Reading interviews with 
managers, producers and directors, overall there was a strong feeling that 
specialisation was a significant factor. 
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Speaking to producers and directors who are over 45 years old their 
experiences are remarkably similar, many see themselves as “the last of a 
dying breed” of multisport producers. For most of these producers their 
early experience was gained at a traditional broadcaster, like the BBC in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s where they worked on numerous sports. The 
managing director of a major independent sports production company 
echoed the senior manager that had worked on 42 different sports: 
 
There	  won’t	  be	  any	  one	  else	  like	  me	  in	  the	  future,	  someone	  who	  has	  worked	  on	  everything.	  
In	  every	  field,	  new	  projects	  [now]	  require	  specialists.	  (Managing	  director,	  independent	  
sports	  production,	  2012)	  
 
Whilst all the contributors interviewed felt sports production had entered an 
era of specialisation, there was less clarity about when this changed. In the 
1990s and into the early 2000s, and here, as a participant-observer, I refer 
to successful production service tenders I wrote for NBA (Channel Four and 
ITV), Rugby Special (BBC), Formula 1 (ITV) and World Rally Championships 
(Federation-based production) I can confirm it was still possible to offer “a 
fresh pair of eyes” when designing coverage of sport for a broadcaster or 
even a federation. But, from around 2005 the scope for different ideas and 
new approaches appears to have narrowed significantly. In part this is due 
to the rapid extension of Olympic Broadcasting Services and Host Broadcast 
Services, plus the expanded output of league-based operations like Premier 
League Productions; these commissioners prefer to use production 
specialists.  
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Broadcasters increasingly prefer production experts who know the unwritten 
rules when covering specific sports and that will not cause embarrassment 
with the league or federation from which the broadcaster has bought the 
rights. In the case of Channel Four horse racing, in 2012 IMG hired an 
executive producer from BBC Sport to deliver this expertise. With producers 
and directors providing the same expertise for different broadcasters then 
differences are likely to diminish further. Considering other reasons that 
could be driving specialisation, a senior series producer adds a useful 
perspective: 
 
There	  are	  so	  many	  new	  channels	  to	  fill.	  Before	  this	  [changed],	  you	  would	  work	  on	  6	  or	  7	  
sports	  in	  a	  year.	  But	  there	  is	  so	  much	  sport	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  filled	  you	  have	  to	  specialise	  in	  
football,	  cricket,	  golf,	  snooker,	  darts	  and	  so	  on.	  Producers	  concentrate	  on	  that	  one	  sport	  to	  
the	  exclusion	  of	  everything	  else.	  The	  transformation	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  sport	  broadcast	  is	  
responsible	  for	  specialisation.	  (Senior	  series	  producer,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  
2012)	  
	  
This straightforward view has its merits, a full-service football channel 
broadcasting 24 hours a day 7 days a week will promote specialisation in 
football. But linking key producers and directors to coverage of specific 
sports is not new. Since the late 1980s, as independent sports production 
companies responded to production tenders, it was common practice to 
name individual senior producers or directors in the production contract for 
the duration of the series. Broadcasters were the first to do this but 
federations, too, became increasingly aware of the value specific producers 
and directors could add to their coverage. For example, ITV’s Mike Watts 
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was a favourite director of UEFA on Champions League coverage. As noted, 
Karl Hicks specialised in horse racing at the BBC and brought this 
experience via IMG Sports Media to Channel Four when, in 2012, the 
broadcaster acquired the rights to all significant racing in the UK. For many 
years Keith MacMillan was known for Formula 1 coverage at the BBC, when 
coverage moved to ITV in the mid-1990s MacMillan, now freelance, took 
charge of directing the British Grand Prix. Occasionally a director who has 
gained recognition in covering one sport, say Martin Turner who developed 
rugby union coverage at Sky Sports, will be used to help secure another 
contract, as was the case when Sky Sports acquired the majority of rights 
to broadcast Formula 1. From the mid-1990s federations were becoming 
more aware and more influential about which producers and directors would 
be acceptable to take charge of coverage.  
 
What is new today is the intense pressure to specialise exerted by 
broadcasters and federations. As noted, for any tender response specialist 
knowledge is essential – “Independents have to pitch with experts 
otherwise you won’t get in”, confirmed a senior executive producer 
speaking in 2013. This pressure is not exclusive to broadcasters: as a 
participant-observer I recall how the NBA tried to influence Channel Four in 
the choice of a sympathetic producer when Channel Four renewed its 
broadcasting rights for the NBA in the mid-1990s116. And, in late 2013, 
when IMG Sports Media appointed a new executive producer to run Premier 
League Productions it is reasonable to assume that approval from the 
Premier League was sought. 
                                           
116 Having been wary of the initial editorial tone and choice of talent the NBA later adopted 
many of these techniques and hired several of the talent for their own productions – field 
notes as a participant-observer. 
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There is one further trend towards specialism that has had a direct influence 
on the day-to-day work of sports producers and directors, the rise of the 
production management department. 
 
8.5 The rise of production management 
Since the mid-1990s a new specialisation has emerged that mirrors the 
increasingly business-oriented aspects of television sports production: 
production management. A senior manager from a leading independent 
sports producer with a broadcaster background explains: 
 
Production	  managers	  and	  directors	  of	  production	  are	  very	  much	  an	  independent	  sports	  
production	  thing.	  There	  were	  no	  such	  roles	  at	  the	  BBC,	  even	  now	  [there	  aren’t	  any].	  When	  
independent	  sports	  production	  companies	  started	  they	  probably	  had	  producers	  who	  didn’t	  
have	  the	  experience	  of	  budgets	  that	  broadcasters	  had.	  (Senior	  manager,	  independent	  
sports	  production,	  2013)	  
 
My own experience as a participant-observer is that independent producers 
can deliver accurate budgets. Whilst not adopted at the BBC, production 
managers were used in ITV sports departments from the early 1990s, with 
some then moving into independent production. But the most interesting 
link is between rise of production management and the increasing centrality 
of contracts, IP rights and the attachment of financial value to all stages of 
the television sports production chain as the sector has become more 
business-oriented.  
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Collating my experience working at several different independent producers, 
a typical pyramid structure in a production management department 
includes a director of production and several heads of production that 
oversee groups of productions. Roles usually assigned to a primary 
production include production executives, production managers, production 
co-ordinators and production secretaries. Among key responsibilities are: 
project budgeting, cost reporting (reconciling forecast budgets with actual 
spending), insurance, risk assessment, health and safety, scheduling (from 
travel and crewing to post production facilities), delivery, and all contract 
management (including engaging and paying freelance staff, plus the 
acquisition of any third party material and music usage reports). Issues to 
do with production quotas and Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) may also 
arise but would involve liaison with senior managers and specialist lawyers. 
Whilst not a legal or business role per se, the striking growth in production 
management appears to reflect the ways in which previously informal 
relationships have come to be increasingly expressed through contracts and 
how financial values have become the determining factors of many more 
activities (Harvey, 2005). For example, the relatively simple task of 
acquiring a release form117 from a contributor has become more complex 
due to (a) the increasingly legal expressions used, (b) the extent of the 
rights sought (often for all media in perpetuity) and (c) the token 
compensation offered for these rights by the production company (a fee of 
£1 is required to validate the agreement). This has made the process more 
complicated and invites interrogation from contributors’ agents who are 
                                           
117 All contributors should sign a consent/release form before interviews can be used in a 
programme. As independent sports production companies generally try to avoid payments 
for contributions this sets up a potential conflict. 
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likely to attach a much higher value to the contribution as they anticipate it 
will be recycled (and monetised) in numerous alternative forms.  
 
In contrast to the group of special advisors to leagues and federations 
dominated by men (see chapter 7), women fulfil the majority of roles in 
production management. At IMG Sports Media - apart from the director of 
production and a single head of production - the department (including 5 
further heads of production and numerous production managers and co-
ordinators) features female staff. There are almost no female producers. 
 
Another revealing division can be seen in the terms used to engage staff. 
Whilst the majority of production managers are offered staff contracts118 
within the independent sports production sector the trend is towards issuing 
short-term contracts to all producers, directors and assistant producers. 
Speaking in 2013 IMG’s director of production confirmed the company was 
“moving towards a contract-based” policy with contracts tied to specific 
productions. This ensures full recovery of all costs particularly salaries (for 
example, by limiting engagement to a single season of UEFA Champions 
League magazine shows, including a mid-season 2 month unpaid break).  
Once the over-arching production contract expires (i.e., the contract 
between the commissioner and the independent sports production 
company) the expectation is that production staff will be released unless 
other projects are available. With senior production managers on staff 
terms and producers, directors and assistant producers increasingly 
                                           
118 The likelihood of receiving a staff contract increases with the seniority of the position, 
particularly from production manager and above. 
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employed on short-term project-specific contracts, whether intentional or 
not a divisive power imbalance exists. 
 
As production management has extended its influence in television sports 
production, many of the duties once carried out by senior and executive 
producers – for example budgeting - have been curtailed, with producers 
now encouraged to focus on creative and editorial input rather than 
contracts and costs. One executive producer in charge of a prominent 
weekly magazine show at an independent sports production company 
speaking in 2012 confirmed he “had no idea about the programme budget”. 
“I don’t pay much attention to that”, he added119. In addition to gaps in 
information, a senior executive producer now working in independent sports 
production explains some tensions in play: 
 
I	  was	  used	  to	  a	  team	  including	  a	  producer,	  a	  production	  assistant	  and	  a	  technical	  manager.	  
That’s	  it.	  The	  production	  manager	  role	  was	  new	  to	  me;	  I’m	  still	  not	  100%	  clear	  what	  his	  or	  
her	  role	  is.	  At	  first	  it	  seems	  more	  financial,	  but	  then	  they’ll	  get	  involved	  in	  booking	  a	  
satellite…	  Heads	  of	  Production	  definitely	  try	  it	  on	  with	  younger	  producers	  because	  they	  
can,	  but	  not	  with	  old	  and	  haggard	  producers	  like	  me.	  (Senior	  executive	  producer,	  
independent	  sports	  production,	  2013)	  
	  
Many producers interviewed confided they were happy to work with 
production managers, but most found the role of head of production more 
vexing as questions of authority arose – who is in charge? In 2011 I was 
executive producer of a new series of documentaries made by IMG Sports 
                                           
119 As participant-observer I was aware the budget was running over and was causing 
serious alarm at the company. 
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Media for Trace Sports. Formally introducing the IMG team to the client it 
was made clear, by the director of production, that the team leader was the 
head of production. The head of production was staff, the executive 
producer role on short-term contract. Examples like this signal the central 
importance of contracts and compliance in day-to-day production matters. 
 
Among the younger producers interviewed, many viewed production 
management as acting as some sort of internal policing, constraining 
programme spending, enforcing compliance and various contractual 
activities, ranging from the use of third-party footage and music to risk 
assessments and insurance reports.  
 
The tension continues as production managers frequently view producers as 
being undisciplined or lacking motivation when it comes to meeting 
assigned budgets and carrying out necessary administrative duties, 
including providing signed consent forms, clearing third party content and 
declaring music usage in completed programmes. As one senior production 
executive confirmed: 
 
I	  am	  sick	  of	  playing	  the	  bad	  cop,	  chasing	  up	  clearances	  and	  contributor	  release	  forms	  that	  
producers	  can’t	  be	  bothered	  to	  get	  signed	  when	  they	  are	  shooting,	  but	  know	  they	  should	  
have	  done.	  We	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  let	  them	  [producers]	  know	  exactly	  what	  they	  need	  to	  
do,	  but	  when	  they	  don’t	  even	  bother	  to	  read	  the	  guidelines	  they	  are	  given	  it	  becomes	  very	  
frustrating.	  (Senior	  production	  executive,	  independent	  sports	  production,	  2012)	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These comments, made by a respected production executive at a leading 
independent sports production company, represent a typical response. Many 
production managers working in sport revealed they felt undervalued by the 
producers they work with and some felt undervalued by the company. The 
split between editorial and operational management is an important trend 
that, intentionally or not, sees producers and directors being led away from 
the business-side of production. As they also see opportunities for creative 
input reduced - particularly in respect of league and federation run 
productions - then friction cannot come as a surprise. In some respects this 
situation can be regarded a consequence of the rapid expansion of the 
downstream content provision market and the financialisation of 
independent sports production activities. 
 
Regulations and approvals 
Briefly returning to media regulation, regional production quotas and 
Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE), it is reasonable to conclude that company 
managers, heads of production and executive producers have primary 
interaction with these areas (see chapter 6), with most producers happy to 
keep such matters at arms length. However, the rise of health and safety 
and third party liability usually has a more direct impact on production. An 
experienced director working on live international productions explains the 
changes he has noticed: 
	  
Health	  and	  safety	  is	  the	  biggest	  element	  in	  live	  production.	  Cables	  laid	  near	  athletes	  or	  the	  
public	  and	  working	  at	  heights	  are	  a	  no	  go	  compared	  to	  15	  years	  ago.	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  
preparation	  –	  and	  health	  and	  safety	  in	  place	  –	  to	  get	  Bob	  up	  on	  a	  wall	  so	  you	  can	  get	  your	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nice	  wide	  shot.	  But,	  increasingly,	  there	  are	  also	  cultural	  considerations.	  For	  example,	  how	  
women	  are	  expected	  to	  dress	  when	  working	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  (Live	  international	  sports	  
director,	  2012)	  
	  
Sports television is not the only industry to see health and safety 
management spread. In any case, as the scale of outside broadcast and 
major event coverage has increased markedly they have attracted more 
scrutiny. Most independent sports production companies run health and 
safety courses that require staff to update their understanding on a regular 
basis. However, issues to do with conduct and security are relatively new 
developments. A film about the Anzi Makhachkala football team based in 
Dagestan (an unstable federal republic of Russia located in the North 
Caucasus by the Caspian Sea) that I supervised for IMG in 2011 required a 
detailed specialist security report to be carried out and recommendations 
for safety set out before the production could proceed. Similar conditions 
apply for sports events held on remote or in potentially dangerous locations, 
this include the last two World Cup Finals in South Africa and Brazil. 
 
Discussing the changing demands of the role prompted contributing 
producers to raise a further concern: the increasing layers of editorial 
approval now required, both internal and external, compared to 15 years 
ago. 
 
Whether it is (a) a broadcaster’s commissioning executives, genre heads 
and channel controller, (b) intervention directly from leagues or sponsors, 
or (c) production manuals prepared by federations, the perception is there 
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are far more steps spanning a wider range of editorial decisions. To some 
extent this may be a hangover as sports producers adjust to the reality of 
working for different clients (rather than the audience) and that, in the 
past, they had enjoyed significant freedom during live broadcasts where 
direct intervention is less practical. Further levels of supervision also reflect 
the increased importance of sports content to rights holding broadcasters. 
 
Two examples from Channel Four illustrate the extent of change. In 1998 I 
produced the first series of Sumo. Although none of the content had been 
viewed, Channel Four arranged a large press/publicity screening. Just 
before the screening began, Adrian Metcalf, the commissioning editor, 
quietly called me over: “Mike, the programmes are okay, aren’t they?” 
Fortunately they were well received. Spooling forward to 2012, as noted 
above and as relayed in 2013 by a senior producer who was present 
throughout, Channel Four convened a press conference to announce the line 
up of presenters for their 2012 Paralympic coverage. The commissioning 
editor and production teams had worked for some time to compile these 
teams, including screen testing them on various Channel Four programmes. 
Following the press launch Channel Four’s chief creative officer, Jay Hunt, 
unilaterally decided to make wholesale changes to the line-ups. This case 
illustrates the underlying importance of sports presentation to a channel, 
plus how an increase in the number of editorial decision makers in the 









Chapter 8 addressed the second part of the third research question: how do 
upstream pre-production processes impact on independent sports television 
production, from company-level activities to the shop floor and the day-to-
day work of sports producers and directors? The chapter added a micro-
level view to the supply side oriented perspective provided throughout this 
research. The chapter also fills a gap in the literature describing 
contemporary television sport production. Reasons why transformations in 
television sports production discussed in part two have not resulted in a 
creative heyday for sports producers and directors were examined. Instead, 
it was noted that inhibition and prescription have become recurring themes 
in television sports production.  
 
The chapter opened with an introduction to the UK independent sports 
production sector. Independent sport production companies face several 
significant challenges: 1) they do not usually hold any sports broadcasting 
rights, 2) they do not have direct access to audiences, 3) operations are 
usually on a small scale, 4) companies are increasingly controlled by private 
equity firms or are part of larger independent media groups, and 5) the 
cyclical nature of sports rights means winning competitive tenders for 
production services is a vital and costly activity.  
 
The commissioning process for independent sports production services was 
reviewed. As they seldom hold rights (even secondary rights) independent 
sports production companies sell their production services at costs plus a 
percentage fee primarily to broadcasters but, increasingly, directly to 
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leagues and federations as these organisations extend their own production 
operations. The different demands made by content commissioners were 
discussed. In important ways these demands can be considered just as 
influential as technology in shaping the final output we see. 
 
A number of factors, including a substantial increase in demand for content 
and the prominence of live sports broadcasting (with its increased technical 
and logistical complexity), when added to the limited scope of output 
offered by most independent sports production companies has created 
considerable pressure to specialise in the sports that they cover. The 
question of whether replication had become more important than originality 
was raised. The tension experienced between (a) providing a more 
standardised international coverage for federations or (b) more localised 
presentation for broadcasters was discussed. It was argued that the 
introduction of standardised and approved coverage by federations is a new 
kind of content  - a new media-sports product - and another important step 
in the commodification of television sport. As sports television is 
increasingly assimilated within the growing marketisation and promotional 
culture of sport, independent sports production companies, producers and 
directors have to play by the rules, or not play at all. This condition is one 
of the most fundamental changes to television sport production in the past 
decade.  
 
The chapter concluded by identifying further specialisation in television 
sports production: the emergence of production management. Marked 
divisions between editorial and operational management in downstream 
content provision were discussed including the tensions felt on both sides, 
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by producers and production managers. The tendency for senior production 
management roles to benefit from staff positions, whilst producers and 
directors are increasingly engaged on short-term project-specific contracts 
was identified and a further power shift away from producers was noted. 
How increasing layers of approval that producers are required to navigate 
through was provided in 2 examples from Channel Four. Overall, sports 
producers said they felt their role was diminishing.  
 
Throughout this research it has been argued that the activities of sports 
federations and leagues need to be more fully accounted for within a 
political economy perspective of television sport. Having reviewed upstream 
activities in part two, chapter 7 identified several additional ways that 
league and federation activities have a direct impact on the downstream 
supply side.  
 
Chapter 9 provides the conclusion to part three and to the research as a 
whole. 
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Despite its prominence and popularity among viewers, television sport 
remains an under-researched area in media studies and is a subject that 
lacks a ready-made theoretical context. Although this presented a 
challenge, a number of important themes recurred in the literature, 
including ideas about value, commodification, transformations, power-
relationships and the emergence of a profit-motivated sport-media-
corporate axis. As a result, an adjusted political economy approach was 
adopted to answer 3 primary questions: 
1) Whilst sports and broadcasting systems in the US and UK started 
from diametrically opposed positions post-World War II, why have 
the similarities between them, including the adoption of a more 
overtly consumer-oriented approach in the UK, become the most 
noticeable features? 
2) How do three often unseen upstream pre-production processes – 
technology, broadcasting rights and regulation - increasingly 
influence what television sport looks and sounds like, where it can be 
seen and who can see it?  
3) How are upstream pre-production processes manifest downstream 
on the supply side in terms of (a) broadcasters (including who 
provides sports media) and (b) independent sports television 
production, including the day-to-day work of sports producers and 
directors?   
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The adjustments to a political economy interpretation involved identifying 
what, in my view, are two critical perspectives currently missing from 
discussion: 1) the central role of sports federations, ranging from the 
“peculiar economics of sport” (Neale, 1964) through to federation run host 
broadcast operations for major events; and, 2) a relevant micro-level 
analysis of downstream supply-side activities following the trickle down 
effect of significant upstream transformations. This new perspective 
complements the big picture often presented by political economists. It was 
argued that important transformations in technology, broadcasting rights 
and regulation have radically changed the television sport landscape in the 
UK. How these factors have evolved and how they combine goes a long way 
to explain (a) what sport we see on television, (b) where we can see it and 
(c) what the final output looks and sounds like. The sheer extent of these 
transformations was also illustrated. 
 
The battle to control broadcasting rights and subsequent television output 
was set against the increasing commercialisation of sport and the 
marketisation of broadcasting. Given the scale and speed of 
transformations, many of the outcomes have not yet been researched, for 
example:  
a) The expansion of federation-based activities. This now includes host 
broadcast production (providing sympathetic coverage for global 
audiences) and branded-content channels with extensive 
international distribution networks. 
b) A general increase in detailed production prescriptions provided to 
rights-holding broadcasters as a key part of broadcasting rights 
agreements. 
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c) When international coverage from major sports events is provided by 
the organising federations how broadcasters increasingly concentrate 
on presentation (as approved global feeds are localised and branded 
by broadcasters for their domestic audience). In addition to 
presentation style, additional services (like red-button options or 
online channels) are used to provide a further point of difference 
from other broadcasters. 
d) How independent sports production companies, including individual 
producers and directors, increasingly offer specialised production 
services.  
e) The ultimate requirement: that all sports production companies, 
producers and directors play by the rules or don’t play at all. 
 
The arrival of digital technology in the mid-1990s accelerated and 
intensified these processes. Mason (1999:403) argues that sport has 
commodified as it has become increasingly bound up in the processes of 
economic production and distribution. Looking at sport as a media product, 
it can be argued that intellectual property rights have been used to “inhibit 
rather than encourage creation and creativity” (Haynes, 2005:10) and, 
overall, there is a “danger based on the quiet accretion of restrictions” 
(Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002:4). Seen against the rising tide of wider 
neoliberal values, where the neoliberal project involving the “financialisation 
of everything” (Harvey, 2005:33) and “accumulation through dispossession” 
(Harvey, 2005:159) is apparent, then commercial values and the market 
are the driving forces in the digital era of television sport.  
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Summarising this research, part one provided a back-story missing from the 
literature, as the development of sport and television in the US and UK 
between 1945 and 1995 was compared. Despite starting from virtually 
opposite positions post World War II, and as “the rule of amateurs kept 
capitalism at bay in British sport” (Holt, 1989:281), sport was poised 
between an idealised past and a commercialised free-market future. This 
proved to be a mismatch. As sport disengaged from the wider social and 
cultural meanings that had kept it firmly anchored, in the race between 
money and meaning there was only ever likely to be one winner. When the 
tide turned, in the 1980s, it did so quickly and sport and television became 
realigned along commercial and consumer-oriented structures more 
typically seen in the US.  Today, the Premier League demonstrates 
unprecedented levels of corporate organisation and profit-driven motivation, 
even surpassing some of the activities of the NFL, a league that had set the 
benchmark for commercial activity for more than 3 decades. The undertow 
of part one was how a trinity of technological, economic, and political forces 
began to combine in various ways to create a world where what is good for 
business is considered to be good for us all (Harvey, 2005:117).  
 
Understanding the shift in market power, from the broadcasters 
(downstream) that bought rights to the sellers (upstream), requires 
engaging with league and federation behaviour. Changes can be mapped in 
7 important developments. 
 
1) The NFL was the first professional sports league to understand the 
importance of (a) the collective sale of sports broadcasting rights 
(cartel behaviour), (b) providing league-wide sporting equilibrium 
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(competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome) and (c) exercising 
its market power to collect this value. This took the form of rationing 
broadcasting rights that, in turn, created scarcity. As there was no 
effective substitute for the NFL it became a seller’s market. The price 
of NFL rights rose steadily from the 1970s.  
2) The next step came in the late 1980s when the NBA overtly allied its 
sport media product to entertainment values and celebrity 
endorsements that, together, helped to create (a) a global NBA 
brand that was exported worldwide, and (b) to propel the 
increasingly commercial culture of modern sport into the 
mainstream.  
3) The formalisation of global corporate sponsorship as a viable 
alternative to advertising in the 1980s was another critical 
development that had a profound impact on the growth of global 
sports events, including the Olympics and the World Cup Finals. The 
amalgamation of sport, television and corporate interests into a 
single package was commercially successful and, from the landmark 
1984 Los Angeles Games, the IOC moved forward on a more 
aggressively commercial basis as it sought ways to deliver a 
television product that was entirely sympathetic to the requirements 
of its preferred sponsors (The Olympic Programme, TOP). Similarly, 
FIFA increased its revenues from advertising, sponsorship and 
broadcasting rights from the early 1980s, with the biggest gains 
coming from 1986 onwards.  
4) Marketing activities also changed federations’ view of audiences. In 
the 1980s and 1990s as it sold its broadcasting rights into more 
international markets, Formula 1 began to focus on global rather 
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then local audiences. F1 actively sought a consistent television 
output across an entire season, moving from race to race and 
country to country. Although Formula 1 could not make a 
commercial success of its own pay-TV coverage, it did begin to re-
define television-sport relationships, particularly where federations 
would play an increasingly significant role in identifying and 
delivering standardised coverage of their own events for global 
audiences. F1 was also at the vanguard of identifying increasingly 
specific conditions under which its events could be broadcast.  
5) Under acute commercial pressure from Europe’s leading clubs, the 
UEFA Champions League was launched in 1992. Working with TEAM 
Marketing AG, many of the lessons learned by the IOC, FIFA and 
Formula 1 were re-articulated. As a formal obligation, UEFA required 
all rights-holding broadcasters to comply with the prescriptions set 
out in its Production Manual. The UEFA Champions League 
Production Manual set a new benchmark when attaching conditions 
to sports broadcasting rights and imposing these requirements on 
broadcasters’ output. 
6) The creation of the Premier League in 1992 signaled the most 
rational approach to capital accumulation so far by any British sport.  
With its corporate structure and commercial autonomy, the Premier 
League is driven by an unambiguous profit motive. In some 
important ways it can be argued that the Premier League has 
become even more commercial and profit-driven than the NFL, both 
in terms of its structure, where members act as shareholders, and 
the revenues for broadcasting rights it has achieved globally. 
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7) The emergence, around 2005, of federation run host broadcast 
operations at major sports events is very significant. Approved and 
non-controversial coverage for global audiences was now delivered 
to all rights-holding broadcasters. 
 
Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, elite sport had come to matter a 
great deal to big business and to managers of increasingly commercial and 
global media industries. “Sports now stress the need to be business like and 
efficient, offer sites for the celebration of corporate capitalism… and, in 
general have become prime sites for the construction and reproduction of 
an entrepreneurial culture”, concluded Whannel (1992:208).  Boyle and 
Haynes (2000:222) added that sport, for the media industries, “offers a 
product, which can be transformed into a valuable commercial entity 
delivering readers, viewers, advertisers, customers and subscribers. Sport, 
it appears, is often only too happy to oblige as a willing victim in this 
process.” Following this trajectory, Falcous (2005) found that professional 
sport had become realigned with the interests of corporate investment and 
the managerial tenets of advertising, marketing and public relations. A new 
sport-media-corporate axis had emerged. 
 
Part two considered how a trinity of influential pre-production factors, 
technology, broadcasting rights (economics) and regulation (politics) have 
been instrumental in transforming television sport since the early 1990s. 
This is the first interpretation that considers both the interaction and 
collective impact of these factors on the development of television sport.  
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Chapter 4 focussed on technological transformations.  On the production-
side, the increasing prominence of live sports broadcasting, driven by the 
arrival of Sky Sports in 1992, was not based on new technology so much as 
on using more of the existing technology in new ways. Via encrypted 
satellite transmission, a solution to market failure was found by charging 
customers monthly subscriptions to access encoded signals, as popular 
sports became private goods, hidden from general access behind a pay wall. 
For Boyle and Haynes (2004:20), this marked the transformation of viewers 
from citizens to consumers. Aligned to an aggressive marketing strategy, 
the new Sky Sports style adopted several overtly US methods and 
continued Roone Arledge’s close up and personal philosophy. Rising to 
levels of importance found in the US, live sports broadcasting soon became 
the definitive form for television sport in the UK. 
 
Although transmission operations at broadcasting networks were among the 
first areas to adopt automated digital systems - utilising software and media 
server solutions capable of scheduling and transmitting multiple channels to 
numerous territories and time zones at the same time - the transition to a 
fully digital and tape-free workflow was not straightforward. In 2014, a lack 
of common standards remains problematic. By contrast, the arrival of digital 
production technology, new workflows and much faster ways of working, 
dovetailed perfectly into a reconfigured television sports environment; 
potential output was radically transformed. Whilst large volumes of media 
could be quickly transferred between locations, it was the capability to allow 
simultaneous access by numerous clients (users) to the same original 
material that was revolutionary. 2 important phases for technological 
transformation can be noted: (1) between 1994 and 2004 key non-linear 
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editing and tapeless media technology was rolled out; introduced to 
production workflows this technology enabled a greatly increased volume 
and scope of sports content to be produced much faster than ever before, 
and; (2) from 2004 onwards, how sports federations, including the Premier 
League, were able to harness the potential of new technology and digital 
workflows to produce, under their own control, a guaranteed standard for 
global output that was closely aligned to their own brand values. In this 
case it is not the technology itself, but who uses the technology and why 
that is most significant. The mid-2000s saw federations move the goalposts 
as they took charge of their own television coverage at major sports events. 
 
A new case study considered the Premier League’s production arm, Premier 
League Productions. Reviewing new workflows and massively increased 
output revealed how a single minute of live football action is transformed 
into 11 minutes of programming designed for worldwide consumption 
delivered via a dedicated channel offering 168 hours of Premier League 
content each week. Operating at an entirely new level of commodification, 
Premier League Production’s digital output represents a quantum leap from 
the BBC’s 1992 analogue-based Match of The Day operation.  
 
In contrast to fast moving developments in technology, including the 
capacity to create more content, more quickly for use on more platforms, 
any discussion of broadcasting rights tends to involve a rapid deceleration; 
rights are usually about what you cannot do as a broadcaster or producer. A 
great deal of commercial sensitivity, even secrecy, surrounds broadcasting 
rights. However, the way that broadcasting rights are issued, alongside 
increased competition from broadcasters to acquire the most popular rights, 
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has seen market power move upstream to the leagues and federations that 
collectively own the rights. A key contribution here is an examination of how 
prescriptive conditions are frequently added to broadcasting rights by 
league and federations, reinforcing their dominant position.  
   
Chapter 5 opened by reviewing the nature of intellectual property, including 
(a) how intellectual property knows no bounds (Haynes, 2005), (b) the 
often confusing idea/expression dichotomy and (c) the tendency of 
copyright to be defined by market-driven principles that demarcate who 
owns what. Without a homogenised approach to international copyright, 
individual states sanction and regulate intellectual property rights. The 
utilitarian, market-driven principles of copyright (and how they are 
interpreted by contemporary global media companies) have increasingly 
become the de facto understanding of how media rights are valued, 
organised and distributed. In terms of sports broadcasting rights in the UK, 
values began to escalate from the late 1980s. Using the Premier League as 
an example, factors that shape value were explained and the different ways 
that rights are broken down (by range, distribution platform, broadcast 
territory and period of license) were discussed, including the revenues 
achieved for Premier League broadcasting rights. As the cost of sports 
broadcasting rights escalate, a corresponding increase in the risks 
associated with acquiring such rights was identified, including the 
consequences of over valuing or losing important rights. The rising tide of 
commercialism in UK sport provided the backdrop for increasingly intense 
battles to acquire the most appealing sports broadcasting rights.  
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However, among concerns raised in the application of intellectual property 
rights is what Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) describe as a “quiet accretion 
of restrictions”, or what Harvey (2005:159) has, in more general terms, 
called  “accumulation though dispossession”.  For television sport, these are 
largely unseen activities manifest in an increasing number of prescriptions 
that are now applied to production. How leagues and federations have 
exercised their market power through typical prescriptions was illustrated 
with two case studies from Formula 1 and the UEFA Champions League, 
with its extensive Production Manual.  
 
The third pre-production factor that influences what sport we can see on 
television, including who makes the final programmes we see, is regulation. 
If broadcasting rights can be considered to follow one cycle (typically 3 
years) behind developments in technology, then regulators and competition 
authorities in the EU and UK can be seen to follow a further step behind. For 
Boyle and Haynes (2004:52) “a re-regulation of broadcasting is taking place 
within a more commercial and market-driven frame of reference”.  
 
Attitudes towards regulation differ in the US, UK and Europe. For 
Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006) sport in the US is seen as a commodity 
that can be redesigned as required, whereas in Europe sport is considered 
part of the cultural heritage – sport cannot be reduced to an audience-
generating mechanism alone. Following deregulation in the UK, market 
forces increasingly determined broadcasting markets.  
 
For sports broadcasting rights, intervention involves (a) listed events 
legislation (first adopted in the UK in 1954 and later championed by the EC 
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from 1996) and, as Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013) note, (b) the 
application of competition law to correct market failure and address the 
market power of dominant pay-TV broadcasters. It was EC intervention that 
finally ended BSkyB’s monopoly hold on exclusive Premier League 
broadcasting rights in 2005. However, as a result there was a significant 
escalation in rights fees paid to the Premier League. The cost to consumers 
who wanted to watch Premier League football also increased. These were 
probably not the outcomes initially sought by intervention. Lying outside the 
protected list of events the activities of the Premier league and UEFA have 
attracted considerable scrutiny; questions about the ultimate usefulness of 
the outcomes were raised.  
 
Even within literature on regulation and competition, the picture remains 
frustratingly incomplete. From the programme supply side there are further 
dimensions that should be considered, including: (1) significant areas 
apparently not covered by regulators and competition authorities (including 
the extended activities of leagues and federations as they provide coverage 
for major sporting events, or run their own international channels) and, (2) 
the effects of regulation that impacts directly on production, following (a) 
the regulation of content, (b) regional and independent production quotas 
and (c) recent EU employment legislation such as Transfer of Undertakings 
(TUPE) – these issues were described by contributing experts as having a 
“massive impact” on independent sports production. These were discussed 
in chapter 6. 
 
Two examples from the US were considered relevant in finding a solution. 
The US leagues have adopted several voluntary forms of self-regulation and, 
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whilst this is not the case in the UK, this may be a useful are to explore in 
the future, particularly as UEFA introduced Financial Fair Play rules for the 
2013-14 season.  Even without a list of protected events, the US Major 
Leagues have not migrated to pay-TV but, instead, have maintained a 
strong presence on the 4 commercial free-to-air networks. Although the US 
market is much larger than the UK and the ownership of rights to all 4 
major leagues by any one broadcaster is, for cost reasons alone, highly 
unlikely, in general terms Evens, Iosifidis and Smith (2013:228) conclude 
the increased exposure and higher audience ratings via free-to-air television 
in the US example can serve the interest of teams, leagues, broadcasters, 
advertisers, sponsors and viewers alike.  
 
It was concluded that there were some troubling gaps between the 
potentially valuable underlying intentions of intervention and the practical 
outcomes it delivered. As Boyle and Haynes (2004:165) put it: “regulators 
strive to keep pace with a digital mediascape which threatens to perpetually 
run ahead of regulatory frameworks”. As moves by federations to take 
control of their own host broadcast coverage, and leagues to distribute their 
own global content, could leave regulators even further adrift, it was argued 
there was a need for new ways of thinking about regulation, including 
looking at (a) the solutions adopted by the US leagues and (b) how leagues 
and federations might consider the example set by the German Bundesliga, 
where the game is considered to be a public good and where football, not 
the exclusive pursuit of financial revenues, remains at the heart of all club 
activities.  
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Part three addressed a further gap in the literature by providing a micro-
level analysis of the contemporary programme supply-side, including 
important challenges faced by broadcasters and independent sports 
production as the effects of transformations in technology, broadcasting 
rights and regulation trickle down to the television sport workplace. For 
broadcasters the challenges include: (a) the increasingly close relationship 
between sports broadcasting rights ownership and the commercial 
performance of large media firms (for example BT Sport and BSkyB), (b) 
the consequences of federation-based host broadcast coverage for major 
events and how, (c) this has created a division between event coverage 
designed for global audiences and presentation for local audiences 
increasingly offered by broadcasters. Additionally, (d) how increased 
demand for sports content has failed to deliver any meaningful critical 
comment was noted; for Boyle and Haynes (2000:107) television knows 
“that it must not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”. 
 
In an oligopolistic market structure, changes in sports broadcasting rights 
ownership directly impact on the economic performance of competing 
companies; the growing significance of corporate performance suggests the 
way in which sports broadcasting rights are valued is becoming more 
complex. As the escalation in prices paid for sports broadcasting rights 
show no sign of slowing, the possibility of encountering winners curse 
increases; of bidding too much for rights. The expanding portfolio of 
international sports rights acquired by Al Jazeera (also trading as beIN) was 
noted by several expert contributors. An interesting scenario could play out 
if, sensing a commercial opportunity, a very large company like Google or 
Microsoft were to enter the market for broadcasting rights and potentially 
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change the viewing paradigm, this view concurs with Evens, Iosifidis and 
Smith (2013).  
 
The emergence of federation-based host production operations is one of the 
most significant recent developments in television sport, as it changes the 
rules of engagement with broadcasters and producers – in a sense an 
intermediary level of production has been removed. The IOC, FIFA and 
UEFA now seek control of every aspect of production as they provide a 
dependable and sympathetic international feed of coverage to all rights 
holding broadcasters. In doing so, the line between what is best for 
advertisers/sponsors and broadcasters becomes increasingly blurred. 
Gruneau and Cantelon (1988:347) note how the Olympics have become a 
market-oriented project where “a more fully developed expression of 
incorporation of sporting practice into the ever-expanding marketplace of 
international capitalism is now manifested”. It is argued that federation-
based production is a critical new phase in television sports production, one 
that illustrates the continuing migration of power upstream to the leagues 
and federations.  
 
As broadcasters respond to federation-based host broadcast operations that 
deliver approved coverage, and with increased amounts of coverage bought 
in from other broadcasters to fill expanding television sports schedules, 
then the importance of presentation as a distinct aspect of production 
activity has increased significantly in the past decade. Whilst the BBC is 
frequently beaten in commercial competition to acquire sports broadcasting 
rights, the corporation, in 2014, still has access to the Olympics, World Cup 
Finals and Euro Championships. However, coverage of major international 
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sports events are now provided by the federations via their own host 
broadcast operations. This has released the BBC to concentrate its efforts 
and resources on the presentation of major events. Presentation is the 
shoulder programming that wraps around the provided international 
coverage and that, importantly, the BBC localises for UK viewers. 
Presentation is also a means to differentiate broadcast output and to build a 
recognisable brand identity. The BBC has retained a plausible position as 
the broadcaster that can deliver a shared viewing experience for large 
numbers of British viewers. Presentation is one of the remaining areas 
where broadcasters still retain substantial control, so is of particular 
interest.  
 
Why transformations in television sport did not provide a foundation for a 
creative heyday for sports producers and directors but has, it was argued, 
“inhibited innovation and creativity” (Haynes, 2005:10) was addressed in 
chapter 8 and the day-to-day work of independent sports production 
companies. 
 
Independent sports production companies face several unique challenges: 
1) they do not hold sports broadcasting rights, 2) they do not have direct 
access to audiences, 3) operation is often on a relatively small scale, 4) 
companies are increasingly controlled by private equity firms seeking short-
term returns, or are part of larger independent media groups, and 5) the 
cyclical nature of sports rights means that winning competition tenders to 
provide production services is a critical concern. Given their already limited 
scope, these factors encourage independent sports production companies to 
specialise. 
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Unlike other areas of independent production, sports production companies 
tend not to hold even secondary rights so they sell their services at costs 
plus a percentage production fee. Their primary customers are broadcasters 
but, increasingly, leagues and federations also seek short-term production 
expertise to support their host broadcast operations. The different demands 
of federations (reaching a global audience, non-controversial output, often 
very prescriptive) and broadcasters (local audiences, increasingly focussed 
on presentation rather than coverage, occasionally more creative) are 
significant and, in several important ways, these demands are extremely 
influential in shaping the final output.  
 
A number of other factors, including (a) substantial increase in demand for 
sports content and (b) the prominence of live sports broadcasting (including 
technical complexity and logistics) when added to (c) the limited scope of 
output usually offered by independent sports production companies, 
generates further specialisation. In these circumstances questions include 
whether replication is now more important than originality in television 
sports. As sports television is increasingly assimilated within the growing 
marketisation and promotional culture of sport, it was argued that 
broadcasters, independent sports production companies, producers and 
directors now have to play by the federations’ rules. This is one of the most 
fundamental and important changes to television sport in the past decade.  
 
Further evidence of specialisation is found in the emergence of production 
management. Over the past decade, as production managers have taken 
over many responsibilities previously held by producers, a marked division 
between editorial and operational management in television sports content 
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provision is evident. The tendency for senior production management roles 
to occupy a limited number of core staff positions at independent sports 
production companies, whilst producers and directors are increasingly 
engaged on short-term project-specific contracts indicates the role of sports 
producer is, in general terms, diminishing. Whether a result of adjusting to 
the needs of having more clients, the growing importance of sports rights to 
broadcasters or simply the centrality of broadcasters presentation strategy, 
virtually all producers interviewed noted they were required to navigate 
through more levels of supervision and approval than in the past. The 
universal message from sports producers and directors was that of 
increasing specialisation and prescription in their work, with less and less 
room afforded for creativity. Describing what it is like to work for a 
federation, memorably one producer said: “the difference is like living in a 
democracy and living in North Korea”. Even allowing for some exaggeration, 
the differences are not subtle. 
 
The paradox of television sports production 
Boyle and Haynes (2000:38) wrote: “a history of sport is often presented as 
a history of televising sport”. On the subject of television sport they add: 
“what is significant is the scale and the intensity that now exists within this 
relationship and the rapid pace of change which characterises the media 
and sporting industries” (2000:x, preface). 14 years later, the intensity and 
pace of change has accelerated to unprecedented levels as the leagues and 
federations that run sport have become increasingly powerful and ever 
more prescriptive.   
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Following the landmark 1990 Broadcasting Act, 1992 was a pivotal year in 
the transformation of television sport in the UK - BSkyB launched with live 
and exclusive coverage of the newly formed Premier League and the UEFA 
Champions League format was rolled out with its Production Manuals and 
embedded sponsorship model. The mid-2000s provided another critical 
turning point as new digital technology, intellectual property control and 
lack of applicable media regulations allowed leagues and federations to 
seize even more control of television sport through host-broadcast 
operations and providing their own brand-name sport channels for 
widespread international distribution. Tunstall (1993:72) was concerned 
that the prominence placed on technology and logistics in television sport 
could diminish the journalistic value of the content. In 2014, what 
journalistic value that does remain appears to have migrated from 
standardised international coverage designed for global audiences to the 
presentation offered by rights holding broadcasters as they repackage and 
brand events for local audiences. 
 
As a participant-observer who has worked through this entire period, 
television sport has entered a particularly paradoxical phase. On one hand 
the technical capacity and specialist production skills deployed in capturing 
and conveying elite sports performance on television, particularly in the UK, 
US and at major global events, can produce breath-taking coverage; 
incredibly detailed sequences and atmospheric audio that combine in 
unforgettable programmes showcasing a wide range of human performance, 
drama and emotion. At its best, television sport can be captivating, 
compelling and memorable. On the other hand, even the most outstanding 
coverage can quickly become one-dimensional as it seeks to avoid all 
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controversy and provide the most sympathetic and uncritical coverage on 
behalf of the host federation and its key sponsorship partners. Whilst there 
have been enormous increases in the volume of sports television coverage, 
including more scope than ever before, the overall gravitational pull is 
towards generating more and more standardised global television sport 
products. It has become the role of rights-holding broadcasters, should they 
be motivated to do so, to localise this coverage via presentation defined by 
their editorial approach, style and on-screen talent. Above all, this is an era 
where criticism of leagues and federations is not encouraged – with so 
much money invested in winning and retaining popular sports broadcasting 
rights, or in winning production service contracts, who dares to bite the 
hand that feeds?  
 
As Boyle and Haynes (2004:167) point out, sport has a remarkable ability 
to re-invent itself as new technology has come along. Similarly, the battle 
to control sport is not new, although, it is argued here, that the battle has 
entered a new and more intense phase where the leagues and federations 
have become even more dominant. Today’s extremely sophisticated 
television sports coverage, drawing on an unprecedented arsenal of digital 
technology, high-capacity workflows and battalions of ever-more specialised 
producers and directors, has one objective: to remain in thrall to sport. A 
political economy perspective asks if a working balance can be found 
between short-term gain and long-term wellbeing, between local and global 
priorities and, most of all, between making money and cultural/historical 
meaning? Until some checks and balances can be restored – and I have 
argued that these should come from the leagues and federations - then 
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contemporary television sport will be ever more closely aligned to elite 
sport’s wider global marketing objectives and profit targets.  
 
Since 1992 television sport in the UK has been totally transformed; the 
goalposts have moved and the rules have been changed. As it continues to 
attract mass audiences, there is little doubt that live coverage and 
subsequent presentation of elite sport sets new standards for scope and 
sophistication, for technical excellence. The appeal of television sport seems 
undiminished. However, in the same way that broadcasters are carried 
along on the bow wave of sport’s commercial rapacity, whether they like it 
or not, whether they admit it or not, today’s sports production companies, 
individual sport producers and directors are all part of this market-led 
momentum. The message is simple: you play by the new rules, or you don’t 
play at all.  
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